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3Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Im Rahmen dieser Dissertation wird gezeigt, dass Ma¨rkte, Industrien und
Technologien mit verknu¨pften Ertra¨gen sowie Upstream und Downstream
Verbindungen, im Vergleich mit diesbezu¨glich als isoliert zu betrachtenden
Ma¨rkten, Industrien und Technologien, einigen speziellen Dynamiken hin-
sichtlich der Wirtschaftsaktivita¨ten und Innovationsta¨tigkeiten unterliegen.
Den Schwerpunkt der Promotionsschrift bilden Spezialfa¨lle verknu¨pfter Mrk-
te, welche durch das Vorliegen von General Purpose Technologies (GPT, zu
Deutsch: Allzweck–Technologien) gepra¨gt werden. Bei GPTs handelt es sich
um Technologien, die sich durch eine weitreichende Durchdringungsfa¨higkeit
und Verbreitung, fortlaufende Weiterentwicklung und Verbesserung sowie
das Hervorbringen von komplementa¨ren Innovationen in verbundenen In-
dustrien, charakterisieren. GPTs stellen damit ‘Sonderfa¨lle’ auf dem Gebiet
des technologischen Wandels und der Innovationen dar und bilden, ob ihrer
Besonderheiten, einen der Schwerpunkte dieser Dissertation.
Etwas abstrakter formuliert, ko¨nnen GPTs als Upstream Ma¨rkte, die mit ei-
ner Vielzahl von Downstream Anwendungen verbunden sind, betrachtet wer-
den. Diese Eigenschaft macht sie zu einem zentralen Treiber o¨konomischen
und technologischen Wandels in verbundenen Ma¨rkten. Grund hierfu¨r ist,
dass die Verbindung zwischen GPTs, ihren Anwendungsgebieten und den
betreﬀenden Industrien, Einﬂuss auf die Entwicklung und Verbreitung tech-
nologischen Wandels sowie die wirtschaftliche Leistungsfa¨higkeit hat. Aus
diesem Grund ist Mehrzahl der Kapitel dieser Dissertation den Dynamiken,
welche Industrien und Innovationen inha¨rent sind, vor dem Hintergrund des
Einﬂusses von GPTs gewidmet.
Die Analyse im Rahmen dieser Dissertationsschrift reicht aber u¨ber die
volkswirtschaftliche Betrachtung von Ma¨rkten, die durch GPTs und deren
Anwendungsbereiche miteinander verknu¨pft sind, hinaus. In einigen Kapi-
teln werden die Untersuchungen auf Themen wie Marktselektion oder wirt-
schaftspolitische Intervention erweitert. Dabei stehen Sonderfa¨lle, und we-
niger Gesetzma¨igkeiten im Fokus. Verletzungen der Replikator–Dynamik —
erkennbar durch regressive Entwicklungen bezu¨glich der Marktselektion und
bestimmt durch Vorliegen von vertikalen Beziehungen — stellen ein Beispiel
solcher Irregularita¨ten dar. Diese werden zuna¨chst identiﬁziert und anschlies-
send in die Entwicklung einer allgemeingu¨ltigeren Theorie zum Wettbewerb,
im Sinne von Marktselektion und –Neu–Allokation, einbezogen. Ebenfalls in
diesem Zusammenhang werden verschiedene Politikmassnahmen, welche die
Beschra¨nkung von Verdra¨ngungseﬀekten im Kontext der Kommerzialisie-
rung wissenschaftlichen Wissens oder wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse zum
Ziel haben, ero¨rtert und einer experimentellen Untersuchung unterzogen.
Das zweite, dritte und vierte Kapitel widmen sich vollsta¨ndig dem Themen-
komplex der GPTs.
Erstgenanntes beinhaltet eine umfassende Literaturu¨bersicht der Theorien
zu GPTs, von welcher ausgehend, die mikroo¨konomischen sowie industrie-
dynamischen Theorien als rahmengebend fu¨r die anschliessende Analyse be-
stimmt werden, um somit den konzeptionellen sowie deﬁnitorischen Schwie-
rigkeiten bei der Bearbeitung des Feldes der GPTs entgegenzutreten. Die
bedeutendsten theoretischen Bausteine fu¨r eine mikroo¨konomische Betrach-
tung von GPTs werden im Zuge dessen vorgestellt und diskutiert.
Kapitel Drei weitet die Analyse des vorhergehenden Kapitels durch eine
Fokussierung auf aktuellere Beitra¨ge zu GPTs aus, wobei mit der Kon-
zeptualisierung von GPTs, als ein Spezialfall der O¨konomik verbundener
Ma¨rkte, begonnen wird. Insbesondere soll in diesem Kapitel ermittelt wer-
den, ob die bestehenden Theorien zu GPTs fundiert und erkenntnisbringend
sind. Ein bezu¨glich solcher Fragen positives Ergebnis unterstu¨tzend, wird das
Kapitel eine Verbindung zwischen GPTs, den Theorien zu Ausstrahlungs–
und U¨bertragungseﬀekten von Wissen und Forschungs– und Entwicklungs-
erkenntnissen sowie Entwicklungsdivergenzen begru¨nden.
Beiden Verallgemeinerungen liegt die Betrachtung von GPTs als ein Netz-
werkpha¨nomen zugrunde, wobei der Forschungsschwerpunkt nicht auf einer
Herausarbeitung eines alleinstehenden, bestimmten GPTs sondern vielmehr
auf der Analyse der Vielzahl verschiedener Impulse und Eﬀekte, hervorge-
rufen durch das Entstehen eines GPTs, liegen wird.
Der letzte Abschnitt des Kapitels widmet sich der empirischen Untersu-
chung von GPTs. Hierbei ist vorgesehen, dass die erarbeiteten Generalisie-
rungen als Leitfaden zur Gestaltung von empirischen Untersuchungen von
Sonderfa¨llen, wie sie beispielsweise in Form von GPTs auftreten und die
nicht auf Fallstudien oder Patentanalysen begrenzt sind, fungieren. In die-
sem Zusammenhang wird ein nichtparametrischer Vergleich der variierenden
Verteilungen industrieu¨bergreifender F&E–Wachstumsraten mit dem Ziel,
beschleunigte Innovationsta¨tigkeit als Folge von eines entstehenden GPTs
nachzuweisen, vorgestellt.
Im vierten Kapitel soll sich der zugeho¨rigen Frage gewidmet werden, wie
GPTs entstehen — pra¨ziser formuliert, wie eine Technologie das namensge-
bende ‘General–Purpose–Charakteristikum’ (‘Allzweck–Charakteristikum’)
erlangt. Eine erste und vorla¨uﬁge Antwort auf diese Frage leitet sich aus ei-
nem analytischen Modell, welches den Wettbewerb zwischen den Upstream–
Technologien bezu¨glich der Downstream–Ma¨rkte abbildet, ab.
Mithilfe des Modells wird zuna¨chst eine statische Beschreibung der mo¨glichen
Zusta¨nde, die sich aus technologischem Upstream Wettbewerb um Down-
stream Ma¨rkte ergeben ko¨nnen, vorgenommen: Die neue Upstream Tech-
nologie kann erfolgreich im Sinne einer vollsta¨ndigen Marktbeherrschung
sein, kann scheitern und nachhaltig randsta¨ndig bestehen oder zusammen
mit dem bestehenden GPT in anna¨hernd parita¨tischer Art und Weise auf
dem DownstreamMarkt koexistieren. Eine Ero¨rterung wirtschaftspolitischer
Massnahmen wird dem nachgestellt. In diesem Kapitel wird zudem ein
erster Entwurf des dynamischen Modells pra¨sentiert, in dem Netzwerkef-
fekte bezu¨glich der Technologie–Adoption auf Downstream Ebene in das
Modell einbezogen werden. Dies gelingt u¨ber den Grad der Anschaﬀung,
repra¨sentiert durch die Gro¨sse Downstream–Nutzerbasis, sowie die Vertei-
lung der relativen Leistungsfa¨higkeit der neuen Upstream–Technologie u¨ber
die Downstream Industrien hinweg. Die Untersuchung der Einﬂussgro¨ssen,
welche die Verbreitung der Upstream–Technologien determinieren, soll die
Wirkmechanismen und Prozesse, die zur Etablierung potentieller GPTs in
den verbundenen Ma¨rkten fu¨hren, deutlich machen.
Die Kapitel Fu¨nf und Sechs behandeln das Themenfeld der verbundenen
Ma¨rkte aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln. Ersteres fu¨hrt das Konzept der
Marktselektion dahingehend fort, als dass nun Ma¨rkte, die vertikal inner-
halb der Wertscho¨pfungskette integriert sind, untersucht werden. Der Analy-
serahmen der Replikator–Dynamiken wird erweitert, indem die Mo¨glichkeit,
dass das Wirkprinzip des ‘U¨berlebens des Sta¨rkeren’, im Kontext des Schum-
peterschen Wettbewerbs, durch Verknu¨pfungen zwischen Upstream und -
Downstream Ma¨rkten, ausgeschaltet oder sogar invertiert werden kann, ein-
bezogen wird. Die erweiterten Replikator–Dynamiken, einschliesslich der
Wertscho¨pfungsketten, werden modelliert und unter verschiedenen Szena-
rien — unterschiedliche Auspra¨gungen der Wertscho¨pfungskette (‘Ordered
Matching ’ oder ‘Random Matching ’), dynamischen Innovationsrenditen so-
wie Umstellungskosten — computergestu¨tzt simuliert. Kernaussage des Ka-
pitels ist damit, dass verknu¨pfte Wertscho¨pfungsketten, Verletzungen der
Replikator–Dynamik und damit ru¨ckla¨uﬁge Entwicklungen bezu¨glich der
Marktselektion induzieren knnen.
Es wird gezeigt, dass Marktselektion innerhalb der Wertscho¨pfungskette im
Random Matching–Szenario, welches die Mo¨glichkeit des Handelspartner-
wechsels bietet, bei jedem Innovations– und Skalenertrags–Setting zu einer
anfa¨nglichen Phase mit hoher Volatilita¨t bezu¨glich der Marktanteile fu¨hrt.
Damit wird einer neuartiger Beitrag zum Versta¨ndnis von Marktturbulenzen
und deren Persistenz u¨ber Industrielebenszyklen und technologische Rah-
men hinweg, geleistet.
Die Mo¨glichkeit des Partnerwechsels, verbunden mit verschiedenen Formen
der damit einhergehenden Umstellungskosten, beschleunigt die Vera¨nder-
ungen der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Leistungsfa¨higkeit und beeinﬂusst die Se-
lektionsdynamiken, wobei die Intensita¨t dieses Einﬂusses variiert. Markts-
elektion ist auf den verschiedenen Stufen der Wertscho¨pfungskette unter-
schiedlich intensiv ausgepra¨gt, wobei die sta¨rksten Eﬀekte an den End–
Stufen der Wertscho¨pfungsreihe auftreten. Diese Erkenntnis schaﬀt die Mo¨g-
lichkeit der Gestaltung einer Wettbewerbspolitik die sich an einer mit dem
Schumpeter’schenWettbewerb vergleichbaren, Marktheterogenita¨t orientiert.
Im anschliessenden sechsten Kapitel steht ein noch speziellerer Fall der ver-
bundenen Ma¨rkte im Fokus. In diesem wird das Konzept des Marktes deut-
lich weiter gefasst und zwar als ‘domain’ (Doma¨ne oder Geltungsbereich).
Dem folgend wird nun der akademische Bereich mitberu¨cksichtigt, und mit
den sich aus dessen Leistungen ergebenden, Anwendungs– und Kommer-
zialisierungsbereichen anhand der Gru¨ndung von Spinoﬀ–Unternehmen ver-
knu¨pft. Dieser Abschnitt liefert eine experimentelle Untersuchung von wirt-
schaftspolitischen Eingriﬀen, welche auf die Verbesserung des Wissenstrans-
fers sowie der Investitionen von dem Universita¨ts– und Hochschulbereich in
die akademischen Spinoﬀs, abzielen.
Der Schwerpunkt der Analyse liegt auf der Herausarbeitung der Wirkungen
verschiedener wirtschaftspolitischer Massnahmen, einschliesslich der lang-
fristigen Eﬀekte die daraus resultieren. Zu diesem Zweck wird ein Modell
erarbeitet und Hypothesen abgeleitet, welche anschliessend anhand von, im
Experimentallabor ermittelten, Reaktionen verschiedener Versuchspersonen
u¨berpru¨ft werden. Als Hauptergebnis der Studie kann dabei festgehalten
werden, dass moneta¨re Anreizsysteme (Subventionen) die Ho¨he der Investi-
tion nicht signiﬁkant steigern, wa¨hrend Massnahmen bei denen Beho¨rden zu
dem gewu¨nschten Verhalten anregen, die Investitionen fu¨r die Dauer des Ein-
griﬀs erho¨hen, und keine langfristigen (Post–Interventions–Eﬀekte) nachtei-
ligen Folgen aufweisen. Die hieraus abgeleitete Implikation ko¨nnte dergestalt
formuliert werden, dass ein deutlicherer Fokus auf Kommunikations–Politik
gelegt werden sollte. Diese Massnahmen ko¨nnten ein deutlich wirtschaftli-
cheres und gleichzeitig langfristig nicht nachteiliges, Werkzeug darstellen,
mit welchem die Verbindung von Wissenschaft und Industrie weiter forciert
werden ko¨nnte.
Zusammengefasst kann festgehalten werden, dass mit dieser Dissertation ein
nennenswerter Beitrag zu dem, sich im Aufkommenden beﬁndlichen For-
schungsgebiet der verbundenen Ma¨rkte geleistet wird. Die Untersuchung
der Dynamiken von Ma¨rkten und Technologien unter Einbeziehung ver-
schiedener Aspekte wie dem Einﬂuss von GPTs, Innovation und Selektion
in Wertscho¨pfungsketten sowie der Mo¨glichkeit, dass wirtschaftspolitische
Eingriﬀe den Weg fr eine Kommerzialisierung des Wissens heraus aus dem
akademischen Bereich in den Markt ebnen, ermglicht eine komplexere und
ganzheitlichere Betrachtung volkswirtschaftlicher Dynamiken.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
“Put on Schumpeterian eyeglasses, (. . . ) and look around you! You will ﬁnd
many examples of structural tensions and of development blocks extending
over wide areas of the economic and social life.”
— Erik Dahme´n
“History never repeats itself, but it often rhymes.”
— Attributed to Mark Twain
1.1 From General Purpose Technologies to Linked
Markets
Finding regularities is the ‘bread and butter’ of science,1 and the ‘dismal
science’ is no exception. The identiﬁcation of statistical regularities in the
evolution of industries (Dosi, 2007) is the rationale behind a non–negligible
share of research in the ﬁeld of Economics of Innovation, Evolutionary
Economics, and Industrial Dynamics. The reproduction of stylized facts
(Kaldor, 1957) is at the core of many modeling and empirical exercises in
1Paulson, S. (2013), Monsters, Marvels, and the Birth of Science, Nautilus, Issue 004.
2 Introduction
Macro–, Meso– and Microeconomics. This Thesis is instead interested in
what deviates from stylized patterns — it is a study of irregularities.
In the Economics of Technological Change — depending on the degree of
approximation and the particular lenses of analysis scholars wear — irregu-
larities are called radical innovations, disruptive innovations, drastic innova-
tions, breakthroughs, macroinventions, ‘inventions of methods of inventing’,
dominant ﬁlie`res. The common characteristic of all the deﬁnitions in this
still incomplete list is the degree of qualitative diﬀerence between such tech-
nologies and those that are incremental or less game–changing. However,
technologies are systems in nature; they are composed of parts that are
systems themselves, in a recursive way, and this feature makes less trivial
the identiﬁcation of irregularities in the technology domain. Depending on
how ﬁne–grained the level of analysis is, a radical technology can be seen as
incremental, and vice versa. For example, from the viewpoint of the main
functions delivered, a present–day automobile has been subject only to incre-
mental changes compared to the original innovation introduced by Daimler
and Benz at the end of the Nineteen Century. In both periods, in fact, an
automobile mainly delivers the service of mobility. However, the complexity
of cars abruptly increased over the years, and an automobile nowadays is
a complex system of interrelated parts that rely on informational and elec-
tronic platforms rather than mechanical ones. From this perspective, what
looked at a ﬁrst glance as a sequence of incremental innovations appears
now as a radical change.
Given the complex nature of technologies, to assess the radicality of technol-
ogy is a rather non–simple goal. However, technologies that can be classiﬁed
as irregularities display another characteristic that is more relevant than any
degree of ambiguous ‘radicality’. They show generality of purpose. With the
expression generality of purpose we indicate the feature of a technology suit-
able to be used as a component, or input, by many and often unrelated other
technologies and economic activities. Hence, generality of purpose is a mea-
sure of the pervasiveness of a certain technology. The electric dynamo, infor-
mation and communication technologies, the laser, and few other technolo-
gies display a signiﬁcative generality of purpose, that makes them ‘unique’
and belonging to an ad hoc category within the broad set of technological
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innovations. The literature labels these technologies ‘General Purpose Tech-
nologies’ (hereinafter GPTs) and deﬁnes them as technologies characterized
by pervasiveness, continuous improvement, and inducement of innovational
complementarities in linked industries (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995;
Bresnahan, 2010; Lipsey et al., 2005). GPTs are the irregularities of the
world of technological change and innovations and, given their peculiarity,
they are inter alia the ﬁl rouge of this Thesis.
In the history of science, and especially during the ‘great age of wonders’
preceding the advent of modern science (Daston and Park, 1998), irregulari-
ties have been usually collected and stored inWunderkammern, or ‘Cabinets
of Curiosity’. This Dissertation is not meant to be a Cabinet of Curiosity
listing and classifying GPTs. Instead, it is a study into their nature and the
conditions that allow them to become pervasive. One of the main claims
of the Thesis is that the irregularities of the world of technological change
are not unique starting from their very ‘birth’. Generality of purpose is a
feature that can be ‘cultivated’ and it is better represented by a process
leading to pervasiveness rather than as a characteristic assumed a priori.
Economic theory usually disregards or assumes the degree of pervasiveness
of technologies, and this limits scholars’ understanding of the profound role
played by technological change in the economy. In fact, according to Wright,
(. . . ) the importance of many of the great innovations of the
past century (. . . ) was woefully underestimated even by the
inventors, because they could not foresee the extent of future
improvements in the technology, because the scope for applica-
tion depended on the unforeseen development of complementary
technologies elsewhere in the economy, and because future uses
emerged as parts of a complex interdependent system that no one
could have predicted in advance. (Wright, 1997, pp. 1561–1562)
The same uncertainty characterizing the assessment of the relevance of tech-
nologies can also be sensed from the words of some direct protagonists of
technological changes. For example, Rosenberg cites Charles Townes recall-
ing how the ﬁrst reaction to the invention of the laser happened to deﬁnitely
underestimated its potential:
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Bell’s patent department at ﬁrst refused to patent our ampliﬁer
or oscillator for optical frequencies because, it was explained,
optical waves had never been of any importance to communica-
tions and hence the invention had little bearing on Bell System
interests. (Rosenberg, 1998)
Despite the uncertainty that characterizes technological change in general
and the establishment of GPTs in particular, understanding this dimension
of change if of utmost importance. In fact, it will help scholars to build a
bridge between the short–run mechanisms and the long–run trajectories of
innovation and economic growth. Until now, Microeconomics of innovation,
Industrial Dynamics, and theories of Long Waves have followed close but
rarely intersecting paths. A new view of GPTs as the one outlined in this
Thesis may mark not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning
of this research avenue (Lipsey et al., 2005).
It has to be pointed out that this is not a Thesis on merely ‘important’
technologies. Importance, measured using the intensity of some outcome
variables — for example, the value of patents’ licensing fees, stock market
values, and citations — can overlap but does not coincide with pervasive-
ness. Economically important technologies are often not pervasive. In fact,
the peculiar externalities produced by GPTs cannot be well captured by
standard measures (Carlaw and Lipsey, 2002), given that their eﬀect is in-
tangible in nature and has to do with opening up new opportunities and
oﬀering new logics for the recombination of existing inputs and technolo-
gies. In a nutshell, irregularities are so because they are enabling, rather
than important.
For economists, to grasp the dynamic processes leading to the establish-
ment of enabling GPTs means to adopt a diﬀerent viewpoint on this kind of
technological change, one that conceives breakthrough irregularities as the
result of multiple determinants and interactions. Such a viewpoint has to
be grounded in the meso and micro dimensions, meaning those focusing on
ﬁrms and industries as the unit of analysis. As soon as GPTs are consid-
ered as pervasive technologies in the making, the focus of research has to
switch from the very ‘singleton technology’ (Mokyr, 2005) to the linkages
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between the industries and markets that favour or hinder technological diﬀu-
sion across diverse economic activities. In this sense, a study of irregularities
such as GPTs becomes a contribution to a more general Microeconomics of
heterogeneous technological change. Irregularities are the result of the rest-
less stream of (positive and negative) feedbacks occurring in economic and
technological domains. In order to provide not the proximate description of
yet another Cabinet of Curiosities, but the identiﬁcation of the ultimate gen-
erating processes driving economic and technological evolution, the analysis
has, therefore, to focus on feedbacks and their transmission channels. Hence,
to understand irregularities it is necessary — although not suﬃcient — to
look at the edges, namely at the linkages between our objects of interest.
Following this line of though, the focus of the Thesis evolves into the anal-
ysis of Linked Markets, where with ‘linked’ we stress the importance of
connectivity, and with ‘markets’ we go beyond the narrow technological di-
mension in order to widen the framework of study. In a nutshell, the Thesis
posits that markets, industries, and technologies displaying linked payoﬀs
and connections upstream and downstream are subject to peculiar dynamics
for what concerns economic and innovative activities compared to markets,
industries, and technologies considered in isolation. GPTs dynamics thus
become a particular case of linked markets. In a stylized way, those produc-
ing GPTs can be considered as upstream markets connected with a large
set of downstream applications. This character places them as one of the
core engines of economic and technological transformation in linked markets,
as the linkage between GPTs, application sectors and industries aﬀects the
incentives for technological innovation and diﬀusion as well as economic
performances. Therefore, most of the Chapters in the Thesis study the dy-
namics of industries and innovation in the presence of GPTs. Furthermore,
the Thesis goes beyond the enquiry of markets where the linked objects of
analysis are GPTs and application industries. Some Chapters extend the
analysis of linked markets to topics such as market selection and policy. Also
in these cases, the accent is posed on irregularities rather than on regular-
ities. For example, the violations of the replicator dynamics — regressive
developments of market selection — determined by the existence of vertical
relations are identiﬁed and used to develop a more general theory of com-
petition for the market, selection and reallocation. On the same vein, the
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constellation of public policy measures that limit or contrast crowding out
in the context of commercialization of academic knowledge is highlighted
and tested using experimental methods.
Having presented the rationale behind the choice of linked markets and
GPTs as the focus for this study, the next Section describes in details the
structure of the Thesis.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The general aim of the Thesis is to oﬀer new theoretical insights on how
linked markets aﬀect technology and economic dynamics. The Thesis is
structured around ﬁve Chapters. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 address the topic
of linked markets focusing on GPTs. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 deal with
linked markets from other perspectives, namely those of market selection and
public policy interventions to foster academic knowledge commercialization.
The author developed the Chapters of the Thesis beneﬁting from the human
and scientiﬁc atmosphere of the Research Training Group ‘The Economics
of Innovative Change’, jointly organized by the Friedrich Schiller University
Jena and the Max Planck Institute of Economics and supported by the Ger-
man Science Foundation. After two years of doctoral studies as scholarship
holder, the author has been employed at the Chair of Prof. Dr. Cant-
ner at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena, where grew up professionally
and gained even more from the fruitful and inspiring interactions with col-
leagues. The author presented the results of his research in a number of
internal seminars (the Jena Economic Research Workshops and the Jena
Summer Academies on Innovation and Uncertainty), invited seminars (at
University of Insubria, Varese and at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies,
Pisa) and international conferences, among which (in chronological order)
the DIMETIC Summer School in Maastricht, the DRUID Conference 2013
in Barcelona, the 25th EAEPE Annual Conference in Paris, the 1st Doc-
toral Workshop in Economics of Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge in
Turin, the Workshop Explaining Economic Change in Rome, the EMAEE
Conference 2015 in Maastricht and the DRUID Conference 2015 in Rome.
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1.2.1 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 of the Thesis, titled ‘A New View of General Purpose Technolo-
gies’, is a critical review of the received GPT–based theories. It suggests to
ground the study of GPTs on the framework of Microeconomics of Innova-
tion and Industrial Dynamics. The rationale behind the position defended
in the Chapter is that this alternative route for theoretical analysis may
oﬀer a solution to the conceptual and deﬁnitional problems characterizing
the literature on GPTs. The title of the Chapter is inspired by the classic
contribution of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) on ‘a new view of technological
change’: as technological change for Atkison and Stiglitz is localized and
subject to various degrees of spillovers and learning, the modeling of GPTs
in this Thesis has to be confronted with the micro– and mesoeconomic na-
ture of industries’ interactions that may lead a speciﬁc technology to become
general purpose.
The Chapter starts positioning the study of GPTs within the relevant re-
search trajectories, from Long Wave theories to Neo–Schumpeterian ap-
proaches down to New and Endogenous Growth Theory. Introduced as
a useful concept to explain from a neoclassical viewpoint ‘whole technolog-
ical eras’ (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995), GPTs turned to be as widely
applicable as the technologies the concept wants to describe. The review
of the models — mainly growth models — featuring GPTs suggests that
while the existing analytical exercises shed light on the mechanisms lead-
ing to technology–driven ﬂuctuations, they do not solve the identiﬁcation
problems related to the concept of GPT. The Chapter suggests, therefore,
a ﬁrst exploration of a Microeconomics of GPTs, assessing the usefulness of
some theoretical categories used in Economics of Innovation and Industrial
Dynamics to contribute to the understanding of GPTs. The concepts of net-
work eﬀects and dynamic returns to scale, dominant design and industry life
cycles, collective invention and cooperation among inventors are expounded
and linked to the core deﬁnitional criteria of GPTs.
The Chapter is co–authored with Uwe Cantner. The contribution share of
the author is at least 50 percent. A version of the Chapter is published in
Wagner and Heilemann (2012).
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1.2.2 Chapter 3
Chapter 3, titled ‘Generalizing General Purpose Technologies’ builds on the
issues raised in the previous Chapter to further improve our theoretical un-
derstanding of GPTs. It assesses the question whether the GPT–framework
is still valid and useful despite the growing criticism towards the concept and
its analytical and empirical applications. To support a positive answer to
the question, the Chapter extends the conceptualization of GPTs by show-
ing how the dynamics described by GPT models can be framed as special,
but clearly identiﬁable, cases of related theories. The Chapter overviews
recent contributions featuring GPTs and suggests to adopt the concept of
GPT cluster (as deﬁned in Bresnahan and Yin (2010)) as the relevant unit
of analysis. Further, the Chapter oﬀers two generalizations: the ﬁrst relates
GPTs and theories of spillovers, the second connects GPTs with theories of
uneven development. Both generalizations go in the direction of interpreting
GPTs as network phenomena. Accordingly, it is suggested that the focus of
GPT–related studies should not lie in the identiﬁcation of the single, precise
GPT, but in the cascade of inducements and eﬀects the establishment of a
GPT generates.
For what concerns GPTs and spillovers, the Chapter highlights how GPTs
generate a particular kind of externality that aﬀect the returns of linked
industries’ innovative activities rather than economic outcomes. This pecu-
liarity stems from the fact that GPTs are enabling technologies, meaning
that they broaden the set of opportunities for technological exploration and
recombination. For what regards GPTs and uneven development, the Chap-
ter describes how the feedback process taking place within a GPT cluster
may lead to a cascade of eﬀects on the rest of the economy and how these
eﬀects, depending on the heterogeneous distribution of reactions to induce-
ments in downstream industries, may result in synchronous or asynchronous
changes.
The two aforementioned generalizations of GPTs are used to outline the ﬁrst
sketch of a theory of technological multipliers, where the focus is on the re-
verberation of enabling technological complementarities on related sectors’
innovative activities. Contributions looking at similar phenomena, such as
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for example R&Dmultipliers, are described and connected with the proposed
framework of analysis. A ﬁnal Section of the Chapter deals with the empiri-
cal study of GPTs and suggests that the proposed generalizations can serve
as a guideline to design empirical analysis of ‘irregularities’ such as GPTs
that are not conﬁned to case studies or patent analysis. A non–parametric
exercise is provided; it compares over time the changing distributions of
cross–industries R&D growth rates, meant to capture accelerations in inno-
vative activities and, therefore, part of the eﬀects produced by a GPT in the
making. The proposed empirical approach responds to the need to develop,
for economic dynamics, a ‘theory of the growth rate’, rather than simply a
theory of growth (Metcalfe, 2003). The analysis oﬀered in the Chapter is
however limited to the domain of innovative activities.
Establishing a connection between the concept of GPT and the propaga-
tion of GPT–induced eﬀects on innovative activities and the economy, the
Chapter makes the case for considering GPTs a special case of interaction
between linked technologies and industries. The focus has therefore been
shifted towards the structure of connectivity between markets, and to the
role it plays in shaping the chances for a given technology to gain prevalence
and pervasiveness.
The Chapter is single–authored.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
Chapter 4, titled ‘Competition for the (Downstream) Market: Modeling
Acquired Purposes’ completes the theoretical analysis started in Chapter 2
and Chapter 3 dealing with the question of how a GPT comes into being.
We posit that the process through which a technology gains pervasiveness
matters: the evolution of a technology can result in a broad diﬀusion or in
a failure to spread. The literature on GPTs, with a few exceptions (Thoma,
2009; van Zon et al., 2003), assumes the generality of purpose feature of a
given technology. However, the relevant phenomenon to be studied is what
happens when generality is not assumed a priori. Therefore, the focus of
the Chapter is on how purposes are ‘acquired’. Purposes are meant in this
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Chapter as ‘applications’, or uses.
The Chapter discusses how a study dealing with the process of purposes
acquisition relates to the more general eﬀort to understand the patterns
of industrial connectivity that is receiving increasing attention in economic
research. There are diﬀerent reasons for such increasing attention to linked
industries and linked markets, most considerably the application of network
theorizing to several ﬁelds of economic theory (Carvalho, 2014; Carvalho
and Voigtla¨nder, 2014; Contreras and Fagiolo, 2014; Hausmann and Hidalgo,
2011; McNerney et al., 2013) and the re–discovery of input–output views of
the economy to measure the eﬀects of ﬁscal and industrial policies in the
context of the current economic crisis (Foray, 2014; Hausmann and Rodrik,
2006; Stiglitz et al., 2013).
We introduce a simple model to describe the process leading a speciﬁc pur-
pose technology to become a GPT. The model builds on the classic model
of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) and introduces technological competi-
tion between an established GPT and one ‘entrant’ technology that strives
to gain pervasiveness. The technological competition occurs in a setting
featuring vertically–linked markets, where a continuum of downstream in-
dustries can adopt one of the possible alternative upstream input technolo-
gies. The competition among those technologies can result either in the
establishment of a new pervasive GPT or in the persistence of the exist-
ing GPT as the dominant one. One of the main ideas introduced by the
model is that downstream industries’ decisions, and therefore the (more or
less) successful pattern of diﬀusion of an upstream new technology, depend
on comparative advantages, rather than on absolute quality and cost of the
GPT as in Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995). In this sense, the model
is an adaptation of the ‘Ricardian’ (or assignment) model of international
specialization of Dornbusch et al. (1977) in line with Cantner and Hanusch
(1993), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Cimoli (1988), Dosi and Soete (1983)
and, more recently, Costinot (2009) and Costinot and Vogel (2015). In the
version of the model proposed in the Chapter, the assignment/matching
takes place between upstream technologies (industries) and downstream in-
dustries, rather than countries and products as in Cantner and Hanusch
(1993) and skills/labor and tasks as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). In a
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sense, the model can be considered as a model of competing technologies in
line with Arthur (1989) that features industries’ vertical relations, as well
as an application of the Schumpeterian ‘competition for the market’ to a
linked market settings.
The model provides in ﬁrst stance a static description of the possible states
that can be attained by the upstream technological competition for down-
stream markets: The new upstream technology can succeed in ‘conquering’
the whole downstream market, can fail and be conﬁned in a niche, or can
share the downstream market with the established GPT on a rather equal
standing. Two scenarios — a competition case and a niche case — are
discussed. The case featuring three upstream technologies competing for
dominance and pervasiveness is provided as well. A discussion on policy in-
terventions follows, indicating the possibility that ‘policy mixes’ intervening
on diﬀerent determinants and ‘levers’ can lead to a larger set of outcomes
than usually considered. The Chapter develops also a ﬁrst sketch of the
dynamic version of the model, by taking into account the presence of net-
work eﬀects linking downstream adoption — so the ‘purposes acquisition’
captured by the size of the downstream user base — and the distribution of
the relative performance of the new upstream technology across the down-
stream industries. The conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria are
identiﬁed and related to the non–homogeneous response of the downstream
continuum of industries to relative usefulness and costs changes.
The Chapter is co–authored with Uwe Cantner. The contribution share of
the author is at least 50 percent.
1.2.4 Chapter 5
Chapter 4 establishes in the context of GPT–related models a ﬁrst con-
nection between competition and markets that are vertically linked. Chap-
ter 5, titled ‘Replicator Dynamics in Value Chains: Explaining Some Puz-
zles of Market Selection’ pushes ahead this idea by asking if, by taking into
account vertical relations — that is, value chains structures, one can ex-
plain same empirical puzzles characterizing the analysis of market selection.
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Market selection and market reallocation are usually studied in the Neo–
Schumpeterian framework of analysis using the replicator dynamics model
(Metcalfe, 1994). The replicator dynamics models the competition for the
market by showing how actors (ﬁrms, industries, regions) with a ﬁtness
above (below) the share–weighted average of that of the reference popu-
lation will increase (decrease) their market share. The idea is to capture
the Darwinian ‘survival of the ﬁttest’ through a set of diﬀerential equations
relating actors’ market share rates of change to the period–by–period assess-
ment of the above (below) average performance. Here, ﬁtness is conceived as
an indicator of ‘goodness’ and can be measured by unit costs, productivity,
product quality, or any other performance measure.
The replicator dynamics is intuitively appealing but seems not to hold ro-
bustly when tested empirically. The limited empirical evidence of replicator
dynamics at work questions the fact that market selection takes place at all.
Alternatively, the theoretical predictions may not be veriﬁed due to an iden-
tiﬁcation problem. Usually, in fact, the population boundaries of empirical
data are those of industries. However, it is well known that industries ag-
gregate heterogeneous activities, and such aggregation may cancel out any
existing trace of market selection. A better deﬁnition of the context in which
market selection takes place is therefore fundamental. Some contributions
(Cantner et al., 2012) focus on speciﬁc markets rather than on industries,
betting on their higher degree of coherence. In fact, signs of the replicator
dynamics at work do appear in this type of analyses. An additional per-
spective is that suggested by this Chapter: the replicator dynamics may
not show up in the data when ﬁrms are connected in value chains. The
limited ﬂexibility of value chains creates the chance for ﬁt ﬁrms to be con-
nected to less well–performing upstream and downstream partners. In this
case, the survival of the ﬁttest cannot be taken for granted, and violations
of the replicator dynamics take place. We name these violations regressive
developments and highlight their existence as a possible explanation for the
empirical puzzles of market selection.
The Chapter provides an analytical study in which the extended replicator
dynamics incorporating value chain relations is modeled and computation-
ally simulated. Furthermore, innovation is introduced in the model accord-
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ing to three regimes of dynamics returns to scale: constant, increasing and
decreasing returns. The eﬀects of diﬀerent innovation scenarios on selec-
tion are analysed comparing the cases of value chains ordered and random
matching. In ordered matching, ﬁrms are linked in value chains according
to their ﬁtness ranking; this setting reproduces the standard replicator dy-
namics and only adds a many market layer structure to the working of the
model. In random matching, ﬁrms are randomly connected, so that the sit-
uation in which ﬁt and less ﬁt ﬁrms are linked is likely to occur. In addition
to that, we explore the possibility of partner switching across value chains,
and analyze the resulting eﬀect on performance under diﬀerent switching
costs regimes. For all the scenarios and regimes considered in the Chapter
we run an exercise in an ‘evolutionary accounting’ (Dosi and Grazzi, 2006):
we provide a decomposition analysis to disentangle how the change in ﬁrms
costs — the chosen ﬁtness — is determined by learning and innovation (the
within eﬀect), selection (the between eﬀect) and the regimes of dynamics
returns to scale (the covariance eﬀect).
We develop ﬁve propositions summarizing the main results of the paper.
In short, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms being related into value chain structures and
depending in their output capacity on their downstream partners do not
necessarily increase their market share even though being most eﬃcient.
The very existence of value chains relations may induce violations of the
replicator dynamics generating regressive developments of market selection.
Furthermore, we show that market selection among value chains in the ran-
dom matching scenario with the possibility to switch partners produces at
the beginning a period of high market share volatility dynamics in any in-
novation and returns to scale setting, which provides a novel contribution to
the understanding of market turbulence and its persistence along industries
life cycles and technological regimes. Next, our results indicate that the
possibility of partner switching, coupled with diﬀerent ‘regimes’ of switch-
ing costs, hastens the change in aggregate ﬁtness and aﬀects with various
intensities selection dynamics. Market selection aﬀects with diﬀerent mag-
nitudes diﬀerent value chain layers, with the strongest eﬀect to be found
at the ﬁnal end of the value chain. Acknowledging that market selection
‘bites’ with diﬀerent strength diﬀerent markets linked in value chains open
room for designing competition policies that account for the heterogeneity
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of markets in the magnitude of Schumpeter competition.
The Chapter is co–authored with Uwe Cantner and Ivan Savin. The contri-
bution share of the author is 40 percent.
1.2.5 Chapter 6
Chapter 6 deals with another, diﬀerent case of linked markets. In this case,
the concept of market is conceived in a broader sense as ‘domain’. The aca-
demic domain is the one taken into consideration and linked to the domain
of application and commercialization of its output. In short, the Chapter
provides an experimental analysis of policy interventions favoring the in-
vestment and transfer of knowledge from Academia to academic spinoﬀs.
Inspired by the example of the trustful relation established between Stan-
ford University and Google and by relevant policy schemes such as ‘Small
Business Technology Transfer’ (SBTT) in the United States and ‘Existen-
zgru¨ndungen aus der Wissenschaft ’ (EXIST) in Germany, the focus of the
Chapter is set on the study of the eﬀects of diﬀerent public policies on
academic knowledge commercialization, as well as on the long–run eﬀect of
these policies.
Governments have indeed a considerable interest in intervening in–between
the linkage connecting Academia and Industry, given the expected broad
societal beneﬁts of knowledge commercialization. Interventions tailored to
foster academic knowledge commercialization usually take the form of sub-
sidy policies consisting of two stages: In the ﬁrst stage, a University receives
a subsidy to support the spinoﬀ creation process. In a second stage, it is
the successful spinoﬀ to be directly subsidized. Alternative forms of policy
such as non–monetary communications and suggestions about the level of
investment considered desirable by the policy–maker are rarely considered,
though they may be implemented with non–negligible savings of public re-
sources. Moreover, policies of the kind described above focus on the short
term eﬀects of interventions disregarding the long term, post–intervention
costs.
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In the Chapter we provided a novel contribution by dealing with both the
issue of alternative policies evaluation and the long–run consequences of in-
terventions. A model is proposed in order to guide hypotheses derivation
that summarize the expected eﬀects of diﬀerent types of policy. We tested
the hypotheses using the responses of experimental subjects in the Labora-
tory. In the experiment we employ a multi–period version of the trust (in-
vestment) game (Berg et al., 1995), where ‘trustors’ investments out of their
allocated endowment proxy Academia engagement in commercialization ac-
tivities and ‘trustee’ reciprocal transfers capture the feedback relations from
Industry to Academia. The experimental design is rather original and rep-
resents another novel contribution of the Chapter to the existing literature.
The policies considered in the contribution are i) a subsidy conditioned to an
high threshold of needed minimum contribution, ii) a subsidy conditioned to
a low threshold of needed minimum contribution, and iii) a targeting policy
suggesting a level of contribution ‘desired’ by the policy–maker.
The main result of the study is that monetary incentives (subsidies) do not
signiﬁcantly increase investment levels, while the targeting policy in which
authorities suggest a desired behavior increases the investment activity dur-
ing the intervention and does not have long–run (post–intervention) detri-
mental eﬀects. For what regards monetary policies involving subsidies, two
implications can be drawn: Experimental subjects tend not to follow the
subsidy policy; if they do, they send mostly the lowest amount required to
obtain the subsidy. Moreover, monetary policy is ineﬀective in inﬂuencing
the investment rate not because the monetary dimension itself, but rather
due to the fact that the subsidy is conditioned on a given action. In fact, ex-
perimental subjects acting as trustee, that unconditionally receive a subsidy
given trustors investments decisions, do not show signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
their trustworthiness level as compared those who do not receive the subsidy.
As a policy implication, the Chapter suggests policy–makers to grant more
consideration to communication and targeting policies. These types of policy
may be a more economic — and non–detrimental in the long–run — tool to
reinforce the link between the domains of Academia and Industry.
The Chapter is co–authored with Igor Asanov. The contribution share of
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the author is 50 percent.
1.2.6 Final Overview
Through a set of Chapters ranging from the Microeconomics of GPTs and
heterogeneous technical change to the extensions of market selection prin-
ciples and policy measures fostering the linkage between Academia and In-
dustry, the Thesis provides a contribution to a nascent Economics of Linked
Markets. The limitations of the Thesis are outlined in the conclusions; in
any case, by studying the dynamics of markets and technologies when GPTs
are involved, when innovation and selection take place in value chains, and
when policy can ease in diﬀerent ways the commercialization of knowledge
from the academic to the market domain, room is open to develop a more
complex and networked view of economic dynamics.
17
Chapter 2
A New View of General
Purpose Technologies
2.1 Introduction: General Purpose Technologies
Technologies are not all alike. Some of them add incrementally to the eco-
nomic and productive system; other technologies, instead, have a revolution-
ary impact: they impose on the economy a new structure of dependencies
and complementarities (they produce a rejuvenation, in Perez (2004) terms)
and exploit physical phenomena in new ways Arthur (2009). The economy
restlessly reconﬁgures itself around these technologies, producing as a re-
sult an open–ended evolutionary process of change. Recently, the economic
literature has started to recognize the heterogeneity that characterizes the
nature of diﬀerent technologies introducing the concept of General Purpose
Technologies (hereinafter GPTs). The aim of this Chapter is to critically
guide the reader into the topic, oﬀering also a novel perspective on this ﬁeld
of studies.
The awareness that major technological changes are the main determinants
of cyclical and non–linear patterns in the evolution of an economy is not a
monopoly of the literature on GPTs. Conversely, the idea is at the core of
the long–standing research on Long Waves (Silverberg, 2003) and dates back
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to end of the Nineteenth century, when scholars started to abstract from the
case–speciﬁc theories of economic crisis, generalizing formal models of trade
cycles (in the United Kingdom), business cycles (in the United States) and
Konjunctur (in Germany) (Besomi, 2010). Further back in time, already
Shakespeare wrote that ‘there is a tide in the aﬀairs of men, Which, taken
at the ﬂood, leads on to fortune’1, highlighting the importance of economic
ﬂuctuations. The work of Kondratieﬀ (Kondratieﬀ and Stolper, 1935) and
Schumpeter (1939) — especially his often misrepresented and re–invented
hypothesis on clustering of innovations and creative destruction — are the
literature’s milestones that paved the way for a wide range of theoretical
and empirical attempts to identify long–wave patterns in economic history.2
From the brief perspective outlined above, the research on GPTs appears
more as a contemporary endeavor to empower endogenous growth theory
with the analytical tools to explain economy–wide ﬂuctuations, than a con-
ceptual novelty.3 The GPT ‘instantiation’ of the more general topic of long
run ﬂuctuations is nevertheless quite interesting and important for innova-
tion scholars, since the narrow focus of GPT theories is on the nature of
technology and its eﬀects on productivity dynamics, capital accumulation
and innovative activities rather than on the explanation of the wave in itself
or on the analyses of the systemic consequence of techno–economic paradigm
changes (Perez, 2004).4
Before dealing with the deﬁnition of GPTs, however, it is worth recalling
two more issues. The ﬁrst helps us to frame GPT models in the literature:5
the similarity between the concepts of GPT and radical innovations, macro–
inventions (Mokyr, 1990), and shifts between technological paradigms (Dosi,
1Cited by Jevons in his Political Economy (Chapter XIV, about the periodicity of
Industry)
2For a comprehensive overview, see Silverberg (2003)
3For the sake of clarity, in the Chapter we use the term endogenous growth theory to
refer to two sets of models, one inspired by the ‘AK’ approach and Paul Romer’s contribu-
tions (Romer, 1986, 1990), the other collecting under the label of ‘Schumpeterian growth
models’ quality–ladder and R&D–based models such as Aghion and Howitt (1992), and
the quasi–endogenous literature started by Dinopoulos, Segerstrom and others (Dinopou-
los and Sener, 2007).
4Alternatives to GPT–based modeling of economic ﬂuctuations and LongWaves are, for
example, Jovanovic and Rob (1990) formal account of Schumpeterian cycles, technological
opportunities, extensive and intensive search.
5For a complete taxonomy see (Coccia, 2003, p. 11).
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1982) is evident. Therefore, as for theorists to identify a clear–cut boundary
between macro and micro or radical and incremental innovations represents
a challenge, a similar shortcoming aﬀects the selection of appropriate criteria
to identify the technologies that actually are GPTs. We deal with such issue
in the next pages, since this is a relevant point for our claims.
The second issue is methodological. GPT–based modeling brings together
the analytical framework of neoclassical growth theory, that is linear in
nature,6 and the one of heterodox growth theories (Setterﬁeld, 2011) that
traditionally paid more attention to the cycling behavior of economic ag-
gregates. This ‘reﬁnement’ of the simpler approach to technological change
adopted by mainstream growth theory, where a generic stock (a scalar) of
‘ideas’, knowledge, or technology interacts with a production function, is
not the only modeling strategy available to economic theorists. As Good-
win puts it clearly in his treatment of the (non–linear) accelerator principle
as the determinant of cycles
(a)lmost without exception economists have entertained the hy-
pothesis of linear structural relations as a basis for cycle theory
(. . . ) whether we are dealing with diﬀerence or diﬀerential equa-
tions, so long as they are linear, they either explode or die away
with the consequent disappearance of the cycle or the society.
One may hope to avoid this unpleasant dilemma by choosing
that case (as with the frictionless pendulum) just in between.
Such a way out is helpful in the classroom, but it is nothing
more than a mathematical abstraction (. . . ) Mention should
also be made of the fact that there exists an alternative way out
of the dilemma — that of an impulse–excited mechanism. There
are two basically diﬀerent classes of such mechanisms to be dis-
tinguished. (a) There are the synchronized systems of which the
most familiar is the ordinary pendulum clock. (. . . ) The wider
system (. . . ) is a particular type of nonlinear oscillator since it
is autonomous and maintains a uniform cycle independently of
initial conditions. (b) Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent is a system subject
6In fact, following Solow (1997), a theory of growth should not explain short term
ﬂuctuations but only the long–term potential trajectory of an economy.
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to random shocks. Here the mechanism itself is damped, but an
outside, unexplained source keeps it going, and in this sense it is
not a complete theory, for the source of maintenance lies outside
the theory (. . . ) (Goodwin, 1951, p. 2)
GPTs models fall under point (b), since a new GPT — also in advanced
models inspired by Goodwinian Lotka–Volterra dynamics (Fata´s-Villafranca
et al., 2012) and even more in the ‘classic’ modeling approach to GPTs (Help-
man, 1998) — arrives from outside the system, when it is modeled directly
as an exogenous variable (in a deterministic or stochastic fashion, as we
deepen further later) as well as when it results indirectly from endogenous
knowledge accumulation. GPTs are then only shocks revitalizing an econ-
omy characterized by the tendency to ‘relax’ in a steady–state equilibrium
growth.
In this Chapter, we argue that in addition to Goodwin’s choice (a), that of
using non–linear systems as modeling workhorse, it is possible to frame a
more complex alternative (c), where the emergence of a GPT is the result
of localized and directed knowledge interactions, exploitation of technologi-
cal opportunities and coordination in production across heterogeneous and
evolving industries and ﬁrms. What we propose is an evolutionary and
Schumpeterian account of GPTs, where the innovative change comes from
within, producing diﬀerential growth.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 critically overviews the criteria
to deﬁne and identify GPTs. Section 2.3 describes the most relevant GPT–
based analytical models. Section 2.4 outlines a ‘Microeconomics of GPTs’
by looking at GPTs from a micro and meso level of analysis. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Deﬁning and Identifying GPTs, Engines of Growth
The strand of literature dealing with GPTs has been initiated by David
(1990) and especially by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995). In the latter,
GPTs are deﬁned as key technologies, fully shaping a technological era, and
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‘characterized by the potential for pervasive use in a wide range of sectors
and by their technological dynamism’ (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995,
p. 84). GPTs execute some generic functions such as ‘continuous rotary
motion’ or ‘binary logic’ and act like platforms, ‘enabling mechanisms’ for
complementary innovations in downstream sectors, leading to the transfor-
mation of the economic system as well as to generalized productivity gains.
Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2004) identify more precisely the properties of
a GPT in their historical case study of the Corliss Steam Engine in the U.S.
(emphasis added):
ﬁrst, (a GPT) is a technology characterized by general applica-
bility, that is, by the fact that it performs some generic function
that is vital to the functioning of a large number of using prod-
ucts or production systems. Second, GPTs exhibit a great deal
of technological dynamism: continuous innovational eﬀorts in-
crease over time the eﬃciency with which the generic function
is performed, beneﬁting existing users, and prompting further
sectors to adopt the improved GPT. Third, GPTs exhibit ‘inno-
vational complementarities ’ with the application sectors, in the
sense that technical advances in the GPT make it more prof-
itable for its users to innovate and improve their own technolo-
gies. (Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2004, p. 65)
Therefore, on the ‘input side’, that of technical features, what makes a tech-
nology a GPT is its i) general applicability,7 ii) technological dynamism and
iii) innovation spawning, as Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) name the inno-
vational complementarity feature of GPTs. Quite similar features are listed
in other deﬁnitional exercises, to be found in the collection of papers edited
by Helpman (1998) and in the studies of Lipsey et al. (2005), Guerrieri and
7General applicability is sometimes replaced in the literature by the term ‘widely used’
— see Bresnahan and Yin (2010), indicating a tendency in the theoretical analyses of
GPTs to loosen the concept in order to group a wider range of technologies under the
deﬁnition of ‘general purpose’. An additional criticism that we will not address here con-
cerns the deﬁnition of general applicability itself, which in the GPT–literature is always
conceptualized in relation to the number of application sectors that use the GPT. Al-
ternatively, general applicability can be interpreted as the feature of ‘doing nothing in
particular’ (Simon, 1987), pointing more to the breadth of functions a technology can
potentially operate, abstracting from the connections with other sectors or technologies.
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Padoan (2007) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005). The latter, in partic-
ular, testing empirically similarities and diﬀerences between two popularly
recognized GPTs, electriﬁcation and ICT, adds six other ‘symptoms’ of a
GPT derived from theoretical models, and holding also (even with diﬀerent
magnitudes for the two technologies) from empirical evidence (Jovanovic and
Rousseau, 2005, pp. 1203–1204). These further features can be considered
the ‘output side’ characteristics of GPTs: i) productivity slowdowns, due to
learning eﬀects and to the allocation of productive resources to develop the
new compatible and complementary capital required to use the GPT; ii) rise
in the skill premium, as the increase in demand for skilled labor should facil-
itate and shorten the learning process; iii) rise in entry, exit and mergers as
a measure of reallocation of resources; iv) initial fall of stock prices, due to
the acceleration in the rate of obsolescence of old capital vintages caused by
the adoption of the new GPT; v) changes in market shares favoring young
ﬁrms; vi) rise in the interest rate and worsening of trade balance, since as-
sets reallocation, by reducing output, pushes demand and consumption to
search for foreign markets.
The productivity slowdowns on the one hand and the consequent time lag
needed for a new GPT’s productivity improvements to show up in the data
on the other, can be seen as one of the explanation for the so–called Solow
paradox (Basu and Fernald, 2007; Solow, 1987). This is in fact also the
main outcome generated by the ﬁrst cohort of GPT–based growth models,
built around the concept of ‘the time to sow and the time to reap’ (Help-
man and Trajtenberg, 1994). Fluctuations in productivity, together with
the acknowledgment that technological progress is uneven, ‘comes in bursts’
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005, p 1221) and is pervasive with diﬀerent de-
grees, can be considered the main motivation leading to the development of
GPTs literature.
We envisaged earlier in the Chapter that the problem emerging from this
kind of deﬁnitions is one of identiﬁcation. The issue is problematic from an
ex ante point of view (can one infer the GPT nature of a technology since
its very introduction in the market?8) as well as from an ex post viewpoint
8In the literature, a GPT is never seen as an ‘emergent property’ of market and tech-
nological interactions.
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(can one classify under the label ‘GPT’ what has been generically recog-
nized as a radical innovation?). Which technology is a GPT and which one,
instead, is not? The knife–edge distinction, here, is between those schol-
ars who recognize only two or three GPTs since the industrial revolution
(the steam engine, electriﬁcation, and the more questioned ICTs) and see
them as singularities or extreme cases of radical innovations (‘epochal in-
novations’, as Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2004) rename them), and those
who expanded the list to a much more wide range of technologies. As we
will show in the next paragraph, the ﬁrst generation of GPT–based growth
models,9 employing one GPT per period, is closer to the ﬁrst interpretation,
while recent models tend to a more generous interpretation of the notion.
Empirical literature made some steps forward in solving the identiﬁcation
puzzle, however, the results are useful only for what concerns measurement
issues and do not allow to distinguish clearly between GPTs and ‘simple’
radical innovations.10
David and Wright (1999) stress precisely the ex post identiﬁcation point
when, after another enumeration of the properties characterizing a GPT,
they criticize the growing number of technologies labeled ‘general purpose’
by growth and innovation scholars:11
One has only to consider the length of such proposed lists of
GPTs to begin to worry that the concept may be getting out of
hand. History may not have been long enough to contain this
many separate and distinct revolutionary changes. On closer
inspection, it may be that some of these sweeping innovations
should be better viewed as sub–categories of deeper conceptual
9Except the very ﬁrst model of Bresnahan and Trajtenberg.
10For example, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) cite the study of Cummins and Violante
(2002) who — adopting a capital–embodying perspective on technological change — ‘clas-
sify a technology as a GPT when the share of new capital associated with it reaches a
critical level, ad if adoption is widespread across industries’. Another empirical choice is
the one needed to identify the beginning of a GPT era. Again, Jovanovic and Rousseau
set it to ‘the point in time when the GPT achieves a one–percent diﬀusion in the me-
dian sector’. Other empirical analyses make use of patent data to ‘uncover’ GPTs and to
forecast new potential candidates for this role (Hall and Trajtenberg, 2004; Youtie et al.,
2008; Feldman and Yoon, 2012).
11For example, Lipsey et al. (2005) suggest ﬁve technological classes into which to group
diﬀerent GPTs. These are materials, ICTs, power sources, transportation equipment and
organizational forms.
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breakthroughs in a hierarchical structure. Alternatively, partic-
ular historical episodes may be fruitfully understood in terms of
interactions between one or more GPTs on previously separate
historical paths. (David and Wright, 1999)
Although subscribing the David and Wright’s comment, we have to admit
that a heuristic to discriminate between GPTs and non–GPTs is still to
be found. In Section 2.4 we will make an attempt to characterize some
of the sources and conditions that can lead to the ex post prevalence and
pervasiveness of a GPT.
2.3 Modeling GPT–based Economic Growth
It is useful to distinguish between a ﬁrst and a second generation of GPT–
based formal models. The ﬁrst generation includes, in addition to the
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) seminal paper, the models collected and
reprinted in Helpman (1998), in particular the two contributions by Helpman
and Trajtenberg and the one by Aghion and Howitt, who introduce GPTs
into a modeling framework a` la Grossman and Helpman (1991). After an
interval of approximately ﬁve years, the research on GPTs restarted with the
studies of van Zon et al. (2003), Carlaw and Lipsey (2006, 2011), Guerrieri
and Padoan (2007), Harada (2010) to end up with the recent contributions
by Bresnahan (2010, 2012) and Rainer and Strohmaier (2014). The list can
be enlarged by at least another model, that of Fata´s-Villafranca et al. (2012),
which deals with major innovations, cycles, Long Waves and technological
eras though without explicitly referring to GPTs. In what follows, we review
only some of the models, that we consider providing the most representative
and relevant contributions.
The rationale for distinguishing between the two diﬀerent cohorts of models
is both conceptual — considering the diverse perspectives on the nature of
GPTs — and chronological, since the second generation of models belongs
to a later reprise of the topic after its rapid success and even faster decline
at the end of the Nineties.
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The Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) model (hereinafter BT) cannot prop-
erly be considered a growth model, since it stems from a micro/industrial
organization–framework and it captures with a strategic game the interac-
tion between two kinds of sector, the (single) GPT sector and a number of
application sectors (AS). The focus in this model is not on the GPT itself,
but on the pure incentive–based ‘dual inducement mechanism’ at work be-
tween GPT and ASs. In short, GPT and ASs play a joint innovation game:
an increase in the quality of the GPT (representing what we called ‘techno-
logical dynamism’) incentivizes the ASs to increase their technological levels
(this is the ‘innovation complementarities’ property of GPTs) and this, in
turn, induces the GPT sector to further advance its technology. The linked
payoﬀs of GPT and ASs produce a mutual feedback leading to multiple Nash
equilibria. This particular structure of interaction relies on two kinds of ex-
ternalities that, from a welfare point of view, lead to a social rate of return
greater than the private rates of return: one is a vertical externality, related
to the connected and hierarchical payoﬀs structure of the GPT and ASs as
well as to the role of imperfect information ﬂows and appropriability be-
tween the sectors. The other is a horizontal externality focusing on the role
of demand, since the more ASs exist in an economy, the more valuable is the
GPT. The presence of the horizontal externality reinforces the importance of
public subsidies and public demand (procurement). The implication of the
BT model is that ‘the coordination problem between technology–innovating
and technology–using industries’ (Hall and Trajtenberg, 2004) cannot be
solved optimally in a decentralized market system.
The Helpman and Trajtenberg (1994) model (hereinafter HT) draws on BT’s
insights on GPTs and inject them into a fully–ﬂedged endogenous growth
model assuming agents’ perfect foresight. Here GPTs become the main de-
terminants of long–run macroeconomic dynamics. Output is produced with
a GPT and a continuous set of components that have to be compatible with
the general technology and that are produced by innovators in a monopo-
listic competition framework. New GPTs arrive in a deterministic way at
predetermined time intervals of equal length, generating a symmetric cycle
with two (or three, in a special case) sub–phases. In the ﬁrst phase, the
old GPT is used to produce ﬁnal output while resources and labor are al-
located to R&D in order to develop components for the new GPT. In the
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second phase, starting after a minimum threshold of components has been
produced, the development of components continues but the new GPT is
adopted, fostering productivity. During the ﬁrst phase of the cycle, real
GDP declines as wages increases, while the other way round happens in the
following phase. This mechanism has been successfully summarized by the
expression ‘a time to sow and a time to reap’, and has been extended by the
same authors in a follow–up paper (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1996) that
keeps the formal structure but allows for the existence of many sectors. The
order of adoption of the GPT across the sectors between early adopters and
laggards, and therefore the diﬀusion process of the GPT technology, can
lead to multiple long–run equilibria. Policy implications are derived from
the model — in particular, the advice to intervene in order to shorten the
ﬁrst phase of the cycle — but an empirical operationalization of the model
to test its predictions results problematic.
The Aghion and Howitt (1998) model (hereinafter AH) starts from HT’s ba-
sic formulation, stressing its limited empirical relevance for what concerns
two issues: Firstly, the representation of the size of the slump, since ‘all of
the decline in output is attributable to the transfer of labor out of manufac-
turing and into R&D. But since the total amount of R&D labor on average
is only about two and a half percent of the labor force, it is hard to see how
this can account for change in aggregate production of more than a fraction
of a percent.’ (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 55). Secondly, the timing of the
slow–down, that in the previous model follows immediately the arrival of the
new GPT. Therefore, AH adds to the HT model both a Schumpeterian ﬂavor
by making the arrival of GPTs stochastic realizations of a Poisson process,
and a more realistic representation of the adoption process by taking into
account ‘social learning’. The AH model divides the cycle into three phases,
instead of the two considered in HT: ‘ﬁrst, the economy wide GPT must
be discovered. Second, a ﬁrm in that sector must acquire a “template”, on
which to base experimentation. Third, the ﬁrm must use this template to
discover how to implement the GPT in its particular sector’ (Aghion and
Howitt, 1998, p. 63). The role of social learning is relevant here: a ﬁrm (an
industry) can move from phase zero to phase one — the acquisition of the
GPT template — via independent discovery (depending on a Poisson pro-
cess) or through imitation, whose likelihood to occur is a probability given
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by a cumulative binomial distribution. The transition from phase one to
phase two, then, requires the allocation of labor resources to R&D activ-
ities, with a rate of success that depends on another Poisson distribution.
Additionally, AH provide extensions of the model that include skill diﬀeren-
tials, wage inequalities and their relationship with technological change and
with the size of the slump generated by the arrival of the GPT. Also the
eﬀect of the innovation–wave arrival on capital obsolescence is analysed.
Despite conceptual or analytical diﬀerences, the ﬁrst generation of GPT–
based models share a common assumption: the GPT is recognized ex ante as
a general purpose technology. In BT, it is the ‘ﬁrst mover’ that incentivizes
application sectors to exploit innovation complementarities and starts the
dual inducement mechanism. In HT and in AH an explicit assumption is
made about the impossibility to develop new components before a new GPT
has arrived. By having ex ante knowledge about the existence of a new
GPT, economic agents are left only with the possibility to decide on the
allocation of resources to research on the basis of their expected proﬁt. The
picture is quite simpliﬁed with respect to a reality of continuous technological
change, with competition (Arthur, 1989), diﬀusion and selection happening
in an uncertain environment that opens room for the role of risk–taking
entrepreneurs.
The model of van Zon et al. (2003) is thus assigned to the second generation
of models, although it is just a modiﬁcation of the Romer model (and so
it may appear to belong to the ﬁrst generation), not only for a chronologi-
cal reason, but mainly because it departs from the assumption that GPTs
are identiﬁed ex ante. It is also the ﬁrst model that allows for co–existing
GPTs. The model assumes two types of stochastic (Poisson) R&D pro-
cesses: a basic R&D sector, which produces ‘core’ technologies (the GPTs),
and an applied R&D sector, producing ‘peripherals’, corresponding to HT
components. Both R&D sectors are subject to decreasing returns, so after
the arrival of a core technology the economic incentive — and the labor
force — switches to the production of peripherals, and the other way round.
The fundamental novelty of the model resulting from its solution using sim-
ulation methods, relates to the possibility that some cores become ‘failed’
GPTs if few or no components are developed for them. Failed GPTs remind
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us that ‘during the innovation process, the actual pervasiveness of an inno-
vation when and if it arrives can only be guessed at’ (van Zon et al., 2003,
pp. 8–9). A GPT is an ‘ex–post mental construct’, deriving from the evi-
dence that a particular technology is capable to execute a wide range of (old
and new) productive functions in the economy. To assume the existence of a
GPT ex ante can lead to a limited comprehension of pervasive GPT–based
economic growth.
Carlaw and Lipsey (2006) (hereinafter CL) extend the idea of the van Zon
et al. model, proposing an out–of–equilibrium three (competitive) sectors
model, where the appearance of a GPT is driven by an endogenous mecha-
nism. The three sectors, each represented by a speciﬁc production function,
are: i) a fundamental research sector that accumulates a stock of basic
knowledge and produces the GPT; ii) an applied R&D sector and iii) a
consumption sector. The latter sector produces consumption goods with a
productivity level derived from a share of the knowledge generated by the
applied R&D sector. In turn, the applied R&D sector accumulates knowl-
edge with a degree of eﬀectiveness that depends on the stock of knowledge
available in the fundamental research sector. Finally, the fundamental re-
search sector creates basic knowledge with a productivity that depends on
the share of applied knowledge that is not directed to the production of
consumption goods. The basic knowledge generated by the fundamental re-
search sector is accumulated at every period as a ‘potential’ stock, but can
be used only when a new GPT appears. The arrival of a new GPT is again
stochastic and it relies on a slightly more complicated mechanism than the
Poisson process used in other models: two (left–skewed) Beta distributions
generate two random values; the ﬁrst is compared with a threshold–value
and, if bigger, the GPT appears. The second random value resulting from
the remaining Beta distribution calibrates the amount of potential basic
knowledge accumulated before the arrival of the new GPT that becomes
usable with the appearance of the GPT. The model is closed specifying con-
sumers’ expectations, the maximization problem and the resulting resources
allocation that is assumed to be conducted by a social planner. The results
of the model simulation show that economic growth persists as long as the
fundamental knowledge sector is ‘feeded’ by GPT, that restlessly ‘rejuve-
nate’ the system and produce waves (spikes) in the allocation of resources
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and in the output produced. CL model is further developed in a succession
of studies featuring multiple and coexisting GPTs being active in the econ-
omy (Carlaw and Lipsey, 2011). There, the fundamental research (GPT)
sector is divided into diﬀerent technological categories, while the applied
R&D sector is represented by many research facilities. The picture of eco-
nomic evolution oﬀered by such model becomes quite realistic, however at
the price of a stretching of the very concept of GPT. As mentioned above
in early warning of David and Wright, the modeling of plenty of co–existing
GPTs can be at odds with the aim to describe the role played by ‘revo-
lutionary technologies’. Further, the promising idea of the van Zon et al.
model to challenge the assumption of an ex ante identiﬁcation of GPTs is
lost in the CL formulation, which considers only the stochastic modeling of
the GPTs arrival.
Before concluding this overview Section, another critical point should be
added: in the models presented, as well as in the Goodwinian model of
Fata´s-Villafranca et al. (2012), the arrival mechanism of a new GPT de-
pends on the accumulation of a certain quantity of knowledge, either due
to the optimal allocation of resources to research or to routinized decision–
making. Technological eras follow one another because of the collection of a
generic, non–well–speciﬁed commodity labeled ‘knowledge’. Once one real-
izes that the evolution of knowledge is something more complex, localized,
purposeful and ‘sticky’, the modeling strategy used in the existing literature
to represent the arrival of GPTs can results too stylized. To capture this
more sophisticated issue, a new view of GPTs should, therefore, be grounded
on a ﬁner–grained level of analysis, opening room — as suggested in the next
Section — for a Microeconomics of GPTs.
In spite of some of the theoretical developments overviewed above, we think
that the initial approach followed by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg remains
the most promising starting point to deal with GPTs, since it focuses on the
micro– and meso–economic interaction structure between GPTs and their
applications rather than on the black box assuming a certain data gener-
ating process determining the GPT arrival. Two recent contributions by
Bresnahan (2012) and Bresnahan and Yin (2010) extend our understanding
of GPTs in this direction. The paper of Bresnahan and Yin (2010) deals with
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the role played by heterogeneous consumer demand. GPTs replacement is
the outcome of the process through which ‘growth bottlenecks’, which are
generated by the inertial (locked–in) trajectory of technical progress within
the established GPT and ASs, are overcome thanks to the presence of un-
served demand that searches for new GPTs. The study of Bresnahan (2012)
returns instead to the supply side of the story to analyze the conditions for
the emergence of a ‘GPT cluster’, that is the ensemble of a GPT and its
linked AS. Here the role played the ‘recombination’ of diﬀerent technologies
and the ‘re–use’ of the resulting knowledge are key to understand the es-
tablishment of a GPT. Three stylized processes are highlighted: i) planned
initiative, the classical hierarchical interpretation of GPT, where the intro-
duction of a GPT induces the development of complementary innovations;
ii) technological convergence, where speciﬁc technologies are invented ﬁrst
— even lacking the knowledge about their potential linkages — and these
inventions raise the expected proﬁt of inventing a GPT able to connect and
recombined the already existing technologies; iii) inversion, when a ‘spe-
ciﬁc’ innovation increases the value of inventing a GPT whose introduction,
in turn, increases the incentive to introduce a new speciﬁc technology.
The last two contributions we discussed, even if they do not tackle the
identiﬁcation problems (a GPT is identiﬁed as such ex ante, right from
the model setup, and in all the three scenarios outlined), pave the way
for an analysis built on micro and meso arguments. An uneven and self–
reinforcing (or self–reducing, as it could be possible in the case of a vicious
circle of disincentives for innovative activities both in the GPT and in the
AS) interaction between a hierarchy of technologies is a perfect point of
departure for a Schumpeterian and evolutionary account of GPTs. The
recognition of the role of technological speciﬁcities and opportunities (in the
cases of convergence and inversion), together with the role demand plays in
the ‘coordination game’ of GPTs’ introduction and diﬀusion, takes us very
close to the conceptual building blocks used by the literature on Industrial
Dynamics and Microeconomics of Innovation.
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2.4 The Microeconomics of GPTs: Prevalence and
Pervasiveness
To summarize the discussion so far, we quote a passage from Bresnahan
(italics is ours):
one goal (of studying GPTs) lies in growth macroeconomics, to
provide an explanation of the close link between whole era of
economic growth and the innovative application of certain tech-
nologies, called GPTs, such as the steam engine, electric motors,
or computers. Another goal is in the microeconomics of techni-
cal change and proceeds by diﬀerentiating between innovations
of diﬀerent types. The incentives and information related to
the invention of GPTs themselves, may diﬀer from those related
to the invention of applications; another example would be the
incentives and information related to an established GPT with
successful applications in contrast to earlier stages. A third goal
links the macro and the micro. Can we understand the linkages
between aggregate economic growth and the incentives and in-
formation structures related to particular inventions and to their
application to particular uses and sectors? (Bresnahan, 2010,
p. 763)
In this paragraph, we look at GPTs from a microeconomic point of view.
The discussion of GPTs within the growth literature has shown that the
appearance of GPTs in the models is taken as rather exogenous and their
inﬂuence on other industries and sectors in an economy and hence their
pervasiveness is taken as given. Certainly, to analytically proceed in this
direction can be justiﬁed in two ways. First, it is for the purpose of model-
ing convenience allowing for an analytical solution. Secondly, the discussion
of Long Waves of economic development has repeatedly highlighted the oc-
currence of fundamental technologies. The emergence of these fundamental
technologies (as well as the approach of Long Waves in general) still is a
phenomenon not well understood, despite several attempts in the Eighties
and Nineties (Haag et al., 1987; Weidlich and Haag, 1983) searching for
32 A New View of GPTs
an explanation. In view of that state of the art, especially the assumption
about the exogeneity assigned to GPTs in macro modeling seems to be not
too farfetched.
Our stance in this discussion is, however, to go further and to highlight
some directions of analysis that allow to better grasp and understand the
phenomenon of GPTs. For this purpose we combine the insight by van Zon
et al. (2003) of a GPT as a ‘ex post mental construct’ with considerations
on early indicators of the emergence of GPTs. Hence we attempt to come
closer to the ‘origins’ of a GPT. By this we certainly follow Arrow (1991)
in admitting that ‘. . . it is hopeless to develop a model which will genuinely
predict innovations’ and in claiming that those models and the considera-
tions behind them will provide ‘. . . some useful idea of the average rate of
technological change, of the degree of ﬂuctuations and the kinds of surprise
that we may ﬁnd in the future. We cannot, of course, predict a surprise; that
is a contradiction in terms. But we can predict the kind of surprises that
might occur’. On this basis we suggest to enrich the approaches to GPTs by
a micro and a meso level analysis and draw attention to approaches which
address path dependency, technology competition and dominant designs, as
well as collective innovation and sectoral interdependencies. A look at the
characterization of GPTs from a microeconomic point of view again already
indicates some avenues to follow.
As discussed abouve, an attempt to summarize various deﬁnitional exer-
cises on GPTs in the literature leads to the following three characteristics:
i) Pervasiveness: A GPT should have an impact on technical change and pro-
ductivity growth across a large number of uses/industries; ii) Improvement:
A GPT should experience a wide scope of improvement and elaboration in
its own industry; ii) Innovation spawning: A GPT should lead to product
and process innovation in a broad range of uses / application sectors. These
characterizations are based on an implicit assumption, namely that the tech-
nology under concern, the GPT, is a prevailing technology, it exists for a
longer period of time, it is accepted on a broad scale and for these reasons it
impacts on an economy in a pervasive, improving and innovation generating
way. Hence, the conditions for a broad usage of a GPT in an economy are of
interest but neither her sources nor the conditions of her prevalence. What
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are the sources of prevalence and of pervasiveness so much at the core of
GPTs? What can be said beyond addressing an exogenous source?
2.4.1 Conditions for Prevalence
The prevalence of a technology is given by her persistency over time. In
other word, such kind of technology is unlikely and diﬃcult to be challenged
by new alternative technologies — it seems to be incontestable, at least for
some time. Instead of taking that feature as given we have to think about
mechanisms and determinants just providing for prevalence. To accomplish
that let us ﬁrst look into the reasons for a technology to be incontestable.
According to David (1985, 1987) this prevalence is the result of a coordi-
nation of agents’ choices on a speciﬁc technology. The outcome then is a
speciﬁc allocation which is rather stable over time. Three conditions lead
agents to coordinate their choices and also lend persistence to the result-
ing allocation: i) the technical interrelatedness of system components; ii)
quasi–irreversibility of investment (or, more generally, switching costs); iii)
positive externalities or increasing returns to scale.
The technical interrelatedness of a system (i) appears to be an aspect very
much out of the economic realm. Chemical and physical laws as well as en-
gineering types of relationships presumably determine which kinds of tech-
nologies ﬁt together, which ones may be substituted, and which comple-
mentarities cannot easily be challenged. If we consider GPTs as the core of
such kind of a system then the explanation for their prevalence is a rather
technical one.
The quasi irreversibility of investment and related — often very high —
switching costs (ii) extend the previous argument and translates it into eco-
nomic cost terms. The technical interrelatedness (i) could as well be ex-
pressed in cost terms: the switching costs, related to the resources required
for exploring new chemical and physical laws or engineering relationships,
which allow for breaking up the interrelated system, are very (if not in-
ﬁnitely) high. In other cases, it is the systemic dimension of the supply of
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the goods and services related to a certain technology which protects against
the challenges of new invader technologies — the combustion engine for au-
tomobiles and the accompanying system of fuel stations and fuel logistics
just being a point in case. Combined with these investments are mutual
dependencies — not only of a technical nature but also in terms of relative
prices — which contribute to the prevalence of the core technology. As long
as relative factor price changes remain in a certain range, switching costs
to new alternatives prevail high and secure the persistency of the existing
technology.
Another aspect of a technology, partly related to the aforementioned sys-
temic aspect, addresses the existence of positive externalities or increasing
returns to scale (iii) in the use of a certain technology. These increasing re-
turns may arise either on the supply side of a market as a result of learning
eﬀects (learning by doing or by using) or on the demand side as a result of
positive network (or agglomeration) externalities that raise the beneﬁts of
a technique, product, or location for each user as the total number of users
increases. Learning by doing, allowing the eﬃciency a certain technology
to increase the more it is used, sustains competitiveness and dominance of
the dominant technology. The positive network eﬀects related to customers’
adoption of a certain technology are based on idea that the individual bene-
ﬁts a customer enjoys depends positively on the number of other customers
— as is the case in telephony, video system or in computer software. These
supply and demand side based externalities already protect the established
technology against possible invading new alternatives.
At least the second and third of the conditions above — irreversible invest-
ment and increasing returns — indicate already that the eﬀects on preva-
lence are realized not at a single point of time but rather dynamically. In
either case it is a positive feedback from the macro state of the system (high
level of front–up investment, high number of adopters) to the choices of in-
dividual agents, eventually resulting in de facto standardization on a single
technique. In the words of David (1987), eﬀects of path dependence are
prevailing here.
Taking into account the dynamic dimension of the conditions for preva-
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lence quite naturally leads to considerations about the sources of prevalence.
Hence, the mechanisms that sustain prevalence are also the ones leading to
dominance. Or to put it in reverse order, observing a technology that in
competition appears to dominate due to positive feedbacks allows the con-
clusion that this technology will stay dominant for a certain longer period.
2.4.2 The Dynamics Towards Prevalence
For understanding innovation and technology competition, insights from
Industrial Dynamics and the inherent innovation, learning and knowledge
dynamics are useful. This literature informs about possible mechanisms,
conditions and structural dynamics on which the development or the ap-
pearance of a standard or a dominant design is based.
At the core of the further discussion are approaches in Industrial Dynam-
ics. This ﬁeld of research established by formulating major criticism to the
approaches in industrial organization tackling the traditional issues related
to the Neo–Schumpeterian hypotheses, namely the question whether large
(monopoly) ﬁrms or small (competitive) ﬁrms are the major drivers of inno-
vative activities and the resulting economic development. The inconclusive
empirical evidence on these hypotheses induced a research agenda that con-
siders the analysis of industries and the innovative activities herein to neces-
sarily take into account innovation and technology dynamics. The resulting
competition between diﬀerently innovative ﬁrms or diﬀerent technologies is
a major driving force in shaping industry and market structures.
A GPT in this context can be considered the result of competing new tech-
nologies or the successful challenge of an old (GPT?) technology. The mech-
anism behind is path dependent, presumably leading to the establishment
of a standard or a dominant design — both resembling the characteristics
of dominance over alternatives.
A dominant design in a product class is, by deﬁnition, the one
that wins the allegiance of the marketplace, the one that com-
petitors and innovators must adhere to if they hope to command
36 A New View of GPTs
signiﬁcant market following. (Utterback, 1996)
Compared to a GPT, a dominant design is just deﬁned more from the gen-
erating side, in the sense of where it comes from and under which circum-
stances it appears. About its further eﬀects not much is stated except that
it is useful as well as widely accepted and used. In this sense, it complements
the concept of GPT just from the generating side and combining both may
help understanding better the appearance of GPTs.
As to the emergence of a dominant design, it is a competitive process of
trying out the basic features of the dominant design:
Prior to the appearance of a dominant design many of its sep-
arate features may be tried in varied products which are either
custom designed or designed for a particular and demanding
market niche. (Suarez and Utterback, 1995, p. 118)
The industry life cycle literature — dealing with the long-run development
of industries — just applies the concept of a dominant design (Utterback
and Suarez, 1993) to explain the transition from a phase in which the num-
ber of ﬁrms in an industry is increasing to the appearance of the so–called
shakeout, during which the net entry is negative and a sharp decline in the
number of ﬁrms is observed — then eventually leading to a phase in which
the number of ﬁrm is constant (an oligopoly). The appearance of domi-
nant design is here seen as the outcome of the competition between various
diﬀerent technological solutions during the phase of expansion.
Among the factors reinforcing this development of competitive selection —
best technology compromise; cooperation; combination of sociological, po-
litical, and organizational dynamics; economies of scale in Murmann and
Frenken (2006); similar ﬁrm level related factors as well as environmental
factors in Suarez (2004) — sources of dynamic externalities or positive dy-
namic returns to scale are important in our context. In some literature these
eﬀects are related to path dependencies. Those may be connected to the size
of the ﬁrm and the accumulated production experience or to demand side
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eﬀects. In principle these externalities provide for additional beneﬁts for
a technology which is leading in terms of produced or sold or used units.
Hence, a ﬁrst mover advantage related to size (production volume) con-
tributes to the dominance of a certain technology.
The eﬀects of economies of scale (Klepper, 1997, 1996) and related learning
economies draw from the fact that the more units have been produced or
the more often a technology has been applied the higher is the contribu-
tion to productivity which materializes in lower unit costs (and hence lower
prices) or higher product quality (and hence a higher quality/price ratio).
Both contribute to the beneﬁt a user can reap and hence contribute to the
dominance of the technology concerned.
An equivalent argument can be formulated for the demand side. David
(1985) and Arthur (1989) highlight the beneﬁt of using/consuming a speciﬁc
product depending on the number of other users. Due to random factors one
technology will gain a larger share in the population of consumers accompa-
nied with comparatively higher returns. The likelihood that next consumers
will select just this superior technology increases and subsequently without
further larger random shocks the technology with the small lead will win a
dominant position. Over time, the technology which accidentally grasps a
certain lead in market share will in the end come to dominate the market or
industry. Deviations from this outcome are either due to major stochastic
shocks or the trespassing of a certain critical mass of adopters of a competing
alternative (Witt, 1997).
Taken these arguments together, approaches addressing dominant designs
inform about the competitive environment within which technologies strive
for market dominance. One of the mechanisms or factors behind this pro-
cess, namely dynamic economies of scale, coincides with the mechanism and
conditions which provide for the prevalence of GPTs. On these terms, the
emergence of a GPT and its prevalence seem to be intimately connected via
the same kind of mechanism.
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2.4.3 Conditions for Pervasiveness
The other core characteristic of a GPT, the pervasiveness in application and
for further innovation, is related to i) her broad impact into other sectors
and branches and ii) her relevance for further innovative activities there.
Pervasiveness appears on a ﬁrst sight to be related to technological inter-
relationships, one of the conditions for a stable allocation formulated by
David, and hence to be an exogenous factor. However, research into the
innovation activities of ﬁrms, research institutes and other actors has deliv-
ered collective invention and innovation (Allen, 1983; von Hippel, 1987) as
the mode of organizing these activities which has become more and more
frequent over time. The basis for cooperating in innovation is risk and costs
sharing on the one hand and knowledge exchange, access and sharing on the
other. The context within which this collaboration appears is characterized
by dispersed knowledge and competences which for the sake of coming to
new solutions are required to be combined and interacted. This aspect be-
comes the more relevant the more complex is a technology to be developed
and pursued.
Addressing again the literature on dominant designs12 Liebowitz and Mar-
golis (1995) show that collaboration in innovative activities as well as related
strategies such as licensing of new ideas is conducive to the emergence of a
dominant design. One may assign this property also to the appearance of
GPTs. Moreover, the participation of several actors and their agreement on
the best technological compromise (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Chris-
tensen et al., 1998) induces a broad acceptance which contributes to per-
vasiveness. In this context, the multidimensional nature and high develop-
ment costs of many complex products rather naturally requires that several
parties agree on cooperating and negotiating (Cowan, 1990; Rosenkopf and
Tushman, 1992) in the technology to be pursued collectively.
Establishing a dominant design collectively brings about a certain pattern of
further innovative activities. According to Anderson and Tushman (1990)
the appearance of a dominant design is followed by innovative activities
12For example, Cusumano et al. (1992); Khazam and Mowery (1994).
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which are of a rather incremental type. These incremental steps allow re-
ﬁning the basics of the dominant design and exploiting speciﬁc sectoral,
industrial or agent speciﬁc opportunities the dominant design oﬀers. As
long as these opportunities do not get exploited completely, the pervasive-
ness of the dominant design/the GPT (as well as her prevalence) appears to
be secured.
Certainly, the foregoing discussion of the emergence of a dominant design
as a collective outcome and its persistence over time is quite neutral with
respect to the breadth of this design. With breadth we mean the number
of industries aﬀected by the design, using it or working with it. In fact, the
literature on dominant design is mainly focusing on industries and the com-
petition among ﬁrms and/or technologies in these industries — hence it is an
intra–sectoral analysis with the inter–sectoral dimension not taken on board.
Applying these ﬁndings to our understanding of the pervasiveness of GPTs
requires certainly taking on board the inter–sectoral dimension. To this end
further research needs to be performed which will be informed by analyses
on the technological relations between sectors (Cantner and Hanusch, 1999),
the dimensions of related technological variety between sectors (Buerger and
Cantner, 2011), as well as the policy designs in fostering collaboration in in-
novation (Cantner and Pyka, 2001).
2.5 Conclusion
The success of the GPT ‘category’ in economic theory is probably explained
by the need to gather all the insights coming from a rich research trajectory
on Long Waves and Business Cycles and to condense them into a workable
‘mainstream’ modeling exercise. However, both the very notion of GPT
and the simplifying assumptions accompanying it in the macromodels we
overviewed can be questioned. In this Chapter, we oﬀered a ‘new view of
General Purpose Technologies’, that builds on the classic as well as on the
recent literature, enquiring more in deep the deﬁnitional problems related
to GPTs and the conditions for their emergence, together with the charac-
teristics inﬂuencing their prevalence and pervasiveness. A Schumpeterian
and evolutionary view, pointing at the micro and meso level of analysis —
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that of the dynamics of ﬁrms and industries —, is in our view the privileged
perspective economists need to adopt in order to revitalize the theoretical
and empirical study of GPTs. The similarities with the emergence of domi-
nant designs and the relations with dynamics of increasing returns and path
dependency in the choice between alternative technologies, together with in-
sights taken from studies on collective inventions and cooperative ventures
oﬀer us a set of tools well suited to study the establishment of GPTs as a
process unfolding in time, more than as a single, homogeneous shock.
Explaining GPTs is thus not a matter of technology ‘arrival’, nor does it
require explicitly some inherent ‘radicality’ of the technologies under analy-
sis. GPTs can be introduced in particular niches of the market or in speciﬁc
industries and there they can be ‘cultivated’ or developed until, thanks to
industrial interactions, demand pressures and technoligical competitions,
they assume the role of core technologies, shaping the general conﬁguration
of production and the whole economy.
As Mokyr (2010) points out, ‘major discoveries rarely arise de–novo, and
what seems to us a breakthrough was only the last step in a long intellectual
journey’. Our task as economist is to try to intercept the trajectory of this
intellectual journey so to understand the possible alternatives an economic
system can have at its disposal to increase the total welfare of the Society.
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Chapter 3
Generalizing General
Purpose Technologies
3.1 Introduction
The fertility of a theoretical concept depends on a number of factors, its
diﬀusion being the result of positive feedbacks in use and adoption, or the
fair reward for a superior eﬀort in ‘the art of successful theorizing’ (Solow,
1956), meaning the capability to oﬀer new insights independently of non–
relevant details. Alternatively, the goodness of a theory — and, therefore,
its likelihood to gain shares in the market for ideas — can be measured
by its accuracy in providing correct predictions, despite the realism of its
assumptions or premises (Hausman, 1989). In this Chapter, we assess the
fertility and goodness of the theory of General Purpose Technology (here-
inafter GPT), and suggest some ways to ‘generalize GPTs’.
The concept of GPTs has been introduced in the early Nineties, pooling
together diverse theoretical needs: to introduce heterogeneity in the con-
ceptualization of technological change, to explain growth ﬂuctuations and
productivity paradoxes in a way diﬀerent from both Long Waves theories
and Business Cycles models, and tied to Industrial Organization and en-
dogenous growth theorizing. Having David (1990) drawn a parallel between
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‘the Dynamo and the Computer’, shedding some light on the historical and
technological determinants of adoption–diﬀusion patterns and their eﬀects
on productivity, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) formally developed the
concept of GPT. They did so in order to study the strategic interaction
setting arising from the need for coordination in innovative activities in
linked upstream (the GPT) and downstream sectors (the Application Sec-
tors, hereinafter AS). The resulting mutual feedback, that aﬀects the returns
on innovative activities both on GPT and AS sectors, has been called dual
inducement mechanism, and represents the main feature of the theory at the
micro and meso level of analysis. GPTs have then been borrowed by New
Growth theory, gaining attention thanks to the book of Helpman (1998).
The main insight from GPT models is, however, a microeconomic one: when
sectors are linked in the production and adoption of technologies, the econ-
omy is sensible to externalities and multiple equilibria are possible. Given
that, and borrowing Greenstein’s concise deﬁnition, a GPT can be consid-
ered in general term as
a capability whose adaptation to a variety of circumstances raises
the marginal returns to inventive activity in each of these cir-
cumstances. GPTs are associated with high ﬁxed costs to in-
venting the technology and low marginal costs to use and reuse.
This cost structure both (1) generates heavy early investment
— which can occur before and during diﬀusion of the technol-
ogy — and (2) leads to frequent repurposing of focal inventions.
Rosenberg (. . . ) describes this as ‘the introduction of a relatively
small number of broadly similar production processes to a large
number of industries’. (Greenstein, 2010, p. 483)
Literature converges on three main criteria to identify a GPT (In Chapter
2 we label them ‘input characteristics’):1 i) general applicability, ii) tech-
nological dynamism, and iii) innovational complementarities, to which one
can add some empirical regularities, or output characteristics, that should
1With some variance in the terms used and in the number of characteristics listed, see
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005), Lipsey et al. (1998), Bresnahan (2010).
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accompany the diﬀusion of a GPT (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005).2 While
the feature of general applicability relates mainly to the technical character-
istics of the GPT (that is general purpose because it does ‘nothing special’,
in Simon (1987) words), innovational complementarities are the result of the
dual inducement mechanism described above. There, a rise in the ‘quality’
of the GPT resulting from R&D investments shifts the function of R&D
returns also for the AS (in Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995)’s formulation,
it shifts the AS innovative activities cost function) and vice versa.
The present status of the theory can be condensed in Mokyr (2006)’s claim
that — using the past tense — that of GPT was ‘a theme that brieﬂy rose
to prominence a decade ago in the literature of the economics of techno-
logical change’, indirectly suggesting the belonging of the concept to a now
exhausted wave of economic theorizing. More critically, in his review of
Lipsey et al. (2005) book on GPTs and long–term growth, the very nature
of GPTs as a theory is questioned: ‘The term (GPT) does not (. . . ) con-
stitute a theory. A GPT is in fact a technique that is complementary with
a lot of other techniques. How many is a lot the reader must decide, and
the nature of the complementarity is left a bit mysterious’ (Mokyr, 2006).3
Our claim is that GPTs can constitute a theory, provided that some clariﬁ-
cations are given. In fact, in addition to the shortcomings just quoted, the
GPT framework shows some ex ante as well as ex post deﬁnitional problems
(see Chapter 2), together with a non–consistent use of the identiﬁcation
criteria outlined above when the theory has been applied to detect GPTs
empirically (Field, 2008). The limits of the GPT theory became evident
2See Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2004) for a discussion of the additional feature of
‘relaxation of geographical constraints’ characterizing a GPT such as the Corliss steam
engine.
3Mokyr continues questioning the very usefulness of the GPT concept: ‘A screw, one
would think, is complementary to almost any mechanical construct one can think of, but
the screw is not included in their list of GPT. Ships, on the other hand, are. As the
authors argue, ships may seem to have only one use (to move objects from A to B) but
they qualify as GPTs, as do automobiles, because they can be used to transport almost
anything and are thus complementary to nearly any other technique. The same is true for
printing, presumably on the argument that almost any kind of information can be printed.
But this seems somehow diﬀerent from, say, electrical power or microprocessors, which are
a direct input into the production of many other goods (whereas the printing press only
reproduces information). Internal combustion engines do seem rather obvious GPT’s, but
ships and printing presses only produce one ﬁnal output, even if that has multiple uses. If
the engine and the wheel are GPT’s, why not the ball–bearing, the pulley, the lever etc.’
(Mokyr, 2006)
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in its boom–and–burst application to growth modeling, where it produced
nice results however without inducing a follow–up cascade of contributions
or establishing a dedicated sub–ﬁeld of economic theory.
In spite of the relative decline in prominence of GPT studies, recent years
have seen a resurgence of the topic, both from a (non–orthodox) macro
perspective (Carlaw and Lipsey, 2006, 2011; Rainer and Strohmaier, 2014)
and from a micro one (Bresnahan, 2012; Bresnahan and Yin, 2010). New
GPT–based growth models enrich the GPT framework including uncertainty
and knowledge dynamics among their building blocks, while new micro per-
spectives extend the basic Industrial Organization framework of dual in-
ducement, studying more in deep the ‘Social Increasing Returns to Scale’
(Bresnahan, 2010) that GPTs generate, and broadening the framework of
analysis. At the same time, the literature has seen a surge in empirical
studies related to GPTs (see Section 3.6 for a discussion of GPT empirics).
Notwithstanding all its limits, the GPT concept is still fertile.
Given this up–to–date view of GPT theory, the aim of this Chapter is
twofold: Firstly, to select the core characteristics of the GPT framework
that represent relevant contributions to economic theory, in order to high-
light and generalize them. Secondly, to extend this ‘core’ with additional
insights borrowed from the literature on Industrial Dynamics and Evolu-
tionary Economics. As already pointed out in Chapter 2, the macro and
historical account of GPTs on the one hand seems to be too much aﬀected
by detrimental simpliﬁcations; on the other hand, it is ‘getting out of hand’
(David andWright, 1999) while transitioning from the theory of the few revo-
lutionary innovations that determine the beginning of ‘technological eras’, to
the theory of multiple and co–existing but simply ‘very important’ technolo-
gies. Therefore, we will focus on a broader concept of GPT: an evolutionary
and dynamic process built on micro disequilibria between interconnected
industries’ incentives to innovate, spillovers and externalities, and economic
and technological complementarities.
Our attempt is to frame theoretically the process that drives an initially
‘speciﬁc’ technology, capable of generating positive spillovers in downstream
industries’ innovative activities, to emerge as a GPT within the network of
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industrial connections. From a complexity theory viewpoint, the introduc-
tion of a GPT induces a diﬀerential change in the ‘ﬁtness’ of the existing
technological and economic components of the economic system, modifying
their propensity to innovate in a way that is very similar to that captured
by the class of ‘avalanche’ models (Silverberg, 2002) of technological change.
Being the result of microeconomic interactions, an (ex post) GPT can be
considered as a technological impulse producing as outcome — under certain
conditions — a technological multiplier, the latter meaning an acceleration
of the rate of innovative activities in related industries. If dual inducements
take place, the process generates increasing returns to the use of (investment
in) the new technology, with the technology gaining momentum, persistence,
and pervasiveness (see Chapter 2), so to become a GPT. In this sense, to
understand GPTs as processes, the unit of analysis of the theoretical anal-
ysis has to shift from the very GPT to the network of linkages between the
potential GPT and its downstream applications. Following the most recent
contribution, below we deﬁne such network as GPT cluster. Generalizing
GPTs to a network phenomenon opens room to a wide range of extensions
for the analytical, empirical and policy analyses of pervasive technological
change.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides an
assessment of the recent works on GPTs, which have the virtue of isolating
the mechanisms leading to the implementation, diﬀusion, dual inducement
and switch between GPTs. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 oﬀer two generalizations of
GPT theory: the ﬁrst establishes a link between GPTs and spillover theo-
ries, while the second connects GPTs and unbalanced development theory.
Section 3.5 further develops the generalized approach to GPTs, sketching
the concept of technological multiplier. Section 3.6 overviews the empirical
approaches used in GPT studies and suggests a novel approach consistent
with the theoretical claims made in the Chapter. The proposed methodology
is used to provide a ﬁrst illustrive exploration of technological multipliers.
Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 From GPTs to GPT Clusters
In Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), both the GPT and the AS already
exist in the economy. The purpose of the model is in fact to highlight the
structural connection that ties the incentive to innovate in the two sectors,
more than to enquire the nature of GPTs. As the private returns from a
technological–level–enhancing innovation in GPT (AS) are also function of
the technological level of the AS (GPT), a dual inducement takes place. The
number of AS employing the GPT–embodying commodity as an input can
increase or decrease (in a sort of diﬀusion process), depending negatively on
the price of the GPT and positively on its quality, where the GPT quality
is one of the choice variables whose optimal value results from the condition
of equalization of marginal returns and marginal costs of innovating. The
marginal returns and marginal costs of innovating are in turn inﬂuenced by
the R&D investment decisions of the AS. The analysis of the coordination
problem that arises due to the (vertical as well as horizontal) externalities
generated by this particular structure of interaction is the relevant contri-
bution of that paper.
Recently, Bresnahan provided two studies (Bresnahan, 2012; Bresnahan and
Yin, 2010) in order to ﬁll two gaps in the theory, namely: i) which incentives
and mechanisms lead to the introduction of a new GPT, and ii) how one GPT
is replaced by another. In order to tackle the ﬁrst issue, Bresnahan (2012)
establishes a distinction between diﬀerent kinds of knowledge and connects
such diﬀerent knowledge types with the likelihood of a technological recom-
bination to take place. More precisely, inventions can be introduced in the
market, producing a certain value for their inventors, alone or by raising
the returns of other technologies with which they can recombine. However,
unless the invention is introduced into the market, nobody knows about
it, and possible recombinations are foreseeable only through privately hold
entrepreneurial knowledge, which is a characteristic of the inventor himself
and of the inventors that have to decide whether to introduce into the mar-
ket their products with which the ﬁrst technology can be recombined. If the
expected returns for an inventor are high enough to allow the introduction
of her invention in the economy, knowledge about it changes its nature from
entrepreneurial to distributed market knowledge. Becoming widely avail-
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able, market knowledge of the innovation inﬂuences the behavior of other
inventors, modifying their evaluation of the returns of their own inventions
and the feasibility of further combinations. A GPT–like invention may not
be worth an independent launch into the market, but its likelihood to enter
the market can change if other speciﬁc-purpose technologies — to be used
in combination with the GPT — enter the market, broadening the set of
market knowledge.
Depending on the sequence of introduction of the inventions, a GPT can be
implemented in three ways: i) as a ‘planned initiative’, when the GPT comes
ﬁrst and induces complementary innovations; ii) due to ‘technological con-
vergence’, when special–purpose technologies are invented ﬁrst — even lack-
ing the knowledge about their potential linkages — creating the conditions
for the proﬁtable introduction of a GPT that connects the already existing
technologies; iii) due to an ‘inversion’, when a special–purpose innovation
increases the value of inventing a GPT whose introduction, in turn, raises
the incentive to introduce a new speciﬁc technology. The planned initiative
is the classic hierarchical view of the GPT–AS relation, while the processes
of technological convergence and inversion shed light on the more imbal-
anced and circuitous ways through which a GPT enters the economy. These
alternative sequences may be useful to describe how some technologies have
been introduced in the real world, among them the PC, the E–commerce,
the Internet. Besides, the concept of technological convergence — already
implicit in Greenstein’s deﬁnition quoted above — is directly borrowed from
Rosenberg (1963)’s historical study of the American Machine tool industry,
in which locally emerged technical problems were generalized and solved
at an higher level of the production value chain, and the newly produced
knowledge was applied to diﬀerent but related industries (sewing, bicycles,
automobiles) using the same small set of widely applicable principles.
The processes of technological convergence and inversion represent GPTs as
pervasive technologies in the making, whose success is conditioned on the
state of knowledge and on the possibility of recombination. Notably, in none
of the stylized cases suggested, a technology starts as ‘special purpose’ and
ends as ‘general purpose’ — the ultimate GPT is implemented (if imple-
mented) as such, and it does not acquire the status of GPT over time. Also,
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the ‘reuse’ of technologies in new combinations — that is, the mechanism
through which innovational complementarities take place — is a case of eco-
nomic complementarity, as it represents the economic viability of additional
innovative activities. Technological complementarities are mostly left out
of the analysis, even if one can assume that the technological complemen-
tarities are accounted for in the value function of an inventor. However,
the arguments suggested in Bresnahan’s contribution go in the direction of
extending GPT theory into a theory of recombinant technologies and linked
markets where feedbacks play a fundamental role. Furthermore, the men-
tioned papers also refer to literature on two–sided markets (Rysman, 2009;
Weyl, 2010) because it describes a mechanism of strategic interaction taking
place in network industries that is similar to that at the core of GPT–based
micro models. This reinforces our claim that GPT theory can be subject to
fertile generalizations, useful to increase its explanatory power of phenomena
involving linked markets and pervasive technological change.
So far the focus has been on how diﬀerent GPT–AS structures of interaction
allow for recombinant inventive and innovative activities. The other rele-
vant issue to be analyzed has to do with the substitution of one GPT with
another. Bresnahan and Yin (2010) emphasize the role that demand plays
in determining the switch between GPTs. They extend the classic GPT–AS
setting introducing a third layer of interaction, the one of consumers’ ﬁnal
demand. This new conceptualization starts from the deﬁnition of a set of
concentric frames within which a GPT develops. The bigger frame is the
‘Broad Technological Opportunity’ (hereinafter BTO), a concept related to
the well–known notion of technological opportunity (Cohen and Levin, 1989;
Klevorick et al., 1995) but meant in a more general fashion. Inside the BTO
lies what the authors call a ‘GPT Market Cluster’, that is the classic coor-
dination game between GPT and AS, augmented by an additional sector:
market demand. The economy is thus aﬀected by two contrasting forces:
on the one hand, the progressive dual inducement within the GPT and ASs
cluster generates increasing returns in the use of the GPTs, and therefore
economic growth. On the other hand, as demand changes according to the
evolution of consumer needs, the cluster becomes a ‘growth bottleneck’ for
further expansions of the economy. In fact, the GPT cluster, by becoming
more coherent, may leave unserved some niches of demand that are out-
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side the cluster. In a sense, the establishment of a dominant GPT drives
the system in a lock–in that can endogenously harm the beneﬁts that the
GPT itself generated with its diﬀusion. A new GPT can enter the market
serving the unserved demand, therefore relaxing the growth constraint rep-
resented by the established GPT. If a new GPT–AS cluster starts to take
shape, the increasing returns characterizing also the new technology lead
it to serve larger and larger shares of the economy, taking over also ASs
served by the older GPT and eventually substituting it. Historical examples
of this dynamics are the diﬀusion of white–collar automation (WCA) and
the introduction of personal computing, at the beginning used only to serve
the (limited) demand for personal entertainment and, later on, taking over
the traditional demand previously served by mainframe and minicomputer
architectures.
The discussion of the most recent contributions on GPTs makes clear that
GPT studies are shifting back towards a microeconomic approach. The do-
main of analysis is not anymore that of a few revolutionary technologies. In
a more abstract way, the domain of GPTs is that of industries and technolo-
gies that trigger responses in linked technologies, markets, consumers niches,
and whose pervasiveness is a function of such responses. This change of per-
spective reinforces the doubts about the appropriateness of the deﬁnitional
criteria currently used in the literature to describe and identify GPTs. Also,
it suggests a change in the unit of analysis. The phenomenon of interest,
especially if the ultimate aim is to quantify the potential social and welfare
gains, is not anymore the GPT itself. It is the GPT cluster, meant as a
system or as a network of technologies, that requires economists’ attention.
In fact, given that ‘it is the joint invention in GPT and many AS which
creates economic value’ (Bresnahan, 2010, p. 768), the theoretical rationale
for a generalized theory of GPTs can be restated as the study on how ‘the
innovation cost function of a large, heterogeneous economy can be lowered in
the aggregate if there is a mechanism to share the fruits of innovative eﬀort
across some of these diverse sectors and sub–processes’ (Bresnahan, 2010,
p. 767). We posit that GPT theory is not about a single GPT, but about
linked markets and networked technologies, whose interactions in economic
and innovation activities lead to the establishment of pervasive (upstream)
technologies, and eventually to their replacement.
50 Generalizing GPTs
3.3 A First Generalization: GPTs and Spillovers
The concepts discussed in the previous Section help to deﬁne the bound-
aries of a Microeconomics of GPTs or, more generally, a Microeconomics of
heterogeneous technological change. In fact, the collection of tools outlined
in order to generalize GPTs includes the dual inducement mechanism and
externalities, the alternative processes for the establishment of a GPT, the
concept of GPT cluster, and the role demand plays in facilitating GPTs sub-
stitution. This collection can be further extended by adding arguments that
capture the additional features of the dynamics of GPTs. In Chapter 2 we
outlined how theoretical building blocks borrowed from Industrial Dynamics
literature (dynamic economies of scale, network eﬀects, dominant designs,
competition between technologies, collective invention) describe patterns
that are similar to those leading to the persistence and pervasiveness4 of
GPTs and their related clusters. However, one has to keep in mind how the
theory of GPT in its main contributions is mainly a theory concerned about
linked innovative activities, where the choice variable is the magnitude or
the change in R&D expenditures or similar innovation input and output.
This restricted perspective has already been partially broadened in the dis-
cussion done so far, but it is important to remember the distinction between
economic and technological eﬀects related to GPTs.
In this Section we further elaborate on the extensions of the GPT framework,
connecting GPTs and the literature on spillovers. Previously, we claimed
that what matters for the emergence of a GPT are not only some character-
istics of the technology itself, but the cascade of inducements to innovative
activities it produces, that is the network of interdependencies between user
and producer industries. GPTs are enabling (Bresnahan, 2002), in the sense
that they raise the expected returns of investments in innovative activities,
4For deﬁnitional purposes, the use of terms prevalence, persistence, and pervasiveness
has to be deﬁned more precisely. Prevalence refers to a technology that represents the
established (if unique) choice for a given function or task to be performed, and it is
usually the ﬁnal outcome of a competing technology dynamics (Arthur, 1989). Persistence
relates prevalence to the time dimension, so to its continuation over time. Finally, the
pervasiveness of a technology depends on its patterns of diﬀusion, adoption and use, so
to its spread across the set of economic activities. A technology may be prevalent in a
single application sector but irrelevant in others or show — using GPT criteria — general
applicability, so a cross–industry ease of application that makes it pervasive.
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and this feature — not shared by other technology–related concepts — give
them a special status among technologies. The role of an enabling technol-
ogy is to refresh technological opportunities. Given that, in general, R&D
expenditures are subject to decreasing returns due to the convexity of the
set of technological opportunities, the interaction with an enabling technol-
ogy produces additionality — that is a positive externality, or a spillover.5
As Wright puts it,
(. . . ) at any point in time a number of more fundamentally in-
novative ideas may be spreading through the economy, typically
without explicit public or private sponsorship, their potential as
yet incompletely realised in practice. This is another broad les-
son (. . . ): No matter how successful we may be in accounting
for purposeful investments in the generation of knowledge, the
historical record persistently reﬂects the impact of forces that
are not readily accounted for in this way, something like ‘tech-
nological opportunities’ which we may describe (eschewing the
now–forbidden term ‘exogenous’) as having historical trajecto-
ries of their own (. . . ). The extent of technological opportunity
for a particular sector is related to its proximity to what are
known as ‘general purpose technologies’ (. . . ). (Wright, 1997,
p. 1561)
GPTs can be considered as sources — and products, if one considers dual
inducements — of spillovers. They shift — through their use as an input in
the downstream sectors’ innovative activities and production processes —
an AS’s curve of returns from innovations for a given level of R&D intensity
which, in turn, approximates the size and extent of technological opportuni-
ties. Carlaw and Lipsey (2002) are the only scholars who explicitly theorized
the relation existing between GPTs and spillovers. In order to shed some
light on this relation, they deﬁned the concept of technological complemen-
tarity: ‘a technological complementarity arises in any situation in which the
5From an alternative perspective, the ‘refreshing’ of opportunities can be seen as a
reduction of uncertainty. Concerning the theoretical distinction between externalities and
spillovers, see Mokyr (2006). In this text, however, we use them as synonyms. Further-
more, one can discuss diﬀerent types of spillover such as knowledge or pecuniary ones
(Griliches, 1979; Verspagen, 1997).
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past or present decisions of the initiating agents with respect to their own
technologies aﬀect the value of the receiving agents’ existing technologies
and/or their opportunities for making further technological changes.’ (Car-
law and Lipsey, 2002) Technological complementarity is a special case of
dynamic externalities (spillovers), because it does not necessarily produce a
shift in related sectors’ production functions, but it changes the whole logic
through which inputs are used. This deﬁnition goes hand in hand with the
concept of enabling technology: the eﬀect of a GPT is not just a change
in techniques, but a widening of opportunities. However, to the author’s
knowledge, no theoretical bridge exists between speciﬁc R&D–cum–spillover
studies and GPTs.
The part of Industrial Organization literature that is devoted to spillovers
models the entire spectrum of possible cases, ranging from intra–industry or
horizontal spillovers (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) to inter–industry
or vertical ones. The latter possibility has been studied in the case of ver-
tical spillovers coming from the upstream industry (Harhoﬀ, 1996) as well
as in the opposite direction, where externalities in downstream R&D ex-
penditure raise input costs, partially oﬀsetting the returns to innovative
activities but also producing a rise in (non–innovative) rivals costs (Baner-
jee and Lin, 2003). In these contributions, the study of vertical spillover
is never meant to focus on the simultaneous presence of the inducements
in both directions. In fact, in vertically related industries, a case can be
made for the presence of a crowding–out eﬀect, where downstream R&D
expenditures are substituted by external (upstream) ones. Producers of ﬁ-
nal goods, for example, reduce their inventive eﬀorts since they beneﬁt from
suppliers R&D in terms of know–how embodied in their inputs (knowledge
spillovers) or as non–complete adjustment of prices to quality advancements
(the so–called rent spillovers — see Griliches (1979)). Only the model of
Harhoﬀ (1996) describes an exception to this expected negative spillover ef-
fect. There, a generic R&D activity that is common to all the ﬁrms — and
that is negatively aﬀected by marginal increases in upstream investments
— is coupled with a speciﬁc kind of R&D that reﬂects idiosyncratic and
ﬁrm–speciﬁc knowledge and capabilities, and is positively inﬂuenced by a
vertical spillover. Upstream R&D expenditures induce the re–allocation of
downstream resources to speciﬁc–knowledge investments, with the result of
3.3 A First Generalization 53
increasing innovative activities. The complementarity nature of knowledge
spillovers is modeled only in the case of intra–industry spillovers, for exam-
ple in the model of Levin and Reiss (1984). There, ﬁrms’ R&D intensity is
function of the elasticity if the industry knowledge pool to a ﬁrm investment.
According to the value taken by the elasticity, R&D investments by com-
petitors can produce either crowding–in or crowding–out. However, vertical
relations between diﬀerent industries are not taken into consideration.
Contrariwise, empirical research found traces of positive inducements. How-
ever, studies focused mainly on the estimation of the signs and magnitudes
of vertical spillovers not on R&D intensities, but on productivity measures
such as total factor productivity. In particular, since the studies of Scherer
(1982) featuring technology–ﬂow analysis, many scholars (Wolﬀ and Nadiri,
1993; Verspagen, 1997) measured the relevance of inter–industry technology
spillovers, ﬁnding that an industry rate of technological progress is signiﬁ-
cantly (and positively) related to that of its suppliers. The main problem
of this kind of analysis is that the vertical spillover may not leave a trace
in performance indicators if the inducement produces only a change in the
direction of innovative activities, and not in its rate, or if the eﬀects ap-
pear with very long time lags (Carlaw and Lipsey, 2002). These possibilities
are implicit in the enabling nature of GPTs, and represent a challenge for
empirical analysis.
In sum, the literature on spillovers fails to take into account the dimensions
of feedbacks and technological complementarities that are instead features
of GPTs. With regards to vertical spillovers, that is the case matching
closely the GPT–AS interaction structure: On the one hand, theoretical
models focus on inducements on R&D expenditures as a choice variable but
do not capture the possibility for positive and dual inducements. On the
other hand, the empirical literature successfully identiﬁes positive spillovers;
however, it does that relating upstream technological change to downstream
economic performance, and this biases an analysis of the enabling eﬀect of
a potential GPT on technological opportunities.
This paragraph suggested a ﬁrst generalization of GPT theory, that we now
summarize in the following sentence:
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GPTs, meant as a networked phenomenon, can be considered a special case
of spillovers, namely inter–industry (vertical) spillovers involving enabling
technologies and technological complementarity.
3.4 A Second Generalization: GPTs and Unbal-
anced Development, or ‘Schumpeter meeting
Hirschman’
Our discussion so far suggests that GPTs are sources of very speciﬁc posi-
tive spillovers, involving the enabling of further technological opportunities
for downstream and user sectors. Another direction to be explored to ex-
tend GPTs to a more general networked view of heterogeneous technological
change is that of the type of process leading to the establishment of a GPT.
Bresnahan and Yin (2010) emphasizes the role of heterogeneous demand and
unserved demand as the key to break growth bottlenecks and switch from
one GPT to another. In a view that focuses less on the single GPT and more
on the succession of steps leading to the prevalence and pervasiveness of a
certain sector or technology, here we suggest that another explanatory route
to take is that to consider the establishment of a GPT as an unbalanced
(asynchronous) process, that is a special case of unbalanced development
theory.
Evolutionary and Neo–Schumpeterian economists build their models and
theories on population thinking and on an out–of–equilibrium view of the
economic system; heterogeneous and diﬀerential growth is therefore implic-
itly assumed as a driver of economic change and ‘retardation’ dynamics
(Metcalfe, 2003). This view was however already conceptualized in the
Fifties by Albert Hirschman. In the midst of a long–standing debate be-
tween supporters and contenders of the Big Push theory in Development
economics, he suggested that it is the continuous tension between backward
and forward industrial linkages that generates dependencies, disequilibria
and therefore, unbalanced growth (Hirschman, 1958).6 The very existence
6See Alacevich (2011) for a historical account of the debate and the description of the
divides along which early development economics was split, and Murphy et al. (1989) for
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of linked markets and their diﬀerential evolution over time creates at the
same time inducements and bottlenecks that, when relaxed, open room for
industrialization and growth. In this context, ‘leading sectors’ are the core
and drivers of the process of unbalanced growth. A similar process is at
work within a GPT cluster. As Bresnahan and Yin (2010) suggest, the es-
tablishment of more GPT–AS linkages generates at the same time increasing
returns (growth) and demand bottlenecks that harm growth on the long run.
Therefore, we suggest that the basic GPT model can be considered as a spe-
cial case of unbalanced change, with two caveats: First, in the GPT case the
unbalanced development is related not to economic growth, but to incentives
and constraints to technical advance and innovative activities; Second, the
structure of interaction characterizing a GPT cluster is very speciﬁc, as the
linkages take the shape of a star (Carvalho, 2014), or a tree, with a single
backward ‘node’ with multiple forward connections.
It is within this tree–like structure that vertical and horizontal externalities
occur. In fact, the introduction of a new speciﬁc purpose technology in an
upstream market aﬀects the innovative behavior of the downstream indus-
tries. The linkages work as bottlenecks and channels for forced interaction
that, in turn, shape the opportunities for further innovative activities. The
imbalance created by the spillovers from upstream is asynchronous, in the
sense that not all the linked downstream application sectors respond in the
same way, and with the same timing, to the upstream spillovers. The out-
come of this diﬀerential response determines the state of the system from
period to period, and shapes the conditions for successive waves of innova-
tion activities, in an uneven cascade of eﬀects.
Provided that the fundamental mechanism at work in a GPT cluster can
be meant as a special case of unbalanced development, we can use this
insight to investigate the process leading to the substitution between old and
new GPTs. We refer again to the idea of growth bottlenecks suggested by
Bresnahan and Yin (2010). Growth bottlenecks are the ‘points of resistance’
slowing down the unbalanced process of inducement taking place in a GPT
cluster and can be distinguished in two categories. On the one hand, we have
the feature of a GPT to relax what we call an economic bottleneck, that
a formalization of Rosenstein–Rodan’s Big Push theory.
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is, to satisfy unserved demand. Economic bottlenecks are related to market
conditions and consumer preferences. On the other hand, new technologies
with the potential to become GPTs are often introduced as a response to
a technical challenge, or reverse salient (Sahal, 1985). These technologies
are the outcome of problem–solving activities (Arthur, 2009) and are the
key for the process of technological convergence (Rosenberg, 1963). In this
case, we face a technological bottleneck. The role played by technological
bottlenecks is broader and not only conﬁned to the incentives to introduce
a GPT. The adoption/diﬀusion process within a GPT cluster can be slowed
down or stopped due to the presence of a technological bottleneck. Once
this is removed, GPT–like innovations get often adopted at a very fast pace
(Goldfarb, 2005). In fact, as Goldfarb (2005) points out in the case of the
diﬀusion of electriﬁcation in urban mobility, printing and paper production
sectors, technological bottlenecks appearing at the GPT level aﬀect adoption
rates in a signiﬁcative way, as compared to other factors shaping diﬀusion
patterns such as input and labor costs, sunk costs of existing equipment and
capital structure, and co–invention costs occurring at the application sector
level.
The idea of an asynchronous evolution of the economy is not conﬁned to
Hirschman’s insights during the ‘years of high development theory’ (Krug-
man, 1992). It is indeed a fundamental building block of recent contributions
on adaptive growth modeling (Metcalfe et al., 2006) and on avalanche mod-
els of technological change (Silverberg, 2002). However, such approaches
do not perfectly capture the speciﬁc nature of inducements and linked pay-
oﬀs within and between GPT clusters. The ﬁrst case describes industries’
disequilibrium dynamics relying on a mix of evolutionary and Kaldorian ana-
lytical tools (namely, the replicator dynamics model augmented by technical
progress functions explaining increasing returns and investment rates). This
approach tends to embody technology dynamics into changes in labor pro-
ductivity and labor requirements. Models in this tradition capture dynamic
externalities but may fail to represent technological complementarities in-
duced by enabling technologies. The second strand of literature explains the
percolation phenomenon leading to cascades of innovations using analytical
tools borrowed from complexity theory. A percolation or avalanche model
assumes heterogeneity in adopters’ propensities to accept a new technology,
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and this feature captures the unbalanced nature of inducements we discussed
so far. However, these models pay the price of an abstraction from the real
working of the economic system, and are therefore not easy to operational-
ize for empirical purposes. Another concept related to the dynamics of a
GPT cluster is that of development block (Dahme´n, 1988). Development
blocks are used to describe a dynamics of industrial transformation close
to that outlined in this Chapter with regards to GPTs. In particular, by
conceptualizing a development block as the unit of analysis for the study of
technological and industrial change, Dahme´n emphasizes the role played by
complementarities in generating structural tensions, or disequilibria. The in-
teractions of several structural tensions ‘may result in a balanced situation’
(Dahme´n, 1988, p. 5). Structural tensions and (economic and technological)
bottlenecks both drive and channel unbalanced development processes. In
this sense, a GPT cluster can be deﬁned as a development block with the
capability to aﬀect a large share of the economic system.
As we claimed in the previous paragraphs, the establishment of a GPT can
result from an unbalanced process of inducement of innovative activities and
positive feedbacks between linked markets and technologies. Particular at-
tention should be devoted to the types of deviations from balanced paths
that the establishment of a GPT generates. The eﬀect of GPTs on the rate
and pace of technological change is unbalanced because they rejuvenate ex-
isting opportunities and enable new ones in downstream industries, and this
eﬀect unevenly propagates through the economy. Given the general appli-
cability feature of GPTs, their innovative impulse is quickly transmitted to
the whole industrial network of interdependencies. Here, the initial state
and structure of the system matter: if R&D returns in diﬀerent industries
are aligned on a similar level, the introduction of a GPT like impulse could
generate even or uneven inducements to innovative activities according to
the industries’ speciﬁc reactions to the new enabling technology. Similarly
to Levin and Reiss (1984), the diﬀerent reactions can be thought as elastici-
ties of industries’ R&D intensity to the R&D intensity of the GPT industry.
The opposite situation can also hold: if R&D returns in diﬀerent industries
are not aligned on the same level, then the diﬀerential push to innovative
activities provided by the new technology may produce a re–alignment (syn-
chronization) of the economy–wide rate of innovative activities.
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The distinction made here resembles the one suggested by Harberger (1998)
— and then used by David and Wright (1999) to explain Solow productivity
paradox and the rapid U.S. productivity acceleration during the Twenties
due to electriﬁcation — between yeast and mushrooms–like growth pro-
cesses. Again, there the focus is economic performance (productivity) in-
stead of innovation performance, but the concept should be kept in mind
as a useful guide to help to detect the process of GPTs’ establishment:
while localized technical change (Antonelli, 1996) is economically and ge-
ographically bounded as mushrooms growing up (whose emergence do not
structurally aﬀect the ‘ecology’ of the system in which they appear), generic
processes of technological reconﬁguration aﬀect the whole set of economic
activities at the same moment, as growing yeast expands in all the direc-
tions at each point in time. The latter process better captures what hap-
pened in the case of electriﬁcation–driven productivity advances, which were
spread and shared by the whole set of industries in the manufacturing sec-
tor (David and Wright, 1999). The nature of the diﬀusion process — more
mushroom– or yeast–like — depends on the degree of heterogeneity of the
spillover–receivers (the downstream industries) in terms of technological op-
portunities and readiness to adopt a new upstream technology. In short, the
distribution of characteristics in the downstream market sets the stage for
the dynamic formation of a GPT cluster.
In any case, a yeast–like balanced process and a mushroom–like unbalanced
process of technological change are not at odds with each other. The yeast–
like expansion of the economy is in fact an ex post outcome. The generating
process behind such homogeneous outcome can be an impulse intervening on
a heterogeneous distribution of propensities to react to generic technological
change. In its case study of electriﬁcation in three U.S. sectors, Goldfarb
(2005) already develops the idea that even a process usually recognized
as yeast–like (David and Wright, 1999) is in fact subject to a much less
homogeneous dynamics than usually thought. In that case, technological
bottlenecks aﬀecting the GPT development determined the diﬀerent rates
of diﬀusion of the electric dynamo across industrial sectors, that persistently
showed a non–negligible dispersion until at least the beginning of the Thir-
ties. Napoletano et al. (2006) show in a model how, in a multi–industry econ-
omy that accounts for cross–industry elasticities to productivity shocks, to-
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tal factor productivity growth can result from a ‘purely idiosyncratic’ shock,
from a ‘pure GPT’ process, or from linear combinations of the two. As a
results, ‘the GPT model can only produce a smooth cross–sectoral growth
pattern if the elasticities of sectoral TFP to shocks from other sectors are
similar across sectors. On the contrary, under heterogeneity of elasticities,
growth asymmetries can be observed even if a common component drives
the productivity growth of all industries.’ (Napoletano et al., 2006) In a
nutshell, this means that evidence of a GPT cluster formation should not be
inferred only from synchronous cross–industry transformations. Under the
condition of heterogeneous elasticities of industries’ performance to external
shocks, a GPT–process can be at work despite the evidence of mushroom–
like outcomes. This happens because the heterogeneity of responses to a
GPT–like inducement, meaning the particular shape of the distribution of
returns to adopt/use a potential GPT, works like a ﬁlter that transforms
balanced in unbalanced change, and vice versa. From an empirical perspec-
tive, the diﬃculty to disentangle a GPT–process in the making from its
market outcomes renders the identiﬁcation of GPT clusters problematic, as
it is discussed in Section 3.6.
Furthermore, what matters in the unbalanced development of GPT clusters
is also the speed of the process: if potential GPTs — as we brieﬂy suggested
in Section 3.3 — are able to generate dynamic economies of scale or, in
Bresnahan (2010) terms, to lower the cost function of a whole heterogeneous
economy, then the unbalanced inducement process will be faster or more
intense, leading to a generalized expansion of the economy. This is, of course,
not a necessary condition: long lags can show up between the introduction
of a potential GPT and its realized eﬀects on the economy, which is the
very essence of the Solow paradox. However, this is what we would deﬁne
in other contexts as an ‘emergent property’ of a complex system: many
feedback interactions at a micro level leading — mostly in unforeseeable
ways — to a tipping point, showing ‘broken symmetry’ (Anderson, 1972)
and macroscopic consequences.
This paragraph suggested a second generalization of GPT theory. We sum-
marize it in the following sentence:
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In its dynamics, a GPT cluster is a special case of unbalanced development,
with a peculiar structure of interaction, and focused on cascades of eﬀects on
innovative activities rather than economic performance. The enabling nature
of technological complementarities and spillovers, the feedbacks taking place
within the GPT cluster, and the heterogeneous distribution of responses to
these inducement eﬀects can result in a synchronous or in an asynchronous
change.
3.5 Toward a Theory of Technological Multipliers
So far, we outlined a conceptualization of GPTs and GPT clusters as spe-
cial cases of spillover theories and unbalanced development theories. In
what follows we proceed in our construction of an extended theory of GPT,
suggesting that the concept of technological multiplier provides a nice de-
scription of the process leading to the emergence and establishment of a
GPT cluster.
In a critical discussion of Long Waves theory, Rosenberg and Frischtak
(1983) claim that — in order to be able to support the hypothesis of causal-
ity running from innovation (mainly a micro phenomenon) to historically
relevant ﬂuctuations (a macro phenomenon) — one should assess whether
such hypothesis is compatible with a series of conditions regarding causality
itself, timing, economy–wide repercussions and recurrence of technological
innovation. Fulﬁlled such conditions, one would be able to clearly qualify
technology as primum movens of Long Waves, and to reject the alternative
hypothesis according to which innovations are ‘disciplined and structured’
by long term movements. This discussion summarizes the two main lines of
research that deal with the issues already identiﬁed in Schumpeter’s Busi-
ness Cycles (Schumpeter, 1939): the identiﬁcation of Long Waves (Silver-
berg, 2003) and clustering of innovation (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2003).
The same arguments serve as a yardstick for our extended theory of GPTs.
In fact, a GPT cluster and a cluster of radical innovations share a similar
characteristic: they occupy a ‘strategic position in the economy in terms of
backward and forward links’ (Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1983).
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On the analytical side, to take on board this view means that the model-
ing of GPT clusters has ﬁrst of all to be grounded on the micro and meso
level of analysis. In such a model an initial localized pulsation (a new up-
stream product from existing industries, or the birth of a new upstream
industry) enables a wave of forward and backward innovation expenditures
as well as positive feedbacks on the locus of the originating ‘push’. Forces
playing against positive feedbacks, for example the resistance of existing
technologies and the threat of competing technologies, crowding–out eﬀects
on innovation incentives generated by other sources of externalities, adverse
conditions in terms of macro–prices and expected proﬁts, can contrast the
enabling potential of a technology. In this case, a candidate GPT fails to
become a GPT, a possibility currently featured only in the model of van Zon
et al. (2003). If instead the enabling feedback mechanism prevails, dynamic
economies of scale kick–in, and a technology suited to be speciﬁc becomes
general purpose.
If we are ready to borrow concepts from other strands of literature, we can
deﬁne our generalized approach to GPTs as a fully–ﬂedged technological
multiplier. In the Keynesian view of ﬁscal multipliers, public expenditures
boost growth via a progressive cascade of increases in consumption and
investments (directly aﬀecting, together with expectations, the marginal ef-
ﬁciency of capital). In the same manner a GPT–based inducement eﬀect can
generate a wave of additional growth (a crowding–in eﬀect) in downstream
industries’ innovative activities. As the eﬀect of the ﬁscal multiplier can be
decreased by the pre–emptive anticipative actions of agents endowed with
rational expectations, the potential of the technological multiplier can be de-
pressed by the forces contrasting enabling positive feedbacks. As the ﬁscal
multiplier models the potential cascade of economic consequences from an
initial expenditure impulse, the technological multiplier captures the per-
colation of positive feedbacks through the network of industrial linkages
started by an initial technological impulse. The point of origin of the multi-
plier impulse can beneﬁt from returning positive feedbacks, therefore further
increasing its performance. By improving its attractiveness for additional
applications and linkages, it gains pervasiveness and begins the formation
of a GPT cluster.
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To follow empirically the traces left by a technological multiplier may turn
to be a non–trivial exercise, as suggested later in Section 3.6. In any case,
the detection of a technological multiplier at work can represent a new cri-
terion to identify the process of formation of a GPT cluster, and thus the
pervasiveness in the making of technologies and sectors that might dras-
tically aﬀect the whole economy. The idea that a multiplier mechanism
is at work in the domain of innovative activities can be found in Dietzen-
bacher and Los (2002). They studied R&D multipliers using inter-industry
ﬂows of embodied R&D and distinguishing between backward and forward
multipliers, however without an explicit reference to GPTs. A classic con-
tribution by Momigliano and Siniscalco (2013) go as well in the direc-
tion to identify the transmission of technological know–how through pro-
duction blocks (vertically–integrated sectors) rather than through standard
economic branches. Also Eliasson (2011) develops the similar concept of
‘spillover multiplier’ and studies the channels easing the multiplier eﬀect in
the context of the Swedish military aircraft industry.
An additional consideration to be made for prospective modeling exercises
in the direction suggested by this Chapter regards to the role played by
technological complementarities. It is important to stress this point further,
since it is one of the missing links in the received microeconomics of GPTs
described in Section 3.2. In Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995)’s deﬁnition,
GPTs spawn innovational complementarities, a notion that in the model
is interpreted in purely economic terms: technical advance is the result of
growing returns and proﬁtability, which in turn are properties of the mu-
tual feedback structure of the GPT–AS coordination game. The concept of
technological complementarity, to be understood as the structure of inter-
dependencies and compatibilities between the components of a technology
meant as a system of parts, where such components are technological systems
themselves, in a recursive way, and are arranged in a modular, hierarchical
or near–decomposable architecture (Arthur, 2009), is not part of the analy-
sis. However, technological complementarity is one of the determinants that
aﬀect the dynamics towards prevalence, persistence and pervasiveness of a
given technology, because it inﬂuences the reach of technological exploration
and exploitation and determines the feasibility of certain designs, technologi-
cal recombinations and improvements within the ﬁtness landscape (Frenken,
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2006). Moreover, technological complementarity produces micro as well as
meso/macroeconomic eﬀects, where learning is an example at the microe-
conomic level, while investments in complementary capital and their eﬀects
on real output, wages, and productivity are examples at the macroeconomic
level.
In fact, the allocation of resources to make old and new technologies ‘tailor–
made’ for each other (Aghion and Howitt, 1998) and, therefore, the magni-
tude of the conversion costs, as discussed by Arthur (2009) for the process of
technological re–switching, could be one of the factors inﬂuencing the sign
of the downstream response to upstream spillovers, and one of the explana-
tory variables solving the paradox of the lagged eﬀects of new paradigmatic
technologies on productivity (Solow, 1987). The issue of technological com-
plementarity is partially tackled in the growth model of Helpman and Tra-
jtenberg (1994), where the main mechanism leading to the so–called ‘time
to sow and time to reap’ ﬂuctuation dynamics, relies on the fact that a new
GPT cannot be used until a set of components that are speciﬁcally tailored
for that technology have been developed by devoting R&D resources to this
activity. In that model, GPT–speciﬁc — that is, technologically complemen-
tary — components are usually produced with a CES production function.
This assumption makes components proportionally substitutes, therefore re-
laxing a strict interpretation of technological complementarity meant as ar-
chitectural compatibility and compositional dependence (Lombardi, 2010).
To consider technological and economic complementarities together is there-
fore an important criterium to follow in order to model GPT clusters and
technological multipliers.
This paragraph suggested a further reﬁnement of GPT conceptualization.
We summarize as follows:
An extended theory of GPTs and GPT clusters is in a more general way a
theory of technological multipliers, in which an enabling technology aﬀects
the sectors to which it is linked, and it is aﬀected by them. The net ef-
fect resulting from positive feedbacks, driven by economic and technological
complementarity, and negative feedbacks determines if the technology or the
sector under consideration succeeds to gain pervasiveness, to establish a GPT
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cluster and eventually to inﬂuence the direction of an economy’s evolution.
3.6 The Empirics of GPTs and Technological Mul-
tipliers
Once the theory of GPTs has been extended to that of GPT clusters and
further to that of technological multipliers, the possibilities for empirics of
GPTs can be assessed. Existing empirical analysis of GPTs follows four
main directions: the ﬁrst assumes a technology to be a GPT, and stud-
ies its aggregate eﬀects on the economy. In this framework, studies mostly
focus on assessing the contribution of ICT to delayed productivity growth
(Basu and Fernald, 2007). The second approach presumes a technology to
be a GPT, and focuses then on detecting some output characteristics, reg-
ularities, or stylized facts derived from theoretical expectations and related
empirical insights (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005). A third direction nar-
rows down the scope of analysis, producing case studies about the general
applicability and diﬀusion of certain technologies, such as the Cohen–Boyer
rDNA technology, electriﬁcation in speciﬁc industries or nanotechnologies
(Feldman and Yoon, 2012; Goldfarb, 2005; Youtie et al., 2008). Finally, a
fourth more comprehensive approach is the one pioneered by Hall and Tra-
jtenberg (2004) which, using patent data, attempts to detect GPTs selecting
a sample of technologies ranking at the top in a set of indices created to
proxy the three GPT input characteristics: general applicability, dynamism
and innovational complementarities. Further studies exploit patent data to
study the eﬀect of policy interventions — in particular, innovative public
procurement — on the generality of focal inventions (Raiteri, 2015) or as-
sess how the adoption of GPT–like ‘Key Enabling Technologies’ enables the
formation of new European regional technological advantages (Montresor
and Quatraro, 2015).7 Even if carefully performed, such empirical exercises
are by deﬁnition suﬀering from the shortcomings of patent data. Patents,
7Key Enabling Technologies are those identiﬁed by the European Commission in its
2009 Communication ‘Preparing for our future: Developing a common strategy for key
enabling technologies in the EU’ based on their economic potential, contribution to tackle
societal challenges, and knowledge intensity. They are: i) Nanotechnology, ii) Micro–
and nanoelectronics, iii) Photonics, iv) Advanced materials, v) Biotechnology, and vi)
Advanced manufacturing systems.
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in fact, do not capture the whole extent of inventive activities and are sub-
ject to data truncation. Data truncation, in the case of GPT empirics,
represents an even more severe limitation given that the identiﬁcation of
new or potential GPTs requires up to date citations and does not permit
to fully explore the length of citation lags. A diﬀerent empirical approach,
not directly developed within the GPT framework, is the one introduced by
Kaplan and Vakili (2012), which runs topic detection algorithms on patents
abstracts in order to isolate theoretical breakthroughs starting from their
very conceptualization.
Alternatively, an empirical analysis of GPT clusters can be designed around
the theoretical building blocks developed so far, exploiting information from
spillovers and industrial linkages. The already cited quantiﬁcation of the ex-
ternalities of R&D expenditures generating R&D multipliers (Dietzenbacher
and Los, 2002) is one of the few studies that delve into these dimensions. As
a possible empirical strategy, one could assess parametrically the presence of
positive spillovers on R&D expenditures, testing the existence of a techno-
logical multiplier against the expected signs of the spillover eﬀect, given the
position of an industry in the Pavitt classiﬁcation. The taxonomy developed
by Pavitt (1984) arranges the diversity of technical change by classifying
ﬁrms (industries) in science–based, specialized suppliers, intensive produc-
tion, and supplier dominated.8 Pavitt taxonomy oﬀers an elaborated picture
of industries in terms of the sources of technical knowledge and spillovers,
and presents a rough hierarchy of linkages between the types of industries;
such hierarchy of linkages gives an idea of the direction of the innovative
spillovers (Pavitt, 1984, p. 364). Controlling for parameters that are usually
aﬀecting the level of R&D expenditures such as technological opportuni-
ties (Cohen, 2010; Klevorick et al., 1995), demand conditions, the regime in
which innovative activities occur (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997), ﬁrms’ size
(which, despite the limits of the so–called Schumpeterian hypothesis, still
maintain some power to explain R&D intensities, mainly through a cost–
spreading argument (Cohen and Klepper, 1996)), investments to develop
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), and industries’ market
structures, the residual presence of an inducement mechanism may be iden-
8For extensions of the taxonomy including information–processing industries and the
service sector see Archibugi (2001) and Castellacci (2008).
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tiﬁed. Such inducement can provide supporting evidence in favor of a GPT
cluster formation, especially if found in those industries that are expected to
respond negatively to spillovers, for example supplier dominated industries
such as textile. In these cases, a detected generalized positive propensity to
increase innovative expenditures could uncover innovational complementar-
ities and a GPT in the making.9 However, the limits highlighted by Napo-
letano et al. (2006) still apply: the data generating process behind positive
inducements can be a pure idiosyncratic process, a pure GPT process, or a
combination of the two.
As an alternative, we brieﬂy suggest here a non–parametric methodology to
trace the establishment of GPT clusters. The idea is to capture the broad
eﬀect of technological multipliers focusing on R&D accelerations, where ac-
celeration is meant as a proxy for innovation inducement and, hence, for the
multiplier eﬀect. The variable measuring R&D acceleration is the growth
rate of R&D expenditures. The GPT cluster in the making is studied only
indirectly, refraining from the attempt to identify the single perfect candi-
date technology for the role of GPT. Given the diﬃculty to disentagle the
sources of the technological multiplier, we shift the focus of the analysis to
the changing dispersion of R&D acceleration, that is on the distributional
properties of innovation inducements. Sapio and Thoma (2006) and Castaldi
and Sapio (2009) study the distributional properties of sectoral growth rates
to gain insights into the identiﬁcation problem pointed out by Napoletano
et al. (2006). We apply the same methodology to sectoral R&D expendi-
tures growth rates instead of sectoral growth rates of value of shipment or
value added.
We use OECD STAN Research and Development Expenditure in Industry
(ISIC Rev. 2) for the United States in the period 1973–1997, and restrict
the analysis to 24 Manufacturing industries. The choosen database has the
9A parallel claim can be made concerning the intra–industry incentive to invest in
absorptive capacity. In presence of positive spillovers, despite an incentive to exploit
others’ R&D investments leading to a reduction in R&D intensities, the opposite tendency
is often found, driven not by GPT–like inducement and innovational complementarities,
but by the strategic choice to improve the capabilities to understand and use external
knowledge. This ‘second face’ of R&D expenditures provides a hypothesis of inducements
that produces similar eﬀects to the GPT one suggested in this Chapter, opening room for
empirical analysis and comparisons.
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Figure 3.1: Kernel Density of ﬁve years R&D expenditures growth rates
for 24 Manufacturing industries — 1973–1997
limit to leave out the last two decades of ICTs diﬀusion, but allows for a time
span long enough to permit more period–to–period comparisons. Following
Castaldi and Sapio (2009) the variables used are the normalized logarithmic
R&D expenditures, calculated as ri,t = logRi,t − log < Rit >t, where ri,t
indicates the normalized value of R&D expenditures for industry i at time
t, capital letters represent non–normalized values and < . >t is an average
at time t across the industries. The annual growth rate is then calculated as
git = ri,t−ri,t−1. To reduce the eﬀect of random shocks potentially occurring
in particular years, we take a 5–years growth rate (g5it = ri,t−ri,t−5) as unit
of analysis. Figure 3.1 shows the Kernel density estimation of the 5–years
R&D expenditures growth rates:
The general pattern of R&D accelerations as shown by the dynamics of the
distributions suggests a tendency to de–concentration of industrial R&D
growth rates, at least in the ﬁrst three periods of analysis. An increase in
the heterogeneity of R&D growth rates may reﬂect the diﬀerential magni-
tude of the technological multiplier eﬀect, potentially driven by a common
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component. The last period is characterized by more industries experiencing
an R&D growth acceleration, with the right tail of the distribution becom-
ing fatter. This latter tendency may be related to the reaction of several
industries to the technological opportunities provided by the GPT cluster
related to ICT and informational platforms, that became fully exploitable
after a discovery and learning lag.
Using additional STAN data (Research and Development Expenditure in
Industry, ISIC Rev. 4), we can explore the distributional shapes of R&D
expenditures growth rates in more recent periods. The same exercise is re-
peated with a more ﬁne–grained dataset (35 industries, including services),
using a 5–year growth rate (Figure 3.2) and a 2–year growth rate (Figure 3.3)
for the period 2002–2012. The acceleration of innovative activities seems to
become more uniform during the last period of analysis, with growth rates
showing a higher concentration. Figure 3.2 illustrates — using shorter time
periods as the reference to calculate growth rates in industries’ R&D ex-
penditures — the tendency of growth rates to shift from being more to
less heterogeneous. Combining the evidence from the diﬀerent periods, the
broad picture that emerges from this illustrative exercise is one of contin-
uous change in R&D accelerations. The dynamics of R&D growth across
industries seems to oscillate from homogeneity to heterogeneity (meaning
by more spread distributions), and once again to homogeneity.
The dynamics of R&D acceleration may provide additional insights into the
functioning of the process behind industries’ technological innovation. In
line with Napoletano et al. (2006), pure idiosyncratic and pure GPT pro-
cesses cannot be unambiguously identiﬁed, and therefore not much can be
claimed about the generating process behind R&D inducements. However,
this exploratory analysis already uncovers a generalized tendency of indus-
tries to behave alternatively in a yeast– or mushroom–like way in their inno-
vative activities. A deeper historical analysis and a more reﬁned study into
the lags of adoption and formation of certain GPT–clusters may complement
this kind of preliminary evidence.
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Figure 3.2: Kernel Density of ﬁve years R&D expenditures growth rates
for 35 industries — 2002–2012
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Figure 3.3: Kernel Density of three years R&D expenditures growth
rates for 35 industries — 2002–2012
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3.7 Conclusion
In this Chapter we suggested three directions to generalize the theory of
GPTs. They all share the idea that GPTs have to be considered as net-
work phenomena. The unit of analysis should not be a single, discrete, and
radical technological innovation, but the GPT cluster and the technological
multiplier eﬀect that the establishment of a GPT kicks–in. The basic build-
ing blocks employed in the classic GPT models have been complemented
by concepts developed in the ﬁelds of Industrial Organization, Industrial
Dynamics and Development Economics. A case is made for framing the
theory of GPTs as special cases of spillover theory that deals with enabling
technologies, and of unbalanced development theory. Eventually, GPT the-
ory is extended to a theory of technological multipliers, that is a theory of
innovative activities in linked markets, where feedbacks play a fundamental
role in determining the outcomes of the system under analysis.
The proposed theoretical framework is supposed to inspire new research
questions and applications for GPT theory. Possible research paths are the
critical reprise of theories of long–run technological change and Long Waves,
and the merging of complexity models with microeconomic building blocks
in order to explain part of the non–trivial (and most probably non–linear)
dynamics produced by technological change in a network of linked indus-
tries. Also the study of industries’ statistical regularities (Cohen and Klep-
per, 1992; Dosi, 2007), market selection and industry dynamics in general
can beneﬁt from a viewpoint that integrates innovation and multiple, inter-
connected markets and sectors. In the same way, the study of the pervasive-
ness of GPT clusters and the eﬀects of technological multipliers could oﬀer
useful insights to studies dealing with ﬁrms heterogeneity, turbulence, and
(decreasing) market dynamism (Decker et al., 2014). In fact, the ultimate
determinants of market dynamics may lay in generalized transformations
that originate beyond the boundaries of the industries under consideration.
Once GPTs are conceived as dynamic processes, room opens–up for policy
discussion. The role of policy intervention in this ‘networked’ setting cannot
be conﬁned to the prescriptions suggested by GPT–based growth models,
namely to shorten the ‘time to sow’ in the equilibrium, GPT–driven, busi-
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ness cycle by inﬂuencing the allocation of aggregate resources to innovative
activities. Instead, policy–making becomes relevant to identify, and also cre-
ate, potential GPT clusters. The literature on Smart Specialization Foray
(2014), for example, adopts the concept of GPT to suggest that policy mak-
ers should be ‘promoting GPT networks’ by connecting macro–technological
change with ﬁrm–level learning and discovery processes that have to exploit
the prevalent GPT if they want to be successful. In general, this is nothing
but a ﬁeld of application for Industrial Policy. In fact, to understand the
dynamic externalities and the technological complementarities induced by a
technological multiplier eﬀect is a priority for both industrial and regional
policy. The outcome of a GPT–informed policy making is to intervene not
just on the rate of innovative activities but on their direction as well, easing
a ‘division of innovative labor’ capable of exploiting the opportunities and
the limits of GPT clusters to rewire the network of industrial linkages.
This Chapter has shown that, despite non–negligible conceptual ﬂaws, the
GPT theory is endowed with conceptual tools that can be usefully employed
to increase our understanding of micro–to–macro phenomena involving tech-
nological innovation and industrial linkages. Wright already pointed that
out, when he noted that
(. . . ) the importance of many of the great innovations of the
past century (. . . ) was woefully underestimated even by the
inventors, because they could not foresee the extent of future
improvements in the technology, because the scope for applica-
tion depended on the unforeseen development of complementary
technologies elsewhere in the economy, and because future uses
emerged as parts of a complex interdependent system that no one
could have predicted in advance. (Wright, 1997, pp. 1561–1562)
The uncertainties related to GPTs establishment make GPTs complex phe-
nomena. This is why to design a fully–ﬂedged theory of GPTs is still an
open task. The nature of GPTs and technological multipliers is transfor-
mational and enabling, and therefore abstract in nature and empirically
elusive. As the notion of ‘invention of a method of inventing’, suggested
by Griliches (1957) and Darby and Zucker (2005) to be at the core of the
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modern and present–day science–based industrialization, the feature of gen-
erality of technologies may not appear straightforward, but it is one of the
fundamental ingredients of the continuous change of our economy.
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Chapter 4
Competition for the
(Downstream) Market:
Modeling Acquired Purposes
4.1 Introduction
The pervasiveness (or generality of purpose) of technologies is a feature that
economic theory usually disregards or assumes a priori. In this paper we
posit that the process through which a technology gains pervasiveness mat-
ters: The evolution of a technology can result in a broad diﬀusion or in a
failure to spread. The main question to be answered is: How are purposes
‘acquired’? Purposes are meant in this paper in the sense of ‘applications’, or
uses for a given technology that can serve as a component, or input, to other
technologies or economic activities. Relatedly, we deﬁne purpose acquisition
process the dynamics leading a technology developed to deploy speciﬁc func-
tions or to solve speciﬁc problems to identify further purposes and uses than
the ones the technology was originally planned or designed for. We focus
on a particular setting in which the protagonists are General Purpose Tech-
nologies (hereinafter GPTs), upstream technologies (input) characterized by
a spectrum of application ranging beyond a single industry or sector and by
the capacity to induce economy–wide transformational eﬀects (Bresnahan
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and Trajtenberg, 1995; Bresnahan, 2010; Lipsey et al., 2005). The relation
between GPTs and their applications is a peculiar case of linked markets,
where an upstream industry serves multiple downstream industries.
The study of the process of purposes acquisition is relevant because it cap-
tures the multilevel nature of the determinants shaping technological tra-
jectories (Dosi, 1982). A contemporary example useful to make clear the
issue at stake is that related to the energy–storage and battery sector. As
Crabtree recalls,
In 1991, the year that the lithium–ion battery was commercially
released, no one foresaw the disruption that it would cause in
personal electronics. After initially being used in portable music
players and camcorders, lithium–ion batteries later found their
way into, and spurred the development of, laptops, tablets and
mobile phones — technologies that have permanently changed
how much of society works. Yet there is an even bigger revolution
on the horizon. In the same way that telephones had a rotary
dial for most of their existence, the electricity grid and cars have
mostly existed in a single, unchanged format. But as we move
beyond lithium–ion technology, a new generation of cheaper and
more powerful batteries will completely rejig the power grid and
usher in an age of electrically powered transportation. (Crabtree,
2015)
Taking stock from this quotation means to recognize that i) input tech-
nologies are usually introduced for speciﬁc purposes and gain pervasiveness
later on and ii) the pervasiveness of an upstream incumbent input can be
challenged by entrant technologies that try to increase their downstream
market share of applications. This Chapter takes these facts as the point of
departure to develop a general approach to describe the process of purposes
acquisition.
We propose a model of technological competition in a setting featuring
vertically–linked markets. A set of downstream industries can adopt one
of the possible alternative upstream input technologies that struggle for
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pervasiveness. The competition among those technologies can result either
in the establishment of a new pervasive GPT or in the persistence of the ex-
isting GPT as the dominant one. To understand this dynamics, we extend
the Schumpeterian concept of ‘competition for the market’ to the case of
vertically related industries, introducing a ‘competition for the downstream
market’. As the competition for the downstream market unfolds, the process
of acquisition of purposes might take place if the new upstream technology
prevails on the established one.
We borrow a simple analytical framework used in the literature on interna-
tional trade to model acquired purposes and to oﬀer a description of how,
in a setting featuring linked markets and upstream technological competi-
tion, a newly introduced speciﬁc purpose technology can become pervasive
and, hence, general purpose. The factors aﬀecting the ‘specialization’ of the
downstream industries in one of the alternative upstream technologies are
identiﬁed and discussed.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 deﬁnes the building blocks used
to intersect theories of linked markets, GPTs and technology evolution. Sec-
tion 4.3 set up a simple Ricardian model in the spirit of Dornbusch et al.
(1977) and Cantner and Hanusch (1993), and outlines some static and dy-
namic analysis. Section 4.4 concludes discussing the results and suggesting
directions for further research.
4.2 Building Blocks: Connectivity and General
Purpose Technologies
Given that it deals with linked markets, we consider the study of the pro-
cess of purposes acquisition part of a more general investigation into the
nature of economic connectivity. Indeed, economic connectivity is at the
analytical forefront again. Input–output theorists and development scholars
have always been interested in the inner structure of connections and bot-
tlenecks (Hirschman, 1958) shaping economies, in order to ﬁne–tune public
intervention and to identify the best routes for industrialization processes
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to escape a handful of ‘traps’; on the contrary, standard economic modeling
mostly focused its attention either on aggregate dynamics or on industry
level structural features.
The analysis of the linkages between industries is recently experiencing a
silent resurgence. We outline three main reasons for that, not mutually
exclusive: i) New Growth Theory and Schumpeterian Growth Theory did
not provide enough explanatory power to explain complex market dynam-
ics, thus inducing scholars to investigate beyond the surface of aggregation
and to frame macroeconomic issues (especially ﬂuctuations) as phenomena
emerging from localized and micro–level shocks (Acemoglu et al., 2012); ii)
network models developed in the context of complexity sciences made their
way into economic theorizing, revamping the input–output view of economic
activities as a fruitful way to understand and represent production relations,
industrial transformations (Carvalho and Voigtla¨nder, 2014; Contreras and
Fagiolo, 2014; McNerney et al., 2013), specialization and international trade
(Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2011) and the dispersion of manufacturing in global
value chains (Timmer et al., 2014); iii) the economic crisis and a timely re-
discovery of the role of the public sector in the economy boosted a novel
discussion on the aims and tools of industrial policy (Cimoli et al., 2009;
Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006; Mazzucato, 2013; Stiglitz et al., 2013) and on
the intertwined channels transmitting policy impulses to ﬁrms and markets.
The idea that ties matter in inﬂuencing economic behaviors is certainly not
new in innovation economics: The literature on open innovation, collec-
tive invention, R&D collaborations and patent networks (Cantner and Graf,
2006) is well developed. Also, the very idea at the basis of the Pavitt tax-
onomy (Pavitt, 1984) is to highlight industries’ external sources of technical
change — hence the role played by the connectivity with suppliers, an exer-
cise further developed by a rich literature on rent and knowledge spillovers
(Verspagen and De Loo, 1999) and technology ﬂows analysis (Scherer, 1982).
The diﬀusion of a more network–inspired theorizing due to reasons de-
scribed above allowed for an increased use of concepts that were conﬁned
until recently in niches of the economic discipline as evolutionary, inno-
vation and development economics. Concepts such as multiple equilibria
(Hoﬀ, 2000; Stiglitz, 1987; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014), learning, ergodic
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and out–of–equilibrium processes (Arthur, 2013), positive feedbacks, link-
ages (Hirschman, 1958), all blossom again in the economic literature. These
building blocks are helpful to reformulate economic stylized facts as depen-
dent on linked payoﬀs. More speciﬁcally, stating that economic outcomes
depend on connectivity — that is on the strength and distribution of linkages
between the units of analysis — has consequences for the study of Indus-
trial Dynamics, especially for what concerns some unresolved puzzles. For
example, the known technological and economic drivers of market selection
(Cantner et al., 2012), market turbulence (Cantner and Kru¨ger, 2004) and
industry life cycles (Klepper and Graddy, 1990; Klepper, 1996) may be just
a part of a larger story. Connectivity may aﬀect the speed of selection and
survival probabilities, the rate and pace of technological change, the dura-
tion of the phases of the life cycle. External eﬀects originating in linked
markets may play a much broader role in innovation and economic activ-
ities than it is usually accounted for. This paper deals with connectivity
by studying how the technological specialization of downstream industries
(their ‘upgrading’, in the language of development economics) and the per-
vasiveness of upstream technologies (input) are related.
The more stylized case of connectivity one can study is that of an upstream–
downstream relation between a single supplier and a single customer indus-
try. The literature focuses mainly on incentives and constraints for verti-
cal integration (transaction cost economics being prominent in such type of
analysis; see also Arrow (1975) and Bresnahan and Levin (2012)) and on the
eﬀects of diﬀerent market structures on the performance of vertically related
markets, for example in the case of double marginalization (Spengler, 1950;
Bresnahan and Reiss, 1985). What is interesting is also the endogenous de-
termination of payoﬀs, when decisions on one side of the relation aﬀect the
returns of some activities (for example, innovative activities) on the other
side, and vice versa. This is the case, for example, of two–sided markets
and platforms (standards) formation (Rysman, 2009; Weyl, 2010) driven by
network eﬀects and of organizational ecologies’ densities interdependencies
(De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2012).
The focus of this paper is a very speciﬁc case of connectivity structure,
that stands in–between a singular upstream–downstream connection and a
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complex network structure with multiple upstream–downstream ties. We
consider a production structure featuring vertical (that is, hierarchical) re-
lations between one upstream technology and a set of downstream appli-
cations and analyze the eﬀects of the introduction of incoming upstream
technologies. This structure is similar to what Carvalho (2014) calls a star
economy, with the diﬀerence that here the upstream vertex features several
technologies competing for prevalence in use in the downstream industries.
A star economy–like structure is the most straightforward representation of
the linkages between a GPT (at the center) and its downstream applications
(in the surrounding periphery). On this rather general basis, GPT theory
has been developed in several economic ﬁelds, such as industrial organization
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995), new growth theory (Helpman, 1998),
and evolutionary economics (Carlaw and Lipsey, 2011).
However, the ‘generality’ of the phenomenon it describes has not yet been ex-
ploited to sketch a fully–ﬂedged theory of economic connectivity and linked
payoﬀs in the context of vertically related industries. We ﬁll this gap by ex-
tending GPT setting to the case in which the incoming technology striving
for pervasiveness is not yet a GPT. When the establishment of a GPT is not
assumed a priori, the resulting prevailing and pervasive upstream technology
has to emerge from the competition between upstream technologies for the
downstream industries. The reason to look at GPTs from this perspective
lies in the deﬁnitional underpinnings of the very GPT concept (Field, 2008),
which ‘has come under growing attack’ (Ristuccia and Solomou, 2014) re-
cently. To the authors’ knowledge, only the paper by Thoma (2009) takes
the same viewpoint as the one suggested in the Chapter. The paper studies
how potential GPTs ‘strive for a large market’. Thoma’s analysis focuses
on a speciﬁc case (Echelon’s LonWorks control technology) and highlights
the diﬀerent strategies experimented by the company Echelon to foster a
pervasive use of its product. These strategies were ranging from value chain
integration and collaborations to open sourcing of the product software in
order to create a community of loyal users. Eventually, it has been the role
played by a big public demander to create the conditions for an increasing
pervasive use of the technology. This goes in line with the result of classic
GPT models, according to which public procurement can lead the GPT dif-
fusion to higher equilibria. Our contribution goes in the same direction and
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provides a general framework, rather than a case study, to understand how
incoming candidate GPTs succeed or fail while striving for a large market.
In existing GPT models vertical connectivity is key for economic perfor-
mances and most importantly for innovation performances, given the exis-
tence of the so–called ‘dual inducement’ of innovational complementarities
between the single upstream generic technology and downstream applica-
tions. The problem in that context is to determine and solve the coordina-
tion issue arising between downstream applications and a pre–determined
upstream technology. Market outcomes can be lower than socially desirable,
however, there, coordination is about the intensity, rather than the direc-
tion of innovative activities. In our paper, also the direction matters, in the
sense that the incoming upstream technology is not aware of its potential
GPT ‘status’; it learns it through its (successful or not) dynamics toward
prevalence, persistence, and pervasiveness (see Chapter 2). User industries
can choose the upstream technology to which to be tied; the outcome in
terms of which upstream technology prevails decides the direction innova-
tion activities.
Modeling a star economy in the making is closely connected with three
strands of literature: First, there are similarities with models dealing with
infant industries and early stages of industrialization (Hausmann and Ro-
drik, 2003; Hoﬀ, 1997). In fact, one may think of the process leading to
the establishment of a GPT as a case of ‘infant technology’ development.
Second, modeling the problem of ‘acquired purposes’ closely resembles the
phenomena on which studies on competing technologies (Arthur, 1989) fo-
cus on, namely dynamic increasing returns to adoption. Third, modeling
the switch between upstream technologies by downstream industries can be
framed as a standard topic in industrial dynamics, that of entry/exit pat-
terns. In this case those entering are not ﬁrms; it is an entire application
industry that, by adopting one of the upstream competing technologies,
enters in one of the potential GPT sectors.
Our model builds upon the classic (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995, here-
inafter BT) model.1 There, the authors explore the simple ‘star economy’
1In what follows we refer to the journal version of the study, dated 1995. In case the
contents of interest are available only in the extended working paper version we refer to
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case, the one featuring a vertical relationship between industries. The basic
structure of the model is a ‘hierarchical pattern’ of technological interdepen-
dence between one GPT industry and many downstream application indus-
tries/sectors (hereinafter AS). BT deﬁne an AS an industry/sector ‘that (i)
is an actual or potential user of the GPT as an input; (ii) can earn positive
returns by engaging in R&D of its own; and (iii) the rents it earns increase
monotonically with the “quality” of the GPT’ (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg,
1992, p. 11).
In short, the BT model features a coordination game in innovative activities
with one–to–many upstream–downstream linked payoﬀs. These generate on
the one hand a potential positive feedback process in innovation (a so–called
dual inducement mechanism) and, on the other hand, suboptimal equilib-
ria due to a vertical and a horizontal externality. The vertical externality
emerges from the linked payoﬀs between GPT and AS — it is a bilateral
moral hazard problem; the horizontal externality results from the linked
payoﬀs between the many ASs given their indirect connection through the
GPT. The main variables aﬀecting the two types of sectors’ optimal decision
making with regards to innovative activities (the objective functions to be
maximized being the expected gross returns on innovative activities for the
AS and the expected proﬁts for the GPT) are z (a scalar for the GPT tech-
nical ‘quality’), w (the price of the GPT input) and c (the constant marginal
cost of production of the GPT–embodying commodity for the GPT sector).
This set of variables proxy both economic and technological explanations
aﬀecting the GPT–AS coordination game.
In BT, there is no alternative to an already established GPT. The pos-
sibility that a pseudo–diﬀusion (GPT adoption by the ASs) process takes
place within this game is captured by assuming an invariant ranking of ASs
with respect to V (w, z) (the ASs’ value function of innovation gross rents)
and letting z and w to vary in order to determine the unique ‘marginal’
or threshold AS that ﬁnds proﬁtable to adopt the GPT (Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1992). Formally, ‘for n(w, z) indicating the largest number
of AS that ﬁnds proﬁtable to use the GPT as input given w and z, then
nw(w, z) < 0, nz(w, z) > 0’ (the subscript indicating the partial derivative of
the source dated 1992.
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n with respect to w and z), meaning that, ‘the set of using sectors expands
as the quality of the GPT improves and its price goes down’ (Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1992, p. 13). The adoption process captured by the changes
in n(w, z) is already a broad proxy for a dynamics of purposes acquisition,
if one assumes that ASs are heterogeneous and that therefore an increase
in the number of downstream adopters widens the set of functions and uses
the GPT provides. This is correct, however only because it is given in the
model the presence of a single already established GPT. The change in the
number of AS adopting an upstream input does not depend on the upstream
competition among alternative technologies struggling for success and per-
vasiveness. We extend this process having in mind the general case with
several potential GPTs j and with nj(w1, w2, . . . , wj , z1, z2, . . . , zj), that is
the number of ASs ‘choosing’ a potential GPT j is function of the quality
and the cost of all the relevant alternatives.
Besides the rationales derived from the relevance of studies on economic con-
nectivity and from the received IO–based GPT theory, the Chapter main
question is also justiﬁed by a further theoretical argument that has to do
with the representation of the process of technological takeover. This process
is usually related to the phenomenon of ‘disruption’.2 Adner and Zemsky
(2005) oﬀer a formal discussion of the conditions for technological disruption
to occur. The authors explore the economic conditions and the timing un-
der which a novel technology either invades a mainstream market or remains
conﬁned in a niche, for the case featuring two competing technologies and
heterogeneously distributed ﬁrms’ willingness to pay. Even if the argument
there is not made explicit, the model can be framed as one of ﬁrms’ tech-
nological specialization in upstream competing technologies and goes in the
same direction taken by this paper — to show that multiple equilibria are
possible outcomes in a vertically related market with linked payoﬀs and more
than one potential GPT available. Adner and Levinthal (2002) bring the
analysis of purposes acquisition on the terrain of evolutionary theory by com-
paring the pervasiveness in the making of a technology with the phenomenon
2Despite the similarity of the concepts of generic technological change and disruption,
the two have only a partial overlap. The progressive establishment of a GPT may or
may not produce disruption. Its establishment as an emerging pervasive input can be
characterized by re–domaining (Arthur, 2009) of existing activities around new physical
principles and by the generation of complementarities, rather than substitution.
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of speciation. Speciation in the economy is the application of existing tech-
nologies to a new domain of application (Adner and Levinthal, 2002, p. 51),
just as a candidate GPT gains shares in the downstream application domain.
A close — though distinct — similitude is that with the concept of exapta-
tion (Andriani and Cohen, 2013; Dew et al., 2004). Exaptation occurs when
traits get co–opted for use in unintended ways (Andriani and Cohen, 2013).
Speciation and exaptation processes are conceptually proximate with what
is labeled technological upgrading in Development economics, re–domaining
in Complexity economics (Arthur, 2009) and technological convergence in
the Economics of technical change (Rosenberg, 1963). In a broad sense, the
core idea is that in the struggle for pervasiveness, the more downstream
applications switch to use one of the upstream inputs so that it starts to
be used in new domains, the more the economy experiences a technological
structural change.3
In sum, we can highlight the following theoretical building blocks that will be
used in the remainder of the analysis: i) technology adoption and technolog-
ical competition depend both on economic and non–economic (in this case,
technological) determinants, that can be considered independently from each
other; ii) the adoption/diﬀusion of an incoming upstream technology is func-
tion of the change in the economic and technological determinants across all
the relevant alternatives; iii) an incoming upstream technology striving for
pervasiveness can encounter resistance from the established GPT; iv) pur-
poses are acquired in an evolutionary manner, either co–opting functions for
use in unintended ways or applying existing functions to new domains. In
what follows the building blocks discussed above are used to set up a toy
model that represents how an upstream potential GPT can succeed or fail
to acquire purposes.
3With technological structural change we mean here a transformation of the techno-
logical base of industries rather than — as usually meant for structural change — a shift
in employment allocation through macro–sectors.
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4.3 A Ricardian Model of Technological Special-
ization
We propose a simple model that represents the dynamics of purposes acqui-
sition when more than one upstream technology is available in the market.
The outcome of this competition for the downstream market may vary ac-
cording to the state and change of the economic and technological variables
at work. We distinguish three broad outcomes of the model: i) in the com-
petition between an established and a new upstream technology, the new
upstream technology gains pervasiveness in the market and in the limit
takes over and ‘serves’ the whole downstream economy; ii) in the competi-
tion between an established and a new upstream technology, the established
upstream technology maintains its pervasiveness in the economy and a novel
one occupies only a niche (it is adopted by none or a limited amount of down-
stream sectors); iii) in the competition between an established, a new and
a third, newer, upstream technology, the third, newer upstream technology
displaces the new one, making the former a sort of ‘failed GPT’.
The model is a simpliﬁed version of the Dornbusch et al. (1977) assign-
ment model of international specialization in line with Cantner and Hanusch
(1993), Acemoglu and Autor (2011); Cimoli (1988); Dosi and Soete (1983)
and, more recently, Costinot (2009) and Costinot and Vogel (2015).4 In
our version the matching occurs between upstream technologies (industries)
and downstream industries, rather than countries and products as in Cant-
ner and Hanusch (1993) and skills/labor and tasks as in Acemoglu and Autor
(2011). The units of analysis of the model are generic individual industries;
ﬁrms’ behavior is not explicitly taken into account. We assume homogeneity
between ﬁrms and heterogeneity between industries; while barely realistic
(stylized facts regarding the persistent ‘fractal’ nature of economic charac-
teristics the more disaggregation is deepened are well–known, see Dosi and
Nelson (2010)) the introduction of ﬁrms heterogeneity would only magnify a
phenomenon already emerging under more simplifying restrictions. For the
sake of generality, hereinafter instead of the term ‘downstream industries’
we use the term ‘downstream applications’, in order to take into account a
4The model itself can be conceived as a case of exaptation, given that a framework
developed for a speciﬁc purpose is imported into another ﬁeld of economic theorizing.
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more disaggregated and richer set of economic activities.
The next sub–section describes the case featuring two–upstream industries
— one established and a new upstream technology. Later on, we extend the
analysis to a three–upstream industries scenario.
4.3.1 The Case of Two Competing Upstream Industries
We assume that each upstream industry produces a single technology.5 The
upstream technology is in turn used as a single component in downstream
applications. The structure is that of a value chain with two layers: that of
the suppliers (upstream) and that of the user (downstream) industries. Up-
stream industries are labeled with the index E (for the established technol-
ogy) and N (for the new technology). Technology N is a potential ‘entrant’
in the upstream market; furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that N
is associated with a limited set of speciﬁc downstream industries initiated
thanks to the very discovery or invention of N . Given that downstream
applications’ production technologies depend only on the upstream prod-
uct, they can be characterized by their valuation of the speciﬁc upstream
technologies and ordered in a continuous and closed interval [0; In], where I
indicates a generic downstream application and n is an ordered index.
In Cantner and Hanusch (1993) goods are characterized by a labor require-
ment (the inverse of labor productivity) needed to produce them, with a
decrease in labor requirement capturing an increase in production eﬃciency.
In our model we look at industries or downstream applications (instead of
goods) and we assume that — due to strong complementarities — the up-
stream components quantity requirement is constant (and normalize it to
one unit) and what changes are just the beneﬁt of using one or the other
upstream technology, that in BT are captured by the ‘quality’ of the GPT.
The ranking over the continuum of downstream applications, which is as-
sumed to be invariant over time, distributes the downstream application
according to the relative beneﬁt of using the new upstream technology. Rel-
ative beneﬁt measures the advantage or the disadvantage for a downstream
5By doing so the use of the terms upstream industry and upstream technology in the
paper is indiﬀerent.
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application to ‘attach’ to the new upstream industry compared with the
choice of staying with the established one. This is a measure that proxies
in a scalar a number of innovation determinants that are well known in the
literature, such as technological intensity or performance gap (Cantner and
Hanusch, 1993, p. 220), technological opportunities (Klevorick et al., 1995),
price/performance sensitivity (Almudi et al., 2013; Dosi and Nelson, 2010;
Pavitt, 1984) or relative willingness to pay for the upstream technologies. In
turn, all these concepts are potential proxies for the easiness of technology
switch from an established to a new upstream technology, and capture the
core of the technological side of our model.
In order to keep a degree of consistency with the previous literature, the
model uses the same set of explanatory variables and a similar notation to
that outlined in the building block Section. The measures of beneﬁt out-
lined above can be interpreted as functions of the perceived usefulness of
(one of) the (potential) GPTs. We call zj(I) such application–dependent
usefulness, where j = {E,N}, E is the established andN the novel upstream
technology and z varies in I. The speciﬁc feature of our model is that we
are discussing relative rather than absolute usefulness — that is a measure
for ‘comparative advantage’ of technology N with respect to technology E.
Therefore, our variable of interest is ζ(I) = zN (I)zE(I) , the relative technologi-
cal usefulness (attractiveness) of upstream technologies. It is important to
highlight here that while in Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) model z is
a single scaler value (the GPT ‘quality’) known to all the AS, in our case z
is a downstream application’s valuation of the upstream technology quality.
The model is deterministic, that is we do not interpret z as an ‘expected’
usefulness but as a source of heterogeneity between applications. In this
way, heterogeneity is introduced in the model via a continuous distribution
of downstream propensities to choose the performance of N relatively to E
and the model can be considered belonging to the class of probit or threshold
models of diﬀusion (Geroski, 2000).
Given that it is deﬁned over the interval of downstream applications, ζ(I) is
a function — the relative (upstream) technology usefulness (performance)
curve. Following Cantner and Hanusch (1993) we make the following as-
sumptions on the shape of ζ(I): i) it is continuous and diﬀerentiable in
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[0; In]; ii) it is monotonically increasing in I due to the downstream ap-
plications’ ordering, with ζ
′
> 0; iii) it is reversible (ζ−1(I) does exist).
In short, ζ(I) represents the comparative increasing rewards obtained from
purchasing the new upstream component rather than using the established
one. At this point, it has to be added that downstream sector size does not
play a role in the model; each downstream application, deﬁned over an inﬁ-
nite continuum, has an inﬁnitesimal size with respect to the whole economy.
Theoretically speaking, sub–intervals of technologically proximate (in the
comparative advantage space) applications can be identiﬁed and aggregated
in order to model diﬀerent industries sizes and to provide a more realistic
representation of the unequal weight of downstream economic sectors in the
economy. Such a reﬁnement is left aside in this version of the model, even if
downstream sector size may play a role when mutual feedbacks and linked
payoﬀs are explicitly formalized and taken into account.
In order to have an upstream–downstream markets matching, the techno-
logical dimension has to be confronted with an economic dimension of the
relation. More precisely, the technology relative usefulness (performance)
curve has to be coupled with a relative cost curve. In Dornbusch et al.
(1977) and in Cantner and Hanusch (1993) the corresponding curve is a
demand curve that integrates consumption shares over the continuum of
goods given the Cobb–Douglas preferences of consumers. Here we simplify
the object of analysis by displaying only the relative cost for downstream
sectors to acquire upstream technologies. If each downstream application
purchases a constant amount of upstream component (we assumed only one
unit), then no demand curve exists to determine the pricing of the potential
GPTs. What matters is the relation between the two costs. Again consis-
tently with Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) we deﬁne wj(I) as the cost of
the upstream technology, where j = {E,N}, E is the established and N the
novel upstream technology. We do not deal with price–cost margins (prof-
its) in the upstream market, because the change in the downstream shares
using one or the other upstream technology is completely driven by down-
stream applications’ adoption decisions.6 The ratio ω(I) = wN (I)wE(I) represents
the relative cost (downstream expenditure) curve. Regarding the shape of
6However, price–cost margins may be quite relevant in aﬀecting the magnitude of
vertical externalities (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995).
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ω(I) the assumptions we made on ζ(I) on continuity and diﬀerentiability
hold. Concerning the slope of ω(I), we can imagine three possibilities: i)
ceteris paribus the downstream applications’ ranking, the novel upstream
technology will be relatively more (less) costly for downstream applications
with a comparative disadvantage (advantage) in switching: ω(I) is mono-
tonically decreasing in I; ii) ω(I) is constant over the whole distribution of
downstream application because either wN (I) and wE(I) are constant for
all I or are monotonically decreasing at the same rate over I; iii) ω(I) is
non–monotone. Formulation i) and ii) are more straightforward for com-
parative statics purposes, while iii) may produce multiple equilibria. In the
remainder of this Section, we assume that cases i) or ii) apply.7
In general, the model determines an industry Ie that separates the market
between applications using upstream technology E and applications using
upstream technology N . To determine Ie, over the interval [0; In] we can
set into relation the relative usefulness and the relative cost of the upstream
technologies for each downstream application I
zN (I)
zE(I)
<
>
wN (I)
wE(I)
→ zE(I)
wE(I)
<
>
zN (I)
wN (I)
which transforms in a usefulness/cost ratio
zj(I)
zj(I)
. By the properties of the
ζ– and the ω–functions there is a downstream application Ie for which the
following holds:
zN (I)
zE(I)
=
wN (I)
wE(I)
→ zE(I)
wE(I)
=
zN (I)
wN (I)
A downstream application adopts N if zE(I)wE(I) <
zN (I)
wN (I)
. In Ie the equality
sign holds and the model yields the unique threshold or borderline down-
stream application that is indiﬀerent in the choice of upstream technology.
In addition to the identiﬁcation Ie the model simultaneously provides the
size of intervals ]0, Ie] and ]Ie, In], which are the shares of the downstream
7One may discuss if to identify a single ‘net beneﬁt’ curve by deﬁning a function ν(I) =
ζ(I) − ω(I) could be an equivalent modeling strategy. We prefer to distinguish the two
functions to highlight the role played by both technological and economic determinants.
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market specialized either in E or N . A measure or a metric can be derived
for the length of the ]0, Ie] and ]Ie, In] intervals, and used to assess the per-
vasiveness and thus the ‘GPT nature’ of the upstream technologies and to
track the dynamics of the purposes acquisition process.
The endogeneity of ζ(I) and ω(I) curves’ determination is purposefully
avoided in the model, in order to distinguish the eﬀect of purely techno-
logical and pure economic determinants of the downstream specialization
towards one or the other upstream industry. The feedback eﬀects both on
the demand and supply side can be already detected by fractioning the dy-
namic adjustment process of specialization in one or the other upstream
technology in a sequence of ‘screenshots’. In line with Gans (2011), static
analysis can already be a suﬃcient proxy for dynamics considerations in
some cases. For example, the presence of dual inducements — downstream
adoption improves the quality of the upstream and vice versa — can be
modeled as shifts towards the left of the ζ(I) curve, while the presence of
learning eﬀects (Arrow, 1962; Thompson, 2010), meaning that the gains in
eﬃciency of one technology production (in general or respect to the compet-
ing alternative) are captured by a movement on the left of the ω(I) curve
(with wN (I) decreasing faster than wE(I)). The presence of dual induce-
ments or faster learning eﬀects in the established technology may also give
rise to non–linearities (and therefore potentially to multiple equilibria) in
the both demand and supply relative curves, a possibility here ruled out by
our assumption on the shape of ζ(I) and ω(I).
A graphical representation of the outcomes of the model is provided in Fig-
ures 4.1 and 4.2. The two diﬀerent cases provided are discussed next.
4.3.2 Discussion on the Two–upstream Technologies Case
As anticipated at the beginning of the paragraph, two are the main outcomes
of the two–upstream technologies case. We can label them as the compe-
tition (and potential takeover) case and the niche case. They respectively
mirror the ‘Ricardo case’ and the ‘innovation case’ in Cantner and Hanusch
(1993). In the competition case (see Figure 4.1), the intersection of ζ(I)
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and ω(I) determines the downstream economy’s specialization, which at the
very beginning may feature the established upstream technology to main-
tain its ‘control’ over a wide share of downstream applications. Varying the
comparative (relative) advantages in upstream usefulness and cost, the new
upstream industry starts to acquire purposes (that is, the borderline down-
stream industry moves to the left), leading in the limit to a full takeover. In
this sub–case, the new upstream technology may well be labeled as a GPT,
but only after a process that put it in the position to serve the largest share
of the downstream market. The new upstream technology enters the market
as a speciﬁc purpose technology, gains pervasiveness and acquires purposes
until it dominates the downstream market and becomes a GPT.
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Figure 4.1: Competition case
Note: the shift in the ζ(I) curve indicates an increase in comparative advantage for the new
upstream technology. Shares E, E′, N and N ′ indicate the result of the competition for the
downstream market, respectively for technology E and N before and after the change in relative
usefulness. The rightmost interval [In, Ix] indicates the set of novel downstream industries that
come together with the new upstream technology — there the ζ(I) curve is not deﬁned.
In the second scenario (see Figure 4.2), that we label niche case, ζ(I) and
ω(I) do not intersect, so that despite the increasing attractiveness and com-
parative advantage of the new upstream along the distribution of down-
stream applications the technological argument does not compensate for
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the economic one, with ω(I) lying completely above ζ(I), so that Ie = In.
In this case a novel upstream technology and potential candidate to become
a pervasive GPT fails to emerge as such (van Zon et al., 2003) and remains
a niche component used by a very limited set of applications, at the limit
only those new downstream applications emerged due to the introduction
of the new upstream technology in the economy. A niche case can always
turn into a competition/takeover case, when a shift to the left of ζ(I) or a
shift to the left of ω(I) re–establishes an intersection between the two curves
and sets Ie < In, meaning that the borderline downstream application is an
internal point of the interval.
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Figure 4.2: Niche case
Note: the relative usefulness of the new upstream technology does not compensate for the relative
cost along all the downstream continuum of industries. Only the novel downstream industries
that emerge together with technology N adopt it. N never succeeds in acquiring purposes.
The model can also account for the consequences generated by the emer-
gence of new downstream applications (for example novel downstream prod-
ucts and infant economic activities) that, as mentioned earlier, may follow
the introduction of N .8 This is formalized by extending on the right side the
8The appearance of new downstream sectors can be also understood in the terms
of Bresnahan and Yin (2010), as the emergence of latent sectors whose demand was
beforehand unserved under the dominance of the established upstream technology.
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interval [0; Ie; In] to [0; Ie; In; Ix]. Here [0; Ie[ indicates the interval of appli-
cations attached to the established upstream technology and ]Ie; In; Ix] indi-
cates the extended interval. This includes the existing applications adopting
the upstream technology N , from the borderline Ie to In and those just en-
tered in the market, labeled with x and identiﬁed in the additional interval
]In; Ix]. In the niche case Ie and In will coincide. We assume that newborn
downstream applications can produce for the ﬁnal market only if connected
to the new upstream technology, meaning that they do not evaluate compar-
ative advantage (formally, they have an inﬁnitely high comparative advan-
tage in ζ(I) and an inﬁnitely low ω(I)). New downstream applications add
in an ordered succession to the ranked distribution of the downstream mar-
ket. The presence of newborn downstream applications provides upstream
technology N with a ‘buﬀer’ stock of users. In a dynamic setting featuring
positive feedbacks from the number of adopters to the increasing compara-
tive advantage in adoption (meaning that z˙j and/or w˙j are function of the
sizes of the applications intervals served), such a stock may trigger a pur-
poses acquisition dynamics leading N to become a GPT. In this sense, the
new upstream technology enters the upstream market as a speciﬁc purpose
technology and its applications are only those downstream links existing at
its ‘birth’. If the user base in these downstream industries is large enough,
the relative usefulness of N is aﬀected positively, leading to an upward shift
of the ζ(I) curve or to a downward shift of ω(I), depending on how network
eﬀects are modeled. This, ceteris paribus, increases the size of the down-
stream interval served by N ; in practical terms this means that N diﬀuses
through the heterogeneous downstream industries, increasing its applicabil-
ity and, therefore, acquiring purposes.
4.3.3 Three Competing Upstream Industries
The static model outlined above can be extended to the case of three (or
more) upstream technology. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we in-
troduce in the set of upstream technologies a newer one, labeled M . Given
that downstream applications already face the decision to stay or switch
between E and N depending on the value and shape taken by the relative
usefulness and relative cost curves, to ﬁnd the new upstream–downstream
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market matching with three upstream alternatives it is suﬃcient to derive
two new curves, describing the comparative performance and cost between
upstream technologies N andM . Assuming that the ranking of downstream
applications remains unchanged, we rename ζ(I) and ω(I) as ζEN (I) and
ωEN (I) and introduce ζNM (I) and ωNM (I) as the two new comparative re-
lations. The same assumptions on continuity, monotonicity and reversibility
hold. Figure 4.3 presents the scenario just discussed.
Shifts of in ζEN (I), ωEN (I), ζNM (I), and ωNM (I) may lead to a broader set
of technological specializations in the economy. Once again, the established
upstream technology may maintain its prevalent role in the economy, the
new upstream may take over downstream market shares becoming preva-
lent (that is, acquiring the status of GPT) or the newer upstream may
substitute for the new one, making the latter a failed potential GPT and
the former a pervasive technology. Finally, the downstream market may well
be split among the three competing upstream, avoiding the tendency for any
GPT to appear. The three upstream technologies case can be further ex-
tended to a many–to–many relations assignment model, with a continuum
of downstream applications matching with a continuum of upstream tech-
nologies (see Costinot and Vogel (2015) for such a generalization in the case
of Ricardian trade models). However, the three upstream industries case
is already general enough to highlight the main result of this paper: the
standard GPT model is just a special case of a model of competition for the
downstream market by upstream technologies that can display a richer set
of outcomes and structural conﬁgurations.
In fact, such generalization has the virtue to show how technological compe-
tition for the downstream market may be resolved in a broad constellation
of outcomes, with only some of them leading to the replacement of a GPT
with a new one and to a successful process of purposes acquisition and in-
crease in generality, applicability and pervasiveness for one of the upstream
technologies. Furthermore, the three upstream technologies case provides
another insight on the process of technological competition in vertically re-
lated markets: the higher the number of upstream technologies, the bigger
the number of variables aﬀecting the ﬁnal outcome. Relative usefulness and
relative costs can all be subject to change, and, therefore, the determinants
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Figure 4.3: Three–upstream technologies case
Note: the arrival of a newer upstream technology M increases the competition for the downstream
market based on comparative advantages and costs. In this case, the newer technology ‘steals’
downstream market shares to N , and the whole market is shared on rather equal basis by the
three alternative upstream technologies.
of purpose acquisition may be non–trivial to identify. This, on the other
hand, means that also the ‘levers’ to aﬀect the results of upstream techno-
logical competition multiply — opening room for a wide set of possibilities
for policy intervention.
4.3.4 Policy Interventions
The static model also allows for basic policy ‘experiments’. From Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg (1995) we know that, in a GPT framework, policy inter-
vention in the form of well–designed contracts and public procurement is
a condition to solve the coordination problem and to select better (higher)
equilibria by exploiting the dual inducement mechanism and internalizing
the vertical and horizontal externalities. In fact, ‘learning is just part of
the story: independent scientiﬁc advances as well as massive investments in
purposive R&D have contributed as much to the staggering pace of techni-
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cal advance (. . . )’ (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1992, p. 8). Such ‘massive
investments in purposive R&D’, realized either supporting private actors
or by directly intervening in the economy can be included in the Ricardian
model. Policy interventions aﬀect either the usefulness or the cost of the up-
stream technologies, and can be therefore by expressed as discrete changes
in z’s and w’s. Accordingly, Δzj(I) and Δwj(I) are the magnitudes of pol-
icy interventions, where j = {E,N} indicates that policy can aﬀect one, the
other, or all the upstream technologies. Policy can intervene either on the
economic or technological side, in a well–known policy–mix fashion.
For example, a policy easing the establishment of contacts and linkages
among ﬁrms belonging to diﬀerent industries (e.g. a cluster policy or the
support to multidisciplinary science parks) aﬀects the usefulness dimensions.
Better information on the features of the upstream technologies, resulting
from policies designed to favor exploration and experimentation can change
the downstream distribution of thresholds for adoption. On the economic
side, subsidy and tariﬀ schemes inﬂuence the relative cost of the established
technology compared to the new one. Interventions of this kind are evident
in the case of upstream competition among alternative energy supply tech-
nologies, where governments support the entrant upstream technologies —
namely renewable technologies — intervening on the relative prices discrim-
inating by the source of energy.
A purposive ‘push’ in one of the upstream shifts the borderline application
(applications, in the three upstream technologies case), helping one or the
other upstream component to defend its share of downstream user from the
competing technologies or to ease the process of purposes acquisition. In
short, public intervention can act on diﬀerent upstream levers, leading the
system to one out of many possible specialization patterns. Public policy can
also decide to allocate its eﬀorts to sustain diﬀerent upstream technologies
at the same moment with the objective to explore diﬀerent trajectories in
parallel Cohen and Klepper (1992).
Policy interventions, therefore, aﬀect not just the intensity of innovative
activities, but their direction as well. An interesting point to be mentioned
in this context is that the possibility of parallel explorations of diﬀerent
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trajectories (upstream technologies) allows the economic system as a whole
to screen a wider set of states of the world. However, the allocation of
resources to alternative and competitive ends reduces the ‘demand eﬀect’
that has been identiﬁed as key to kick–in dual inducement dynamics; this,
in turn, raises the chances that a potential GPT gets locked into an inferior
equilibrium in terms of performance and size of the user base.
4.3.5 A Simple Dynamic Setting
The static version of the model can already suﬃce to illustrate the main
claim of the paper: when more than one candidate GPT compete as an
upstream technology for a downstream market of applications, a potential
GPT can either succeed or fail to gain pervasiveness. A GPT is not any-
more assumed to exist a priori in the economy — the case is instead that of
a speciﬁc–purpose upstream technology that acquires purposes and becomes
a GPT. A dynamic extension of the model can, however, shed some light
on how diﬀerent outcomes in the competition for the downstream market
are obtained, meaning how diﬀerent equilibria in the structure of special-
ization of the downstream economy can be reached. Dynamic models of
technology competition and diﬀusion such as the one in Loch and Huber-
man (1999) describe how adoption of alternatives evolves over time, usually
modeling it as function of performance, in turn aﬀected by network eﬀects.
The case described in this model is, however, diﬀerent, since the population
of adopters (the downstream applications) is heterogeneous. This means
that performance does not depend only on technology characteristics (for
example, expected returns or proﬁts) and market characteristics (the mag-
nitude of network externalities) but also on application–speciﬁc preferences
(thresholds) that are captured by the shape of the ζ(I) curve.
Let’s consider again the two–upstream technologies case. A dynamic version
of the model has to determine the law of motion of three variables: ζ(I), ω(I)
and Ie. Following Cimoli (1988), it is useful to derive ﬁrst a scalar measure
for the responsiveness of the downstream specialization to changes in the
fundamental technological and economic conditions. To ease the reading,
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the functions ζ(I) and ω(I) are indicated as ζ and ω. We deﬁne
Ie,ω =
∂Ie
Ie
ω
∂ω
as the comparative costs elasticity of the borderline downstream application.
Ie,ω indicates, for a given ζ(I) function, the percentage change in border-
line application given a percentage change in the relative cost of the two
upstream technologies. As the new upstream technology gets more expen-
sive (cheaper) relatively to the established one, the threshold downstream
sector moves rightwards (leftwards) at a higher rate the higher is Ie,ω. A
similar expression can be derived for the comparative usefulness elasticity
of the borderline downstream application, Ie,ζ , where
Ie,ζ =
∂Ie
Ie
ζ
∂ζ
indicates the percentage change in the borderline application given a per-
centage change in the relative usefulness of the new upstream technology
with respect to the established one. The higher Ie,ζ , the bigger the share
of downstream market the new upstream gains (lose) if its quality improves
(worsen) relatively to the established one.
The dynamics of Ie can be modeled as follows:
∂Ie
∂t
≡ I˙e = Ie(Ie,ωIe,ζ)
[
ζ˙(I)− ω˙(I)
]
(4.1)
where a dot indicates the rate of change of a variable and t is the time index.
The dynamics of the borderline downstream application is function of the
current state Ie, of the elasticities and of the net absolute changes of the
relative usefulness and cost curves. These can be expressed as
∂ζ(I)
∂t
≡ ζ˙(I) = zˆN − zˆE (4.2)
∂ω(I)
∂t
≡ ω˙(I) = wˆN − wˆE (4.3)
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where a hat over a variable indicates a growth rate (percentage change).
Each comparative curve evolution results from the net change between the
numerator and the denominator. Inserting equations 4.2 and 4.3 into 4.1 we
have
∂Ie
∂t
≡ I˙e = Ie(Ie,ωIe,ζ) [(zˆN − zˆE) + (wˆE − wˆN )] (4.4)
Functional forms are kept implicit until now. In order to identify an equilib-
rium Ie, we need to specify them. It is reasonable to assume that either the
relative usefulness or the relative cost is aﬀected by network eﬀects (Arthur,
1989; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007), that is, by the number of downstream
application attached either to N or E. Another way to measure the net-
work eﬀect is by the size of the intervals ]0, Ie] and ]Ie, In]. Setting In = 1
(meaning that we ﬁt the continuum of downstream applications to the unit
support),9 the number of downstream users of E is Ie, while the number of
downstream users of N is (1− Ie).
On the performance side, introducing network eﬀects equals to say that as
the gap in usefulness widens, the more downstream applications switch to
use upstream technology N . On the cost side, the network eﬀects play a
role on the steepness of learning curves: the more downstream applications
switch to N , the faster the new upstream technology can reduce its price.
Since the focus of the paper is that to model acquired purposes, we assume
for consistency that network eﬀects play a role only on the performance
side: as diﬀusion of the new upstream technology takes place, the relative
usefulness perceived increases. This is a proxy for the process of discovery
of new purposes that over time makes a speciﬁc purpose technology to gain
pervasiveness downstream and to become a GPT. Of course, in real–world
contexts network eﬀects do play a role on both the technological and the
economic side.
As a caveat, it is important to remark here that the network eﬀects as
modeled in this Section are not an exact proxy for the dual inducement
mechanism that in Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) takes place between
9Or Ix = 1, in case new downstream industries emerge together with N .
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the single GPT existing in the market and its application. In fact, while
the dual inducement is limited to incentives to innovative activities, here
we take a broader perspective that incorporates technological and economic
determinants. Moreover, downstream industries do not optimize over any
choice variable, but just react to upstream relative performance and cost.
In our model, however, an increase in relative usefulness triggers an increase
in downstream adoption, and vice versa. A mutual feedback in similar to
the dual inducement mechanism is therefore indirectly captured.
We assume for the moment that upstream technology purchasing costs for E
and N are the same for each I (since all downstream applications purchase
one unit of upstream component at the same price from the same supplier),
so that wj,I = wj for j = {E,N} is constant over the downstream contin-
uum. The dynamics of wj follows a simpliﬁed learning curve over time of
the type
w˙j = −γjwj (4.5)
with γj = −wˆj as the (negative) upstream technology constant (and tech-
nology speciﬁc) percentage rate of cost reduction. As concerns performance,
we model improvements in usefulness — and thus acquisition of purposes
— as a function of downstream adoption. The process of performance im-
provement is usually represented as following an S–shaped pattern (Loch
and Huberman, 1999); here we opt for a simpler linear version:
z˙N = θNzN (I)(1− Ie) (4.6)
z˙E = θEzE(I)(Ie). (4.7)
We assume also that the z function takes the shape zj(I) = e
αjI for j =
{E,N}, to represent the monotonically increasing property of upstream
technology usefulness along the downstream continuum. α is a technology
speciﬁc scaling parameter, while θ captures an exogenous rate of technologi-
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cal improvement that is also dependent on the upstream technology chosen.
From this, equations 4.6 and 4.7 become
z˙N = θNe
αN I(1− Ie) (4.8)
z˙E = θEe
αEI(Ie) (4.9)
and the respective growth rates
zˆN = θN (1− Ie) (4.10)
zˆE = θE(Ie) (4.11)
The percentage change in the usefulness of E and N depends therefore
only on the exogenous parameter and — endogenously — on the respective
downstream market shares.
Inserting 4.5, 4.10 and 4.11 in 4.4 we obtain
∂Ie
∂t
≡ I˙e = Ie(Ie,ωIe,ζ) [(θN (1− Ie)− θE(Ie)) + (γN − γE)] (4.12)
The structural equilibrium is identiﬁed when I˙e = 0, where the changes in
relative usefulness and relative cost perfectly compensate each other. One
trivial equilibrium is obtained in the corner solution in which N fully domi-
nates the market. This occurs, that is when Ie = 0. This means that, using
the categories introduced in the static setting, only in the niche case,10 when
relative usefulness and cost do not intersect, the new upstream fails to gain
pervasiveness and to become a GPT. As soon as N is adopted by a minimum
10And only assuming that the interval ]In, Ix] = 0 or that the downstream industries
that emerge together with upstream technology N do not generate any network eﬀect.
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share of downstream application, the system moves to the stable equilibrium
in which Ie = 0, as shown in Figure 4.4. For N to fail to gain pervasiveness
equation either one or both the elasticity terms are zero (meaning that one
or both the curves are rigid), or 4.12 has to show multiple equilibria. How-
ever, this is possible only when non–linearity in the shape of the curves is
introduced. We do that relaxing the assumption that costs change uniformly
along the downstream continuum. One justiﬁcation for this is related to the
possibility for the established upstream technology to ‘ﬁght back’, meaning
to actively respond to the challenge to dominance started by the new up-
stream technology.11 An illustration of this ‘incumbent reaction’ is captured
by the following law of motion for the cost curves:
w˙N = (−γN − Ie−βI)wN (4.13)
w˙E = −γEwN (4.14)
where the term Ie−βI indicates that besides the exogenous component γN
the percentage decrease in upstream technology cost of N is function also
of the speciﬁc downstream application, and β > 1 is a parameter. The
higher in the ranking a downstream sector is, the higher its potential cost
reduction, but also the stronger the reaction of the established technology.
Eventually, the potential eﬀect and the reaction eﬀect interact, generating
a bell–shaped function. Dividing by wj we obtain the percentage changes
and thus the equation for ω˙(I), yielding ω˙(I) = γE − γN − Ie−βI .
Plugging the expression for ω˙(I) just derived into 4.12 we ﬁnd the new law
of motion for Ie:
∂Ie
∂t
≡ I˙e = Ie(Ie,ωIe,ζ)
[
(θN (1− Ie)− θE(Ie)) + (γN + Ie−βI − γE)
]
(4.15)
11An alternative way to is to assume that network eﬀects have decreasing returns, so
that increasing adoption rates lead to further adoption, however at a slower pace.
4.4 Conclusion 101
In this case, the more N gains purposes, so Ie shifts to the right, the more
ω increases its convexity. Depending on the elasticity of ω, the response of
the established technology can lead to two structural equilibria (as shown
in Figure 4.5), the leftmost being locally stable and the rightmost being
unstable.
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Figure 4.4: Dynamics of the Ricardian model — acquired pervasiveness
of technology N
Note: the chart shows the dynamics of the model when I˙e is aﬀected by network eﬀects operating
on the ζ(I) function. The equilibrium is identiﬁed when Ie = 0 — meaning that the whole
downstream market is served by the new upstream technology.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we generalized the theory of GPTs to a theory of upstream
technological competition for a downstream market of heterogeneous poten-
tial applications. To describe our phenomenon of interest, we recombined
contributions belonging to diﬀerent strands of literature: market connectiv-
ity, GPTs, economic development, and technology evolution. We deﬁned a
‘purposes acquisition’ process as the dynamics leading a technology devel-
oped to deploy speciﬁc functions or to solve speciﬁc problems to identify fur-
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Figure 4.5: Dynamics of the Ricardian model — multiple equilibria
Note: the chart shows the dynamics when the established technology ‘strikes back’ acting on ω(I),
but in a heterogeneous way, function of the downstream continuum. Two equilibria are identiﬁed.
ther purposes and uses than the ones the technology was originally planned
or designed for.
We applied a simpliﬁed version of the Ricardian model of international spe-
cialization (Dornbusch et al., 1977) to a context of industries connected
in a hierarchical (vertical) relation. In order to highlight the role diﬀer-
ent factors play in the competition for the downstream market, we kept a
distinction between technological and economic explanatory variables. The
model, notwithstanding its basic setting and the fact that it does not ex-
plicitly formalize the endogenous determination of payoﬀs, is useful to shift
the focus of analysis towards relative (gap), rather than absolute dimen-
sions. Learning mechanisms and feedbacks, as well as policy interventions,
can be taken into account in a stylized way as comparative statics of the
basic setting of the model. Also, it is showed that in the case featuring
three upstream technologies the many possible specialization patterns that
can occur in an economy with upstream-downstream linkages may lead to
technological pervasiveness, to technological co–existence, and to failures,
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with potential GPTs that remain conﬁned in downstream market niches.
From a critical viewpoint, it is possible to argue that while the paper claims
that no GPT is foreseeable in advance, the model implicitly assigns the
status of latent GPTs to the upstream technologies, therefore falling again
in the a ‘priori assumption’ fallacy of GPT theories. On the one hand, such
critique rightly points at a limitation of the paper; on the other hand, the
main purpose of this study was to show how potential GPTs can fail to
become GPTs given that to acquire purposes is not a trivial process but
the result of technological competition in upstream markets. The model
describes such process by oﬀering a view based on comparative advantage
and avoiding assuming which GPT dominates the market in equilibrium;
this is a novel contribution that complements the existing literature.
Another critique has to do with the possibility to deﬁne a relative usefulness
curve. Given the deep uncertainty characterizing new technologies, one can
reasonably posit that some downstream industries have not just an impre-
cise valuation of the possible uses of upstream technologies, but that they do
not have valuation at all, because the uses of the new upstream technology
are not even considered among the possible states of the world. This re-
mark, being certainly well taken, does not change the fact that downstream
industries can always be ranked according to the relative beneﬁt they expect
from the new upstream technology. In case of deep uncertainty, the value
of wN will be 0 and the function ζ(I) in correspondence to those industries
will lay on the horizontal axis.
From an evolutionary economics point of view, the model represents the
competition for downstream market shares (where shares are the fraction of
applications served by an upstream technology out of the total downstream
market existing application). In this sense, it shares some features with the
replicator dynamics model of Schumpeterian competition for the market
(Metcalfe, 1994).
For what concerns the extensions of the model, candidates are the intro-
duction of stochasticity and a through derivation of endogenous dynamics.
Both extensions go in the direction to explain specialization patterns as a
‘self–discovery’ process in presence of uncertainty and learning (Hausmann
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and Rodrik, 2003). Another possible extension relates technological compe-
tition in vertically related markets to Industry Life Cycles theories (Klepper,
1996). Finally, the empirical side of this research could be developed starting
from decomposition exercises (Cantner and Kru¨ger, 2008) to be extended to
vertically related industries.
In sum, the main contributions of the paper are i) the framing of GPT theory
into a more general analysis of vertically-related industries; ii) the modeling
of a downstream market specialization when alternative upstream technolo-
gies are available and the dynamic of GPT emergence, from a ‘speciﬁc’
(niche) upstream industry to a pervasive one; iii) the resulting possibility
for potential GPTs to fail to diﬀuse into the economy. To conclude, the pro-
cess leading to acquired purposes is not supposed to automatically lead to
the establishment of a pervasive GPT. Rather, the establishment of GPTs
it is closer to an emergent phenomenon, with multiple possible (even if not
equally possible) outcomes. Besides the technical features of technologies,
it is the task and the responsibility of economic agents and policy–makers
to determine which alternative specialization path is to be taken.
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Chapter 5
Replicator Dynamics in
Value Chains: Explaining
Some Puzzles of Market
Selection
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter studies the role of ﬁrms integration into value chains (here-
inafter VC) on competitive market selection. Under the integration into
value chains we mean that the performance of a ﬁrm is not only dependent
on its own performance (e.g., productivity, proﬁtability) but also on that of
its partners with whom it is vertically related to produce a ﬁnished good for
consumers.1 Within a value chain, trust and division of labor among supplier
and user industries is enhanced, while ﬂexibility in the choice of partners is
lower compared to a pure arm–lenght market transaction, where ﬁrm can
compete for the best suppliers. The idea that accounting for value chain
1In the Chapter, we use the term ﬁtness rather then performance to indicate the
abstract ‘goodness’ of the unit of analysis with respect to its reference group (competitors)
or environment (industry, market) to keep consistency with the literature on the replicator
dynamics.
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relations may shed some light on competition dynamics extends and may
be at odds with the original stylized model of market selection developed by
Metcalfe (1994) (also known as ‘replicator dynamics model’)2.
In the classic replicator dynamics model, vertical relationships among ﬁrms
can be implicitly considered only as long as their eﬀect is homogeneous
across the ﬁrms acting in the focal market. The diﬀerential performance
of ﬁrms is therefore only attributable to diﬀerent idiosyncratic competences
and abilities. Contrarywise, we argue that this connection can have a de-
cisive inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ success or failure in market selection, given that
value chains can be highly heterogeneous due to suppliers’ diﬀerent costs
structures and product qualities, and to a certain degree of stickyness of the
connections. The importance of ﬁrms’ vertical relations is conﬁrmed not
only by marketing research reporting that the value of business–to–business
(B2B) contracts in many industries is exceeding the one from the business–
to–consumer (B2C),3 but also by numerous studies pointing to the fact that
in the modern economy the degree of specialization and division of labor is
constantly increasing and instead of conducting the entire production cycle
in–house, many stages get outsourced to ﬁrms specializing in certain tasks
and phases of the production process, due to their higher productivity or
possess of speciﬁc resources and capabilities. An important feature of that
vertical relationships, however, is that ﬁrms collaborating on a long term
basis adjust their production process to each other so that switching one’s
partner becomes a very (if not prohibitively) costly issue. As a result, over
time a ﬁrm may get locked into cooperation with less ﬁt partners, which has
a direct impact on the ﬁrm’s performance and market share development.
The principle of reallocation of market shares from less eﬃcient ﬁrms to
their more ﬁt competitors is the key principle of selection–based theories
(Friedman, 1953; Foster et al., 2008), which also play an important role in
the evolutionary economics literature (Nelson and Winter, 1982). However,
2An alternative derivation of the replicator dynamics used by economics scholars can
be found in Schuster and Sigmund (1983). See Silverberg (1997) for a discussion.
3The major reason for this is that in a typical supply value chain there are many B2B
transactions involving sub–components or raw materials, and only one B2C transaction,
namely sale of the ﬁnished good to the end customer. For example, a computer manufac-
turer makes several B2B transactions such as buying microchips, diﬀerent cables, cooler,
which producers in their turn buy, e.g., nanometer transistors, rubber, plastic and metal.
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when it comes to empirical testing of the theory, evidence of that principle
is at best mixed and at worst contradictory (Cantner, 2014). A ﬁrst set of
explanations for this set of results ranges from the choice of not appropriate
variables for ﬁrm performance (ﬁtness) to not clearly demarcated units and
populations under analysis (ﬁrms vs products, industries vs markets/sub–
markets). Other explanations refer to neglected ﬁtness relevant components
(such as sunk costs, see Ho¨lzl (2015)) or — as in this Chapter — to the
exclusion of factors relevant for market share changes such as a ﬁrm’s inte-
gration into a value chain. The topic of vertical relations and value chains
is usually studied through the lenses of transaction–cost theories, in order
to assess advantages and disadvantages of integration and complex contrac-
tual arrangements (Bresnahan and Levin, 2012). By linking the literature
on vertical relations and market selection, this Chapter ﬁlls a relevant gap
and is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to explicitly model vertical relations as
determinants of selection dynamics.
Dealing with the market performance of ﬁrms integrated in the value chain
requires to take into account how the market performance of the downstream
ﬁrm inﬂuences the market performance of the upstream ﬁrm and vice–versa.
To simplify the issue at stake, in this study we assume that the number of
output units of the downstream ﬁrm entirely determines the number of out-
put units of the upstream ﬁrm. This strict relation implies that capacity
expansion (or reduction) of the upstream ﬁrm is not only dependent on this
ﬁrm success in its own market but also on the success of the downstream ﬁrm
in her market. At the limit, such an assumption implies that the replicator
dynamics is factually at work only in the ﬁnal good market, while upstream
ﬁrms just respond to downstream market shares reallocation. This simpliﬁ-
cation becomes useful when we assess through decomposition methods the
eﬀects on selection due to downstream competition and innovation dynam-
ics in all the layers of the value chain. By applying simulation techniques
we are interested under which constellation of value chain relationships the
usually expected outcome of the replicator dynamics is not showing up or
even reversed in its results.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature
review together with hypotheses to be tested. Section 5.3 describes the
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model of the replicator dynamics into the value chain context while in Sec-
tion 5.4 its main results are summarized. Section 5.5 discusses the model’s
implications and concludes.
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
In what follows we review the literature whose main focus is the empirical
study of market selection and market shares reallocation. In a nutshell,
the theoretical prediction of the replicator dynamics goes in line with the
Darwinian ‘survival of the ﬁttest’ principle: ideally, a ﬁrm with a higher
(lower) ﬁtness than the (share–weighted) average of the population increases
(decreases) its market share and drives further the selection dynamics by
aﬀecting the level of the share–weighted average ﬁtness in the following
periods, unless negative feedbacks dampen the dynamics.
Empirically, the literature on market shares reallocation and selection is
strongly related to that on productivity dynamics, especially at the micro
level. The latter has been boosted by the recent availability of ﬁrm and es-
tablishment level data, which start to shed some light on the determinants of
ﬁrm’s heterogeneity and characteristics (e.g. productivity and proﬁtability)
dispersion (Bartelsman, 2010). As a ﬁrst approximation, we can distinguish
between studies grounded on Empirical Industrial Organization (EIO) on
the one hand and Neo–Schumpeterian theories on the other hand; however,
the papers classiﬁed in this rough taxonomy often share a consistent part of
methodological premises.
The ﬁrst strand of research — that studying market selection from an EIO
perspective — descends from models of industry ‘equilibrium evolution’
(such as Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992)) and operates a ‘dissec-
tion’ of aggregate productivity (usually at the industry level) by decompos-
ing it in more fundamental components, either in a static or dynamic way.
Static decompositions follow from the seminal exercise of Olley and Pakes
(1996), that separates the ﬁrst moment of the productivity distribution (the
non–weighted average productivity) from a covariance term, measuring the
distortion provoked by the reallocation of shares from less to more produc-
5.2 Literature and Hypotheses 109
tive ﬁrms. Maliranta and Ma¨a¨tta¨nen (2015) extend the static Olley–Pakes
decomposition to account for diﬀerent categories of ﬁrms (stayers, entrants,
exiters and visitors). Dynamic decompositions usually build upon the con-
tribution of Baily and Campbell (1992) to explain changes in aggregate
productivity, rather than its level. Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster
et al. (2001) extend the dynamic decomposition framework to account for
entry and exit (the two methods diﬀer only with respect to the benchmark
productivity used to calculate the change). Dynamic decompositions distin-
guish between two main sources of productivity change: a within component,
usually interpreted in terms of ﬁrm–speciﬁc learning, and a between (plus
covariance) component, capturing the competition and reallocation (selec-
tion) dynamics. A combination of the static and dynamic decomposition
is derived in Melitz and Polanec (2015), where a dynamic Olley–Pakes de-
composition with entry and exit is considered in order to explain aggregate
productivity changes while maintaining the distributional approach of the
static methods. From the theoretical side, Foster et al. (2008) discuss the na-
ture of selection on productivity and proﬁtability by building and estimating
a model in which the selection dynamics is determined by ‘physical’ produc-
tivity, prices, and demand shocks. In general, the assessment of market
selection in the literature described above is what we label an ‘indirect’ one,
since the replicator dynamics is not tested explicitly but inferred through
the sign and magnitude of the between eﬀect.
The Neo–Schumpeterian literature addresses as well the issues of productiv-
ity dispersion, ﬁrms heterogeneity and the interaction between learning and
selection. However, these studies rely more explicitly on the evolutionary
assumptions of the replicator dynamics model; the idea is to test Schum-
peter’s concept of competition for the market, rather than competition in
the market. Again using indirect methods (namely the Foster et al. (2001)
decomposition), Cantner and Kru¨ger (2008) and Kru¨ger (2014) ﬁnd for Ger-
man manufacturing ﬁrms over the period 1981–1998 a weak tendency that
above–average productivity ﬁrms are selected in favor of below–average pro-
ductivity ﬁrms — this supporting a market selection process in line with the
replicator dynamics. By splitting the sample in two periods (before and after
German reuniﬁcation), Cantner and Kru¨ger (2008) are able to highlight the
stronger eﬀect of market reallocation in the period 1990–1998, interpreted
110 Replicator Dynamics in Value Chains
as a consequences of increased competition due to the reuniﬁcation shock.
In a follow–up study by Kru¨ger (2014), however, these results could not be
conﬁrmed. Similar results have been also obtained by Bottazzi et al. (2008)
and Coad (2007), where it is the within component — that is, learning —
that mainly drives productivity growth. In general, Metcalfe and Ramlo-
gan (2006) take a critical view to the decomposition exercises, considering
them on the one hand useful to uncover the dynamics behind the restless
nature of capitalism, but on the other hand sensible to the assumptions on
the ‘shapes’ of the within and between components. They call for a sound
theory of the interplay between innovation and market reallocation, to be
constructed above these ‘evolutionary accounting’ methods.
Beyond the indirect approaches, some studies attempted a direct opera-
tionalization of the replicator dynamics. In particular, Metcalfe and Calderini
(2000) measured the speed of selection, a speciﬁc parameter in the replicator
equation, for a dataset of the Italian steel industry. They cannot convinc-
ingly show that an evolutionary process according to replicator dynamics
is at work. More recently, Dosi et al. (2015) have enriched the picture on
the strength of selection combining direct and indirect approaches. In their
analysis they conduct a decomposition exercise using ﬁrm level productivity
data for four countries (US, France, Germany and the UK), and also esti-
mate directly the speed of selection for diﬀerent industries in each country.
For both exercises, the results are rather mixed, not supporting the standard
replicator model. A major reason is that an industry is not a market but a
collection of markets, the ﬁrms are multi–product, and the ﬁtness variable
is entirely supply–side determined, in particular, in terms of unit costs of
production. Cantner et al. (2012) take up this criticism and analyze the
rather narrowly deﬁned market for compact cars in Germany using a rel-
ative quality–price ratio, obtained aggregating information over four main
product characteristics and prices, as proxy for a ﬁrm ﬁtness. They ﬁnd
rather compelling evidence for the selection eﬀect working in the expected
direction.
Now, the replicator dynamics suggests that a ﬁrm’s market share change is
positively related to that ﬁrms relative performance in production; hence a
ﬁrm that compared to the other ﬁrms shows an above (below) average pro-
5.2 Literature and Hypotheses 111
duction performance is expected to increase (decrease) her market share.
That mechanism at work requires a market with one price (and market
clearing) and proﬁts (or losses) being used to invest into capacity expansion
(or for disinvestment, respectively). Market shares have to develop accord-
ingly. With a ﬁrm’s integration into value chains this mechanism may not
work properly. A ﬁrst issue is the law of one price: With long–term rela-
tionships special prices can be negotiated, leading to heterogeneity in prices.
A second issue, related to the former, is that vertically related ﬁrms may
cooperate and hence investment is done together. A third issue is related to
the demand for an intermediate product: if the downstream ﬁrm performs
successfully, it will increase its productive capacity and by this increase the
demand for the intermediate product; hence, the intermediate supplier, even
when performing below average in its own market, will face this increased
demand, provide the necessary expansion in capacity and experience a grow-
ing market share. All these constellations are at odds with the ideal selection
mechanism and may lead to the observation that in a speciﬁc market a be-
low average performing ﬁrm is able to increase market shares because her
very well performing partners along the value chain are able and willing
to pay higher intermediate product prices or are engaged in an investment
cooperation with that ﬁrm or demand more intermediate products.
In the following model we just argue in terms of the output relationships
between ﬁrms along a value chain and leave aside the features of diﬀerenti-
ated prices and cooperation in investment. To analyze this framework, we
suggest the following hypotheses:
1. In case all ﬁrms of a value chain hold in their own market the same
production performance position, then market selection in each market
should follow the principle of replicator dynamics.
2. In case of downstream ﬁrms in their own market show a higher rank
in terms of production performance than their partners in upstream
markets, the principle of replicator dynamics does not necessarily hold
in upstream markets.
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5.3 Basic Model
We start by clarifying the variables and notation we use in this study. This
ﬁrst means to determine which is the choosen proxy for the ﬁtness variable.
As it is clear from the literature review, any performance indicator may
serve the scope; usually more or less elaborated versions of the (labor or
total factor) productivity, product quality or costs are used. In order to
ease the comparison and to highlight our contribution with respect to other
modeling exercises (e.g. Mazzucato (1998)), we ﬁrst deﬁne ﬁrm’s total unit
cost Cim (for each ﬁrm i on value chain layer m). Being the result of a
successive transfer of intermediate goods from layer to layer, the unit price
of layerm−1 becomes part of the total unit cost of layerm, to which its own
layer–speciﬁc unit cost has to be added. In general, the total unit cost for
each layer can be decomposed as Cim = p
i
m−1 + cim, where pim−1 is the price
of the intermediate good of the upstream layer m − 1 and cim is the layer–
speciﬁc unit cost. The price of the upstream intermediate good m − 1 can
be expressed as pim−1 = pim−2+ cim−1(1+φ), where φ is a constant markup,
calculated on the ‘value added’ rather than on the cost of all supplies. Hence,
for any value chain, for the ﬁrst layer (layer one) Ci and ci are assumed to be
identical (Ci1 = c
i
1), as the ﬁrm has only its own cost of extracting primary
resources of production; for the second layer of the value chain, the total
unit cost becomes Cj2 = c
j
2+ p
j
1 = c
j
2+ c
j
1(1+φ) and so on until for the Mth
layer of production, CjM = c
j
M + p
j
M−1 = c
j
M +
∑M−1
m=1 c
j
m(1 + φ).
Last layer total unit cost CiM , that equals the whole value chain unit cost,
is our ﬁtness variable (equations (5.1) to (5.4) in what follows explain why
we use only CiM as ﬁtness, assuming that shares dynamics in all the up-
stream markets follow the behavior of the last — downstream — market).
We sometimes also refer to this variable as aggregate ﬁtness. Hereinafter,
whenever not diﬀerently speciﬁed, the use of the term total unit cost refers
to CiM , the last layer (and the whole value chain) cost.
Further assumptions:
1. there areM (let us start for simplicity with three) vertically integrated
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markets, where on each market Nm ﬁrms are operating. One can refer
to those three layers as ‘suppliers’, ‘manufacturers’ and ‘distributors’;
2. no ﬁrm can produce a ﬁnished good alone, but only in cooperation
with ﬁrms in other markets. Thus, we leave out the possibility of
vertical integration with one single ﬁrm present on more than one
layer (market);
3. we abstract from entry and exit behavior to isolate the eﬀect of selec-
tion dynamics (∀m = 1, . . . ,M Nm = constant);
4. for the sake of simplicity, we also ignore sources of uncertainty for value
chains such as demand (volume and product speciﬁcation), process
(e.g., machine downtime and transportation reliability) and supply
(e.g., delivery reliability) described in detail in Strader et al. (1998).
Instead, we assume perfect collection and sharing of information be-
tween supply chain members, which results in no inventories necessary
and order fulﬁllment cycle time being minimized. Such a perfect man-
agement of lead–time in turn presents a barrier for value chain mem-
bers to switch their partners, since tuning of this management is costly
in terms of time and resources. In absence of any friction or asymme-
try, this assumption may create the conditions for the establishment
of vertically–integrated ﬁrms. However, this possibility is ruled out
by assumption two: the impossibility of integration may be anyway
justiﬁed with arguments related to product complexity, specialization
and division of labor.
5. also for simplicity, goods on each market (including the market of
ﬁnished good M) are homogeneous: market dynamics is only driven
by ﬁrms’ diﬀerential ﬁtness;
6. ﬁrms on all M layers seek to earn proﬁt. Thus, on all M layers
proﬁt margin per unit of output ﬁrms charge is ﬁxed (parameter
φ = 0.1 = p
i
m−cim
cim
(10%)), where p indicates the price and cim the
ﬁrm and layer speciﬁc cost. In principle, one could abandon that pa-
rameter. However, since ﬁrms in our model implicitly conduct cost–
reducing R&D, we consider positive proﬁts in order to add realism
to the model. One can later investigate the role played by diﬀerent
markup settings;
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7. another standard assumption from replicator model adopted in this
study is the investment in capacity extension: whenever a ﬁrm makes
proﬁts by selling its output at a price above its costs, a portion of
the proﬁt is invested in increasing its capacity gim = λ(p
i
m − cim) =
yi,tm −yi,t−1m
yim
, where g is the ﬁrm growth rate, which in turn is deﬁned as
the ratio of its output y rate of change over its total production. λ
indicates the (constant) share of investment out of unit proﬁts; unless
speciﬁed diﬀerently, we set the parameter λ = 0.01.
From the replicator model (Metcalfe, 1994) we know that market share
sim =
yim
ym
of ﬁrm i on market m changes according to the following selection
equation, where the term f stands for ‘ﬁtness’:
Δsi,t = si,t − si,t−1 = si,tλ(f i,t−1 − f¯ t−1). (5.1)
As anticipated in the introduction, given that we consider a naive value
chain structure with only one connection in each layer and no other markets
(or ﬁrms) connected to those considered here, one can reasonably argue that
the unit output of ﬁrm j in the ﬁnal layer must be equal to its supplier’s one
in each preceding layer yiM = y
i
M−1 = ... = y
i
1, while the total unit output
of market M is equal to the preceding ones: yM = yM−1 = ... = y1. As a
consequence, the following equalities must hold:
ΔyM = ΔyM−1 = · · · = Δy1. (5.2)
i.e. aggregate changes in outputs on all markets are equal.
ΔyjM = Δy
j
M−1 = · · · = Δyj1. (5.3)
i.e. changes in outputs of all ﬁrms on diﬀerent layers matched into one value
chain are also equal. As a result, on can state that also changes in market
share of all ﬁrms from diﬀerent layers related to one value chain are also the
same:
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ΔsjM = Δs
j
M−1 = · · · = Δsj1. (5.4)
5.4 Results
In the following we explore the behavior of the model under diﬀerent sce-
narios summarizing our results in ﬁve propositions.
5.4.1 Random Value Chain Matching With No Innovation
We consider two contrasting scenarios: in the ﬁrst one, ﬁrms located on
each market m have their layer–speciﬁc unit cost drawn in a way that each
downstream ﬁrm surpasses the next one by the same amount (e.g., 1, 1.5,
2,. . . ); the ﬁrms integrated in a value chain are matched according to their
ﬁtness: the most ﬁt ﬁrm in market M with the most ﬁt ones in market
M − 1, M − 2 etc. and the other way around. In the second scenario, ﬁrms
having their ﬁtness drawn the same way as in the ﬁrst scenario are matched
randomly — some less ﬁt ﬁrms may be matched with more ﬁt ones (see
Figure 5.1). To focus on the selection dynamics driven by VC relations, we
assign to all the ﬁrms the same initial market share.
Figure 5.1: Firms’ ordered and random matching in value chains
Note: The left panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the right one to random matching.
Let us denote the most ﬁt ﬁrm in each layer with index a, the second most
ﬁt with b and (for the simpliﬁed case of three ﬁrms only) the least ﬁt ﬁrm
with c. Hence, in the ordered matching we have all a ﬁrms linked together
(having total unit cost CaM ), while in the random matching — they are
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randomly distributed in diﬀerent VCs. Therefore, in the ordered matching
scenario (benchmark) the most ﬁt ﬁrm in each layer increases its market
share according to equation (5.1). In particular,
Δsa,tM = s
a,t − sa,t−1 = sa,tM λ(C¯t−1M − Ca,t−1M ). (5.5)
The diﬀerence between (5.5) and (5.1) is that the ‘monopolization’ takes
place for the VC case even faster since
CaM − CbM =caM +
M−1∑
m=1
cam(1 + φ)− cbM −
M−1∑
m=1
cbm(1 + φ) =
=caM − cbM + (1 + φ)
(
M−1∑
m=1
cam −
M−1∑
m=1
cbm
)
> caM − cbM . (5.6)
Figure 5.2: Dynamics with ordered and random matching
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower one to random matching.
M = 3 and N = 3.
In the random matching scenario, in contrast, the monopolization takes
place potentially slower since in each layer ﬁrms with diﬀerent ﬁtness are
matched. Eventually, one of the VCs certainly dominates the other one (as
long as its total unit cost is lower), but this has a (negative) side eﬀect in a
sense of a less ﬁt ﬁrm in one (or more than one layer) dominating with its
market share its counter–partners. To illustrate that, consider Figure 5.2.
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The leftmost charts in the upper and lower panels display the diﬀerences in
the speed of market reallocation for ordered and random matching, respec-
tively; the overall selection dynamics among the three diﬀerent value chains
looks rather similar, except that the ﬁnal winner is diﬀerent. The mid charts
show VC–wise the corresponding dynamics with respect to changes in the
average total unit costs C¯jM .
4 Finally, the rightmost charts in Figure 5.2
show layer–wise the development on each of the three markets. In case of
ordered matching, the dominating VC1 is built up by the dominating and
hence best ﬁrms in each market (layer); these ﬁrms drive down the average
C¯j in each layer to the level of VC1, just in line with replicator dynamics.
Also in the random matching case the average C¯jm in each layer approaches
that of the prevailing VC — in this case VC3. However, there the average
ﬁtness approached in each layer is not necessarily the ‘best’, as it should
happen when the replicator dynamics holds. This is more evident when
looking at the average ﬁtness in layer 1, that increases in the ﬁrst 200 sim-
ulation periods and then just returns to its original level. The integration
into a value chain and the piling up of total unit costs as ﬁtness indicator
produces a dynamics that violates that standard replicator predictions. We
name such violation a regressive development.
Analytically this can be supported in the following way. Remember that
C¯m =
∑N
n=1 s
nCnm and given that in our particular case (through a random
event) the second least ﬁt ﬁrm from the ﬁrst and third layers have been
matched with the most ﬁt ﬁrm in layer two, the total unit cost of that value
chain (VC3 on the bottom mid chart of Figure 5.2) is lowest, and hence, it
is merely a question of time when this value chain and eﬀectively not ﬁttest
ﬁrms in layers one and three will dominate the market (see equation (5.5)).
Hence, results stated above support our hypotheses from Section 5.2 and
allow to formulate the following propositions:
Proposition 1. A ﬁrm with a ﬁtness below the average of the market it is
operating in may dominate it if it is integrated with highly ﬁt partners from
other layers, making the overall ﬁtness of the value chain highest on the ﬁnal
end consumer market (layer M).
4Note that so far no innovation (in the sense of autonomous cost improvements by
ﬁrms) is allowed and only the market share reallocation dynamics, by aﬀecting the market–
weighted average ﬁtness, is driving the aggregate behavior of the model.
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Proposition 2. The average ﬁtness in upstream layers of a value chain can
increase rather than decrease over time if upstream ﬁrms that are less ﬁt
than the average of the market they are operating in are linked to highly ﬁt
partners in downstream layers of the value chain. This dynamics violates the
predictions of the standard replicator dynamics model and can be considered
a regressive development of market selection driven by value chain relations.
Furthermore, we would like to stress that the famous Fisher’s principle,
stating that the change in average ﬁtness, and hence the speed of market
shares reallocation, in a population of competing ﬁrms is proportional to
the variance in ﬁtness, is also valid to this model of ﬁrms matched into
value chains.5 In particular, from Figure 5.2 one can see that the diﬀerence
in aggregate ﬁtness between value chains in case of ordered matching is
higher (since all most ﬁt ﬁrms are matched together against all least ﬁt
ﬁrms), and as a result, average total unit cost improvement and market
share reallocation are taking place much faster. A similar eﬀect can be also
obtained under the following three conditions:
1. larger number of value chain layers M , but only for ordered match-
ing. If one increases the number of layers M from three to, e.g., ten,
then for ordered matching the diﬀerence in aggregate ﬁtness between
the value chains measured by total unit costs CjM will increase and
domination of one value chain over other competitor chains will take
place faster (see Figure 5.13 in the Appendix).6 This is because the
term
(∑M−1
m=1 C
a
m −
∑M−1
m=1 C
b
m
)
is increasing with every new layer of a
value chain. For random matching scenario, in contrast, no diﬀerence
should be obtained, since the value chains are matched randomly and
on average shall contain for diﬀerent M the same portion of more (a)
5This strictly holds for the aggregate ﬁtness (total unit cost) of VCs (since competition
on the end consumer market deﬁnes market share reallocation, ΔC¯ ∼ σ2(Cj)), but also
— indirectly — for each market layer (since the variance in ﬁrm’s ﬁtness on each of the
layers contributes to the respective variance of the value chains. For each single layer this,
however, may not necessarily hold since even though there is a low variance in ﬁtness,
e.g., on layer one, the market share reallocation may still be high and equal in speed for
all layers due to high variance in ﬁtness on other layers.
6Note here that we keep the variance in unit cost ﬁxed in each layer, and increasing
M naturally leads to larger diﬀerences between value chains.
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or less (c) ﬁt agents:
E[Cj ] =
caM
N
+
cbM
N
+
ccM
N
+
M−1∑
m=1
(
cam
N
+
cbm
N
+
ccm
N
)
(1 + φ). (5.7)
Therefore, any diﬀerence in speed of market reallocation between bot-
tom leftmost charts in Figures 5.2-5.13 is due to a random event (par-
ticular random VC matching) and not to any objective criterion.
2. larger proﬁt margin φ since it increases the variance in ﬁtness on the
ﬁnal layer M (see 5.6–5.7) similarly aﬀecting the ordered and random
matching scenarios (Figure 5.14 in the Appendix).
3. larger variance in ﬁtness between ﬁrms on any layer. Increasing the
variance in ﬁtness between ﬁrms on any layer (σm)2 =
∑N
n=1
(
Cnm − C¯
)
in our model, one increases the diﬀerences in expected total unit costs
between the value chains, which automatically leads to faster market
reallocation process. This result holds for both, ordered and random
matching scenarios (Figure 5.15 in the Appendix).
5.4.2 Random Value Chain Matching With Innovation
In this section we extend the model by allowing ﬁrms to endogenously im-
prove their speciﬁc ﬁtness (that is, to reduce their layer–speciﬁc unit costs)
through innovative activities.
The selection dynamics becomes in this way aﬀected by two diﬀerent and
interacting forces acting on two diﬀerent levels: on the one hand, the mar-
ket reallocation based on the VC–dependent ﬁtness (that is, on the total
unit cost variable); on the other hand, ﬁrms’ innovation activities resulting
in performance improvements based on each speciﬁc layer (market). The
distinction of the level of analysis at which selection and innovation operate
is justiﬁed by the fact that it captures the real–world behavior of ﬁrms. In
fact, in each layer ﬁrms compete on the basis of their total cost of production
— that is function also of all the prices payed on each stage for intermediate
goods and supplies — but take eﬀorts in order to improve their own idiosyn-
cratic processes and products. In a nutshell, we include now in the model
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both the between (competition) eﬀect and the within (learning/innovation)
one. Our main contribution is to condition the reallocation on the VC
structure, making the case for the replicator dynamics to work in unex-
pected ways. In what follows, we adopt three alternative speciﬁcations of
cost–reducing innovation process: with constant, decreasing and increasing
returns to scale (henceforth, CRS, DRS and IRS, respectively). Following
Mazzucato (1998), this is done by setting
cj,t+1m = c
j,t
m (1− γ) for constant returns (5.8)
cj,t+1m = c
j,t
m
(
1− γ(1− sj,tm )
)
for decreasing returns (5.9)
cj,t+1m = c
j,t
m
(
1− γsj,tm
)
for increasing returns. (5.10)
All these speciﬁcation of technological progress are function of an exoge-
nous rate of technical improvement (cost reduction) γ reinforced, dampened
or neutrally–aﬀected by ﬁrm size (measured by the market share). The
possibility of cost reduction with constant returns to scale, as expected in
accordance with the standard replicator model, creates the possibility of
more than one value chain staying on the market (see leftmost charts in
Figure 5.3).
Since in the ordered matching, the diﬀerence in total VC unit costs between
the value chains is originally larger, the dominating value chain achieves a
higher market share than in the case of random matching. The fact that the
less ﬁt ﬁrm obtains an advantage through linkages with strong partners in
other layers can also be seen from Figure 5.3. The dynamics of the average
ﬁtness in each layer, as shown in the rightmost charts, tends to be similar
in the ordered and in the random matching. However, its interpretation
becomes less trivial. In fact, the reduction in average total unit costs in
each layer can be driven by two dynamics: if the initially ﬁttest ﬁrm gains
market shares, then average layer ﬁtness decreases. On the other hand, even
if a non–ﬁttest ﬁrm, linked with ﬁtter ﬁrms in other layers, gains market
shares, the average layer’s ﬁtness may decrease instead of decreasing if the
magnitude of cost–reducing innovative activities prevails over the increasing
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weight of the non–ﬁttest ﬁrm’s cost in the calculation of the average layer
ﬁtness. In other words, the within and the between eﬀects may compensate
each other and hide the tendency of market selection to work in the ‘wrong
way’. In order to disentagle these two related dynamics aﬀecting selection,
we turn to a decomposition exercise.
We consider the following decomposition of the change in market weighted
average total unit cost in layer m:
ΔC¯tm =C¯
t
m − C¯t−1m =
∑
i
si,tmC
i,t
m −
∑
i
si,t−1m C
i,t−1
m =
=
∑
i
(
si,tmC
i,t
m − si,t−1m Ci,t−1m
)
=
∑
i
(
(si,t−1m +Δs
i,t
m )(C
i,t−1
m +ΔC
i,t
m )− si,t−1m Ci,t−1m
)
=
=
∑
i
(
si,t−1m C
i,t−1
m + s
i,t−1
m ΔC
i,t
m +Δs
i,t
mC
i,t−1
m +Δs
i,t
mΔC
i,t
m − si,t−1m Ci,t−1m
)
=
=
∑
i
si,t−1m ΔC
i,t
m +
∑
i
Δsi,tmC
i,t−1
m +
∑
i
Δsi,tmΔC
i,t
m + 0 =
=
∑
i
si,t−1m ΔC
i,t
m +
∑
i
Δsi,tmC
i,t−1
m +
∑
i
Δsi,tmΔC
i,t
m +
∑
i
Δsi,tm C¯
i,t−1
m =
=
∑
i
si,t−1m ΔC
i,t
m +
∑
i
Δsi,tm
(
Ci,t−1m − C¯i,t−1m
)
+
∑
i
Δsi,tmΔC
i,t
m . (5.11)
Where any ΔCi,tm = Δ
∑M−1
m=1 c
j
m(1 + φ) + Δc
i,t
m , that is the total unit cost
of a ﬁrm, changes as a result of innovation in all the suppliers’ layers and in
its own speciﬁc production process. The ﬁrst term in equation (5.11) cap-
tures the within eﬀect (the sum over all the individual ﬁrms cost changes
each multiplied by the market share before the change in ﬁtness), the second
term — the between eﬀect (the sum of market share changes weighted by
the deviation of a ﬁrm’s cost level from the market–weighted mean cost level
of all ﬁrms — that is basically the replicator term we are most interested
in), while the third term is the so–called covariance eﬀect (which being neg-
ative indicates that the selection is faster than predicted by the replicator
mechanism alone, while its positive value is associated with slower selec-
tion compared to the replicator dynamics mechanism (Cantner and Kru¨ger,
2008)). The covariance component captures the dynamics returns to scale
introduced by innovative activities. For the standard replicator dynamics
to hold the second term (the between eﬀect) has to be negative for each
market, i.e. each ﬁrm being less productive than market average should
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decrease its market share.
The corresponding decompositions into the within, between and covariance
eﬀects are reported in Figure 5.4. Clearly, while in the ordered matching
the between eﬀect is consistently negative and of comparable magnitude
with the within eﬀect in all three layers, the pattern is very diﬀerent for the
random matching. In particular, the between eﬀect becomes much smaller
in absolute terms and turns to be positive in the layer one, indicating that
in this market a ﬁrm integrated in a strong VC was increasing its market
share although its ﬁtness was below the market average. Hence, from the
decomposition exercise it becomes clear that the replicator dynamics does
not necessarily hold in markets that are vertically related (again supporting
the hypotheses stated earlier).7
Figure 5.3: Dynamics with ordered and random matching and innova-
tion with CRS
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower to random matching.
M = 3, N = 3 and γ = 0.005.
7Note that in the former exercise with no innovation the within and covariance eﬀect
are zero, as there is no change in layer–speciﬁc unit costs over time. The between eﬀects
however are present and also occasionally turn to be positive in one or the other layer in
the random matching scenario.
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Figure 5.4: Decomposition of change in average unit cost with CRS
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower to random matching.
From the left to the right the markets (layers) 1, 2 and 3 are shown.
For decreasing returns to scale: Setting the rate of cost reduction to
be inversely proportional to market share, one obtains a typical pattern of
high volatility of market shares in the initial period. This volatility is (po-
tentially) higher in the ordered matching, where the diﬀerences in ﬁtness
between the value chains are higher (Figure 5.5). The corresponding contri-
bution of the within, between and covariance eﬀects to the change in market
weighted average ﬁtness is presented in Figure 5.6. Again, the between ef-
fect is close to zero and occasionally turns positive in the random matching
scenario, but not in the ordered matching one.
For increasing returns to scale: As it is typical for IRS, a random
event (in terms of slightly lower layer–speciﬁc unit cost at the beginning of
simulation) deﬁnes which of the value chains will dominate the others. Once
ﬁrms start innovating, evolution of unit costs and market shares (at least
for the leading VC) proceeds much faster than in the scenario with constant
returns to scale (Figure 5.7). The process of market monopolization is taking
place again faster in ordered matching as the initial advantage of the ﬁttest
value chain over its counterparts is larger. Similarly, the decomposition in
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the between, within and covariance eﬀects demonstrates that in one of the
layers (here layer one) the between eﬀect deviates from the prediction, being
positive in the ﬁrst three hundred periods (Figure 5.8). One can conclude
that also under IRS a less ﬁt ﬁrm integrated in a superior VC gets an
opportunity to improve its ﬁtness rank to the level of the partners.
Figure 5.5: Dynamics with ordered and random matching and innova-
tion with DRS
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower to random matching.
M = 3, N = 3 and γ = 0.005.
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Figure 5.6: Decomposition of change in average unit cost with DRS
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower to random matching.
From the left to the right the markets (layers) 1, 2 and 3 are shown.
Figure 5.7: Dynamics with ordered and random matching and innova-
tion with IRS
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower to random matching.
M = 3, N = 3 and γ = 0.005.
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Figure 5.8: Decomposition of change in average unit cost with IRS
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower — to random matching.
From the left to the right the markets (layers) 1, 2 and 3 are shown.
5.4.3 Possibility of Partner Switching
While in in the previous two exercises the value chains were assumed to be
ﬁxed due to prohibitively high switching cost, one could relax that assump-
tion.8 Switching costs may involve simply a ﬁxed cost SC, and those ﬁrms
which either compensate this cost by gaining lower price of a new supplier
multiplied by existing orders or gaining more orders requested by new down-
stream partner at the current price, will be willing to switch. We propose to
model SC as percentage parameter: a ﬁrm is willing to switch a partner if
it gains in ﬁtness at least a certain percentage from the current ﬁtness level,
e.g., if the new supplier has a lower price than the old one.
To account for the fact that a ﬁrm can switch only if there is reciprocity
from the other side (potential partner ﬁnds it also attractive to switch to
8The possibility to switch partners in a value chain is less unrealistic than it may
appear at a ﬁrst sight; the whole worldwide structural re–organization or production
around global value chains is the most recent example that vertical relations between
industries are neither completely frictionless nor totally rigid.
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that ﬁrm), we introduce a simple search and acceptance algorithm ensuring
reciprocity. In particular, if a ﬁrm j from a layer m1 in a value chain x
(V Cx) considers to switch its current partner jj from a layer m2 (which
can be either m1 + 1 or m1 − 1) and takes (randomly) ﬁrm jk = jj from a
diﬀerent value chain V Cy into consideration (which in its turn has currently
a partnership with ﬁrm kk from layer m1), then those two ﬁrms, j and jk,
will do the switching iff the ﬁtness of the part of the value chain V Cy (ﬁrm
jj from the layer m2 is currently integrated in) j is switching to is better
than the ﬁtness of the corresponding part of V Cx, while the opposite holds
true for the remaining parts of those two VCs: the ﬁtness of the remaining
part of V Cy jk is integrated to is worse in ﬁtness than the corresponding
part of the V Cx j is integrated to (see Figure 5.9).9
↓switching−point︷ ︸︸ ︷
V Cx =
(
cx1 ... c
j
m | cjjm+1 ... cxxM
)
1×M
V Cy =
(
cy1 ... c
kk
m | cjkm+1 ... cyyM
)
1×M︸ ︷︷ ︸
Figure 5.9: Comparison of ﬁtnesses for switching
Necessarily, the parameter of switching cost SC ∈ [0, 1] becomes a key pa-
rameter, allowing situations from ‘fast and easy’ switching for the two ﬁrms
as if no sunk costs of partnership formation exist (close to frictionless mar-
kets on upstream layers) to no switching (and respectively, no competition)
at all. In what follows, we refer to a simpliﬁed case (M = 3 and N = 3)
and to a more general case (M = 10 and N = 10). Figures are given for the
simpliﬁed case, while the more general case is presented in the Appendix.
As in the ordered switching scenario ﬁttest ﬁrms in the respective layers are
matched together, there is basically no room left for switching. In contrast,
in case of random value chain matching, ﬁrms occasionally switch (no mat-
9We also considered a simpler option of switching a partner when the randomly drawn
candidate has a better ﬁtness than our current partner, i.e. cjjm2 − cjkm2 > SC × cjjm2 and
ckkm1 − cjm1 > SC × ckkm1 . But given that this rule ignores the ﬁtness of other partners
integrated in VCs, such a rule is an oversimpliﬁcation of reality and results in a much
larger number of partner switches. The overall result (in terms of market reallocation and
ﬁtness improvement) is, however, consistent with our preferred acceptance algorithm.
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ter whether innovative activity is present and if yes, in which scenario of
scale returns). The moment of switching can be captured by the ‘zig–zag’
evolution (abrupt shifts) of the total unit costs of the VCs (mid–charts in
all four panels of Figure 5.10) and the corresponding adjustments in the
evolution of VC market shares (leftmost charts of the same ﬁgure).10
As a result, in early periods of simulation (which can be interpreted, for
example, as early stage of an industry life–cycle) one observes a period
of volatility in the market share constellation (for a better visualization
consider a more complex scenario with M = 10 and N = 10, Figure 5.16 in
Appendix). Except for the scenario with DRS, a dominating VC is identiﬁed
relatively quickly, driving other VCs outside the market and killing any
volatility in market shares dynamics. The observation on the DRS scenario
is not surprising, as by design DRS is meant to preserve competition between
actors for a longer period of time.What is more interesting is that the market
share volatility in early periods is more universal and not so sensitive to scale
returns, contrasting to the earlier argument made by Mazzucato (1998) that
high volatility in the early period of life–cycle is to be found only for DRS.
Proposition 3. Considering random matching scenario of ﬁrms vertically
integrated in VCs and allowing them to switch, one observes a high volatility
in market share dynamics at the beginning of the simulation (corresponding
to early period of industry life–cycle) irrespective of the speciﬁc return to
scale mode.
10Since for ordered matching the possibility of switching is never exploited, we do not
include the related charts.
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Figure 5.10: Dynamics with random matching, diﬀerent innovation
scenarios and switching
Note: The upper panel corresponds to no innovation, the next to innovation with CRS, the third
from the top to innovation with DRS, and the bottom one to innovation with IRS. M = 3, N = 3,
SC = 10% and γ = 0.005.
In Figure 5.11 one can ﬁnd the corresponding decompositions into the be-
tween, within and covariance eﬀects for the four scenarios with switching.
Given that the ﬁrms in the VCs are connected via constant quantity rela-
tions (the ﬁrm in the last market competes for an output quantity (market
share) and the upstream ﬁrms serve as suppliers of intermediary products
for this ﬁnal quantity), a switch of a VC partner implies a large change in
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the output quantity producing an instantaneous shock, which takes place
synchronously on all M layers, but with diﬀerent magnitudes.11
Figure 5.11: Decomposition of change in average unit cost for diﬀerent
innovation scenarios and switching
Note: The upper panel corresponds to no innovation, the next to innovation with CRS, the third
from the top to innovation with DRS, and the bottom one to innovation with IRS.
Thus, ﬁrms in the up– or downstream part of VC having switched to a
stronger group of partners experience a sudden increase in their market
11This is due to the diﬀerent deviation of each VC member’s layer–speciﬁc cost level
from the market–weighted mean layer–speciﬁc cost level, see (5.11).
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share. Given that by construction switching requires reciprocity and more
ﬁt ﬁrms tend to build stronger VCs, most of the time ﬁrms gaining addi-
tional market shares have a cost below their market average, which results
in negative shocks. As a result, we observe those negative shocks in the be-
tween eﬀects, depicted by the red line in Figure 5.11. Those shocks clearly
correspond to the moments when switching takes place and are concentrated
in the early periods of simulation (see also Figure 5.17 in the Appendix).
The main reason why the switches (and the corresponding shocks in the
between eﬀect) tend to take place so early is that the cost diﬀerences in
the early phases are stronger (this holds true for all scenarios with inno-
vation) so that the term indicating the deviation from the cost average(
Ci,t−1m − C¯i,t−1m
)
is also stronger. The other reason distinguishing some-
what the simpliﬁed and the the more general cases is that the total number
of possible ‘reconﬁgurations’ of the value chains, though being diﬀerent be-
comes quickly exploited within the ﬁrst few hundred periods of the simula-
tion run.
5.4.4 Summary on the Average Unit Cost Decomposition
To better summarize the diﬀerences between scenarios considered in terms of
the average layer–speciﬁc unit cost decomposition, consider Table 5.1, where
the three eﬀects are averaged over all M (here M = 10 and N = 10 are
taken as default) layers and all T (as before, equal to 1000) periods for 1000
restarts. Comparing the left and right hand side of the table one immediately
notices that the between eﬀect in the random matching is consistently less
strong than in ordered VC matching, which is due to the fact that only
in some markets the replicator dynamics works in the ‘right’ way, while
in others — ﬁrms performing worse than market average but integrated
in stronger VCs improve their market position. Notably, in the random
matching scenario the within eﬀect clearly dominates the between eﬀect in
all but no innovation scenario.12 Such result generally supports our idea
12Within eﬀect directed on ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁtness here is certainly zero. However, since
ﬁrm’s total ﬁtness includes costs of input, the within eﬀect can deviate from zero due to
switching. Note that comparing ordered and random matching in case of no innovation
proves the between eﬀects and the overall improvement to be always higher for the former
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that the clear–cut expectated results of market selection are made more
ambiguous by the learning and innovation processes.13
Looking at the results with the possibility of switching partners within a
value chain (second and third panels in Table 5.1), we observe the following
outcomes for the random matching case:
1. in the scenario with no innovation, the possibility of switching has-
tens ﬁtness improvement. This result is logical as one can recombine
the structures of a VC in a more eﬃcient way than the original ran-
dom structure achieving a higher eﬃciency (compare lower panel of
Figure 5.2 with the upper one in Figure 5.10). Increasing the cost
of switching SC to 50% (making it less frequent so that it takes
place when both sides have very large beneﬁts from changing their
upstream/downstream partners), limits the possibility of VC ‘opti-
mization’ and mitigates its eﬀect on ﬁtness improvement;
2. in the scenarios with innovation (CRS, DRS and IRS), no clear pattern
is found, apart for the role of the between eﬀect that increases for DRS
when SC = 10%. The within eﬀect increases the more costly is the
switch (as it becomes more costly to improve VC competitiveness by
partner switching and one has to rely more on internal improvements
(R&D)).
Summarizing the results above, we can outline a fourth result of our simu-
lation exercise:
Proposition 4. For randomly matched value chains, the possibility of switch-
ing boosts the change in aggregate ﬁtness in the case of no innovation. The
possibility of partner switching and the cost of partner switching aﬀect in dif-
ferent ways the working of the replicator dynamics, with the clearer positive
eﬀect on selection to be found in case of DRS and low switching costs.
case, which is consistent with our prediction.
13Another interesting observation from Table 5.1 is the fact that for DRS both for or-
dered and random VC matching the diﬀerence of the between and the within eﬀects is
largest, which is due to the fact that in this particular returns to scale scenario change in
costs slows down due to increasing market shares and, as a result, one observes more dy-
namics in Δsi,tm
(
Ci,t−1m − C¯i,t−1m
)
than in si,t−1m ΔC
i,t
m . In other words, in case of DRS ﬁrms
reach a smaller progress in cost reduction but exhibit a larger market share reallocation
dynamics, which reﬂects in larger values of the between eﬀect.
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Table 5.1: Results for the average unit cost decomposition over diﬀerent
scenarios
Ordered VC matching Random VC matching
Between Eﬀect Within Eﬀect Covariance Between Eﬀect Within Eﬀect Covariance
W
it
h
o
u
t
S
w
it
ch
in
g No innovation
−0.0136 0 0 −0.0045 0 0
(0.1174) (0) (0) (0.0251) (0) (0)
CRS
−0.0130 −0.0067 0.0001 −0.0038 −0.0157 0.0000
(0.1143) (0.0122) (0.0006) (0.0226) (0.0246) (0.0001)
DRS
−0.0155 −0.0040 0.0000 −0.0051 −0.0143 0.0000
(0.1142) (0.0084) (0.0006) (0.0225) (0.0197) (0.0002)
IRS
−0.0137 −0.0059 −0.0000 −0.0051 −0.0143 −0.0000
(0.1173) (0.0081) (0.0000) (0.0254) (0.0186) (0.0001)
S
w
it
ch
in
g
,S
C
=
1
0
%
No innovation
−0.0136 0 0 −0.0019 0.0089 −0.0167
(0.1174) (0) (0) (0.2726) (0.3088) (0.5540)
CRS
−0.0130 −0.0067 0.0001 −0.0035 −0.0106 −0.0055
(0.1143) (0.0122) (0.0006) (0.1031) (0.1140) (0.2033)
DRS
−0.0155 −0.0040 0.0000 −0.0079 −0.0100 −0.0014
(0.1142) (0.0084) (0.0006) (0.1072) (0.1257) (0.2181)
IRS
−0.0137 −0.0059 −0.0000 −0.0039 −0.0080 −0.0077
(0.1173) (0.0081) (0.0000) (0.1843) (0.1983) (0.3616)
S
w
it
ch
in
g
,S
C
=
5
0
%
No innovation
−0.0136 0 0 −0.0043 0.0004 −0.0008
(0.1174) (0) (0) (0.0781) (0.0890) (0.1575)
CRS
−0.0130 −0.0067 0.0001 −0.0038 −0.0156 −0.0002
(0.1143) (0.0122) (0.0006) (0.0325) (0.0377) (0.0516)
DRS
−0.0155 −0.0040 0.0001 −0.0051 −0.0142 −0.0000
(0.1142) (0.0084) (0.0006) (0.0269) (0.0285) (0.0366)
IRS
−0.0137 −0.0059 −0.0000 −0.0048 −0.0135 −0.0012
(0.1173) (0.0081) (0.0001) (0.0920) (0.0999) (0.1813)
Note: Results are averaged over 1000 restarts for all vertically integrated layers and time periods.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
It is useful at this point to analyze how the between, within and covariance
eﬀects vary between the layers of a value chain. We investigate how the
disproportion in distribution of the between, within and covariance eﬀects
between layers changes with respect to the number of layers considered,
experimenting with the cases featuring three, ﬁve, seven and nine layers
(keeping the number of layers odd to simplify selection of the ‘mid’ layers,
M−1
2 + 1 following the notation used so far). Results of the experiment are
presented in Figure 5.12. In general, the pattern that emerges is one in
which — both in ordered and random matching — the between eﬀect is
stronger for layers being closer to the ﬁnal market. In fact, all three type of
eﬀects are concentrated on the bottom (M) layer, while with the increasing
number of layers the disproportion in the distribution of the eﬀects increases
consistently. This is particularly pronounced for the CRS and DRS cases,
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where the within eﬀects are about ﬁve times bigger (in case of nine layers)
in the bottom layer compared to the upper layer. The fact that diﬀerent
layers are heterogeneously aﬀected by selection dynamics provides a matter
of discussion for policy and in particular for competition policy. Markets
that are linked in value chains require diﬀerent sets of policy measures ac-
cording to the strength of competition and reallocation. At the same time,
knowing the heterogeneous magnitudes of selection dynamics in diﬀerent
layers of the value chains may aﬀect ﬁrms’ strategic decisions regarding the
establishments of speciﬁc value chain linkages.
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Figure 5.12: Dynamics in the decomposition into between and within
eﬀects for diﬀerent number of layers
Note: The upper panel corresponds to no innovation, the next to innovation with CRS, the third
from the top to innovation with DRS, and the bottom one to innovation with IRS. M = 10,
N = 10 and SC = 10%.
This experiment on the distribution of the within, between and covariance
eﬀects with respect to the number and position of the layers of the VC allows
us to derive a ﬁfth result:
Proposition 5. For all the types of value chains, selections aﬀects diﬀerent
layers (markets) in diﬀerent ways. More speciﬁcally, the replicator dynam-
ics intensiﬁes its eﬀect the closer the layer is to the ﬁnal market. The
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heterogeneous distribution of selection eﬀects across value chain’s layers has
implications for competition policy, that may discriminate ﬁrms according to
their position in the value chains, and for ﬁrms’ strategic decision on value
chain positioning.
5.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter we generalize the replicator dynamics model to the case
of ﬁrms vertically related in value chains. For that we conduct a series of
exercises starting from the most simplest one without innovation to three
innovation cases and increasing the complexity stepwise. Doing this, we con-
trast two scenarios with ﬁrms being matched according to the performance
rank of its members (ordered matching scenario) and those being matched
completely randomly. In addition, we introduce a simple rule of partner
switching ensuring reciprocity from both sides. Then, using some analytical
but mainly computational tools, we show how the two scenarios diﬀer.
A result of this exercises is the series of propositions 1-5. First of all, we
demonstrate that ﬁrms being related into VC structure and depending in
their output capacity on their downstream partners do not necessarily in-
crease their market share even though being most eﬃcient that is, having
higher (lower) ﬁtness (total unit cost)) on their respective layers. This is
due to limited competition on upstream markets (ﬁrms being locked–in into
VCs) and aggregate ﬁtness of a VC being crucial for the success on the ﬁnal
consumer market. Relatedly, the very existence of VC relations may induce
violations of the replicator dynamics generating what we called regressive
developments of market selection; in these situations the average ﬁtness may
decrease rather than increase over time.
Furthermore, we show that for ﬁrms in the random VC matching scenario
with the possibility to switch partners produces at the beginning a period
of high market share volatility dynamics in any innovation and returns to
scale setting, which provides a novel and simpler explanation to the evidence
discussed by Mazzucato (1998).
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Next, our two last results indicate that the possibility of partner switching,
coupled with diﬀerent ‘regimes’ of switching costs, hastens the change in ag-
gregate ﬁtness (for randomly matched value chains) and aﬀects with various
intensities selection dynamics. Moreover, market selection aﬀects with dif-
ferent magnitudes diﬀerent value chains layers, with the strongest eﬀect to
be found at the ﬁnal end of the value chain. The latter results may be taken
into consideration to derive policy implications. Although policy makers
have generally limited inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ strategic decisions with regard to
partner selection, certain measures such as increasing market transparency
or ﬁnancial support for ﬁrms at the early period of alliance formation may
come in question to facilitate the ‘survival of the ﬁttest’ principle and to
support productivity improvement on a given market.
Our results call both for more diﬀerentiated analyses of the replicator dy-
namics on diﬀerent stages of value creation14 and possibly diﬀerent competi-
tion policy measures applied for diﬀerent markets. In general, the idea that
market selection may ‘bite’ more in certain layers of a value chain opens two
broad sets of research questions to be analysed; ﬁrst, how policy interven-
tions targeting innovation and competition should focus more on upstream
and downstream bottlenecks rather than just looking at a single layer rate
of innovation and production. Second, how the current reconﬁguration of
production into global value chains (Timmer et al., 2014) has been aﬀected
by (and can aﬀect) the Schumpeterian competition for the market.
For further research we plan to explore at least two main trajectories: First,
to deepen our understanding and identiﬁcation of the VC structures under
which the replicator dynamics is violated and regressive developments take
place; Second, to generalize the exercise allowing ﬁrms to partner more than
one ﬁrm from the same layer at the same time. This should allow to address
network properties of production chains. Furthermore, one can draw better
intuition on diﬀerences between layers in terms of their alliance formation
power and ﬁrm survival.
As a conclusion, by introducing value chains into the mechanism of market
14Thus, while it may be easier to ﬁnd evidence for the replicator model on the down-
stream market, such as stage of assembling and selling compact cars, it is more challenging
for producers of intermediate parts, and one has to take this into account.
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selection, our contribution sheds a light on the multidimentional nature of
the replicator dynamics model; instead of conﬁning it among the theoret-
ically elegant but empirically irrelevant economic tools, we hope this will
induce new attempts to enrich its framework and understand its validity
and explanatory power.
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5.6 Appendix
Figure 5.13: Dynamics with ordered and random matching with ten
layers
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower to random matching.
M = 10 and N = 3.
Figure 5.14: Dynamics with ordered and random matching with alter-
native proﬁt margin
Note: The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower to random matching.
M = 3, N = 3 and φ = 0.5.
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Figure 5.15: Dynamics with ordered and random matching with larger
variance in ﬁtness
Note: While in the default case, as it was mentioned earlier, ﬁrms’ productivity has been drawn
in a way that each ﬁrm surpasses the next one by 0.5 (which was leading to (σmc )
2 ≈ 0.167), here
we increase the step to 1 and, respectively, the(σmc )
2 to ≈ 0.67.
The upper panel corresponds to ordered matching, while the lower to random matching. M = 3
and N = 3.
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Figure 5.16: Dynamics with random matching and switching for diﬀer-
ent innovation scenarios
Note: The upper panel corresponds to no innovation, the next to innovation with CRS, the third
from the top to innovation with DRS, and the bottom one– to innovation with IRS. M = 10,
N = 10 and SC = 10%.
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Figure 5.17: Decomposition of change in average unit cost for diﬀerent
innovation scenarios
Note: The upper panel corresponds to no innovation, the next to innovation with CRS, the third
from the top to innovation with DRS, and the bottom one- to innovation with IRS. M = 10,
N = 10 and SC = 10%.
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Chapter 6
Short– and Long–run Eﬀects
of External Interventions on
Trust
6.1 Introduction
In 1998, Stanford University licenses the PageRank patent to one of its newly
established spinoﬀ companies. This investment initiates the growth of one
of the worlds’ largest high tech company Google that soon revolutionizes
the IT market and changes the whole world economy. Besides public eco-
nomic impact, this investment brings private ﬁnancial beneﬁts to Stanford
that in large extent include voluntary ﬁnancing of research scholarships and
common projects.1
The success of Google explains why governments often intervene aiming to
foster the academic spinoﬀ creation and knowledge commercialization. Typ-
ically, such intervention takes the form of subsidy–policy that comprises two
phases: First, a university receives a subsidy if it invests in the spinoﬀ; Sec-
1For instance, in 2008, Google paid approximately $1,881,400 to Stanford University
out of which only $426,950 payments related to the license of patents. The largest part
of the payments — about $1,246,000 — was donations for scholarships and other philan-
thropic endeavors (Wikinvest.com, 2009).
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ondly, the successful spinoﬀ gains additional ﬁnances from the government.2
Alternative forms of policy such as targeting are rarely considered, though
they may not involve subsidy spending. Moreover, since the policy makers
are often focused on immediate consequences of the interventions, the long
term, post–intervention potential costs are not taken into account. We at-
tempt to ﬁll this gap using controlled laboratory experiment that allows to
make a direct comparison of diﬀerent policies’ eﬃciency in the short– and
in the long–run.
In this experiment we analyze the eﬀects of external intervention such as
subsidy and targeting on the investment decision during the intervention
and after. We employ a multi–period version of the trust (investment) game
(Berg et al., 1995) introducing either the monetary incentives for contribu-
tion or providing a suggestion about the level of investment. The experiment
consists of three blocks with policy intervention in the second one that let
us to consider immediate as well as post–intervention eﬀects.
The study oﬀers three main original contributions: First, we analyze the
eﬀect of non–monetary intervention in form of suggestion on trustful be-
havior; Second, we compare the eﬀect of non–monetary policy to monetary
ones; Third, we provide an analysis of the long–run eﬀects of external inter-
ventions on trust.
More speciﬁcally, we aim to answer the next four questions: i) Do non–
monetary intervention such as suggestion increase investment activity during
and after they are introduced? ii) Is subsidy policy an eﬃcient mean to
foster investment activity in the short–run? iii) Is a low level of investment
required to receive a subsidy detrimental for an investment? iv) Does the
subsidy policy have a negative impact on investment level after the policy
termination?
We ﬁnd that non–monetary policy in form of suggestion increase investment
activity during the intervention and we do not ﬁnd any detrimental eﬀects
afterwards. Subsidy policy, however, does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the level
2See, for example, programs such as ‘Small Business Technology Transfer’ (SBTT) in
the United States and ‘Existenzgru¨ndungen aus der Wissenschaft ’ (EXIST) in Germany.
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of trust in the short– or in the long–run. We associate the ineﬀectiveness of
subsidy policy with two regularities: Subjects show low propensity to follow
this policy and if subjects follow it, they send mostly the lowest amount
required to get the subsidy.
We also ﬁnd indirect evidence that the monetary policy is ineﬀective not
because of the presence of the subsidy itself but rather from the fact that
monetary reward is conditioned on a certain behavior: Subjects that un-
conditionally receive subsidies do not show a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent level of
trustworthiness. We conclude that targeting policy should be considered as
an eﬀective tool to foster investment activity.
The rest of the Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 provides a short
review of the relevant literature. Section 6.3 describes the theoretical frame-
work and the hypotheses. Section 6.4 presents the experimental design. Sec-
tion 6.5 provides the results of the experiment. Section 6.6 then discusses
the ﬁndings, followed by some ﬁnal remarks.
6.2 Related Literature
The Chapter builds on three diﬀerent strands of literature.
First, it relates to studies on interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic mo-
tivation. From the early research of Titmuss (1970) on blood donations
to the experiment of Andreoni (1993) on public good provision, the studies
point out the potential detrimental eﬀects of external interventions on intrin-
sic motivation. For instance, in a meta-analysis of experimental studies on
external incentives and intrinsic motivation, Deci et al. (1999) indicate the
presence of negative eﬀects that are particularly relevant in case of tangible
rewards.
Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012), however, come to a diﬀerent conclusion
evaluating the results of experiments on the relation between incentives and
social preferences. They note that the eﬀect of the incentives depends on the
pre-existing social framework and can be both negative and positive. Gneezy
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et al. (2011) extend this discussion urging to consider both the potential long
term costs and beneﬁts of external interventions.
The second strand of literature looks at the role that trust plays in in-
vestment decisions. Trust is involved in almost every economic transaction
(Arrow, 1972) and, indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that the trust
is crucial for venture capital investments (Bottazzi et al., 2011), mutual in-
vestment decisions (Felli et al., 2010) and has a positive association with the
level of investment across countries (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
The trust (investment) game that we employ in the experiment mirrors the
investment situation with imperfect contracts. The behavior in this game
varies across countries with diﬀerent economic characteristics (Johnson and
Mislin, 2011). Moreover, the trustful behavior in this game correlates with
the diﬀerences in investment propensity between countries — for instance,
Germany and France (Willinger et al., 2003) or Gulf region and Western
countries (Bohnet et al., 2010) — that make it possible to better understand
the variation in the investment rates across nations.
Thirdly, this Chapter is closely related to the studies of the interaction
between external incentives and trustful behavior. Fehr and List (2004) ﬁnd
that the threat to punish increases trustworthiness, but the punishment
crowds out trustworthy behavior. Furthermore, Bohnet et al. (2001) ﬁnd
that the threat of potential contract enforcement crowds in trustworthiness,
although this eﬀect depends on the level of enforcement.
Studying the eﬀect of various incentives on trustful behavior Charness et al.
(2008) allow a third–party not only to punish but to reward as well. The
experimental results corroborate the hypothesis that the threat of punish-
ment increases trust and trustworthiness. However, the eﬀect of reward on
trust is rather ambiguous.
Gachter et al. (2011) further extend the research on the eﬀect of punish-
ment and rewards on trustworthiness. Using a multi–phase gift–exchange
game they ﬁnd that trustworthiness (exerted eﬀort) increases both in the
presence of a ﬁne or a bonus. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of the bonus is much
smaller than the eﬀect of the ﬁne due to the crowding out: Under the bonus
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condition subjects tend to choose an eﬀort not higher than a best–reply
level.
As concerns the eﬀect of non–monetary incentives on trust, Bracht and Fel-
tovich (2009) show that the information about the previous actions of oth-
ers can enhance cooperation.3 Moreover, Berg et al. (1995) provide evidence
that even an aggregated information about previous behavior — information
about the average amount sent by other subjects — can strengthen trust-
ful relations. Similarly, Tho¨ni and Gachter (2012) show that peer–eﬀects
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the trust level and suggest conformism as an
explanation of this phenomenon.
6.3 Theory and Implications
6.3.1 The Game
We use a version of the trust (investment) game. In the original trust game
(Berg et al., 1995), two players interact with each other: player 1 (the
trustor) decides which amount of his initial endowment E to send (to give)
to player 2 (the trustee). The amount sent s is multiplied by a certain factor
m and player 2 receives the multiplied sum. Player 2, in turn, chooses how
much to return R of the amount received. See Figure 6.1 for the structure
of the game and a description of the payoﬀs π of players 1 and 2.
In our version of the investment game, an external intervention is introduced.
This intervention is devised alternatively as either a subsidy or a suggestion.
The subsidy Z is obtained by both players if the contribution of player 1
is greater than or equal to a certain threshold T (ﬁgure 6.2 describes this
version of the game). In the case of suggestion, no subsidy is available but
it is suggested to send not less than a threshold level.
The game is played for several periods and consists of three blocks. Blocks
1 and 3 consist of repetitions of the standard trust game, while in the block
3In addition, Duﬀy and Feltovich (2010) ﬁnd that the recommendation by third–party
aﬀects subjects behavior in the two–player game of Chicken.
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1
0
S
1 : π = E − S
2 : π = E + m · S
2
0
R
m · S
1 : π = E − S + R
2: π = E + m · S − R
E
Figure 6.1: Trust (investment) game
2 the interventions are introduced.
In what follows, we outline a simple model to develop the theoretical pre-
dictions and hypotheses.
6.3.2 Trust under External Incentives
To derive the theoretical predictions, we apply backward induction solving
the model from the second stage. We denote by v the value that trustor
expects to receive back in the second stage of the game. This value is a
function of the amount sent s. Thus, the utility function of the trustor
takes the form:
u = E − c(s) + v(s) + o(s) + I, (6.1)
where E is the player’s endowment, c is the individual’s cost of sending an
amount s, o is the trustor’s other–regarding preferences that depend on s, I
is the eﬀect of external incentives that can take the form of either a subsidy
or a suggestion.
Let’s begin the analysis with the subsidy policy. The subsidy policy is
characterized by a tuple of parameters (Z, T ), indicating the size of the
subsidy and the threshold (minimal) amount that the player must send to
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1
0
S
2
0
R
m · S
1 : π = E − S + R
2 : π = E + m · S − R
S < T
2
0
R
m · S
1 : π = E − S + R + Z
2 : π = E + m · S − R + Z
S ≥ T
E
Figure 6.2: Trust (investment) game with subsidies
obtain this subsidy, respectively.
The subsidy oﬀsets the costs of sending but can aﬀect other-regarding pref-
erences as well. We assume that the other-regarding preferences are aﬀected
by a measure λ < 0.4 Thus, the utility function in the presence of a subsidy
policy is
u = E − c(s) + v(s) + o(s) + 1{s≥T}[Z + λo(s)], (6.2)
where the indicator 1{s≥T} = 1 if s ≥ T and zero otherwise.
The players maximize their utility so that the marginal costs of sending are
equal to the marginal beneﬁts (the values are expressed in discrete terms to
account for the discontinuity in s = T ):
Δc(s)
Δs
=
Δv(s)
Δs
+
Δo(s)
Δs
+
Δ1{s≥T}[Z + λo(s)]
Δs
, (6.3)
To analyze the eﬀect of a subsidy policy, we compare it to the case where
there are no incentives. The subsidy is contingent on the relation between
threshold and amount sent. We therefore consider two states (1) when the
amount to be sent without incentives s0 is lower than the threshold and (2)
4 We make this assumption in line with previous experimental results. See Bowles and
Polania-Reyes (2012) for a discussion.
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when it is higher. We then obtain the following two relations:
Δc(s∗)
Δs
=
⎧⎨
⎩
Δv(s)
Δs +
Δo(s)
Δs +
Z
Δs +
λΔo(s)
Δs if s0 < T
Δv(s)
Δs +
Δo(s)
Δs +
λΔo(s)
Δs if s0 ≥ T
(6.4)
One can easily see that it is beneﬁcial to send more whenever the amount
to be sent without incentives s0 is lower than the threshold T and the direct
eﬀect of the subsidy ZΔs is larger than the crowding out eﬀect of the subsidy
λΔo(s)
Δs . However, if s0 < T , there is no direct subsidy eﬀect (the subsidy is
independent from additional sending, ZΔs = 0), whereas the negative eﬀect
of the subsidy on other–regarding preferences is still present, λΔo(s)Δs < 0.
We are therefore able to formulate the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The amount sent is higher under external monetary incen-
tives than without them if (1) the threshold level is higher than the amount
sent in case without the incentives s0 < T and (2) the direct eﬀect of the
subsidy is larger than the crowding out eﬀect ZΔs +
λΔo(s)
Δs > 0.
Hypothesis 2. The amount sent is lower under external monetary incen-
tives than without them if the threshold level is higher than the amount sent
in case without the incentives s0 < T .
Concerning the targeting policy (suggestion), this policy is also character-
ized by a threshold level T (the suggested minimal level to be sent). The
policy does not use subsidy but players can get an utility complying with
authority (Karakostas and Zizzo, 2012).5 We denote this utility by A (that
is independent from s). Thus, the senders’ utility is
u = E − c(s) + v(s) + o(s) + 1{s≥T}(A), (6.5)
Analyzing the players’ utility function in the case of targeting policy in the
same way as in 6.3 and 6.4, we obtain the next relations:
5In Karakostas and Zizzo (2012), the information communicated by a third-party aﬀects
the behavior of subjects. They attribute this eﬀect to compliance to authority. We suppose
that the suggestion have a similar eﬀect.
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Δc(s∗)
Δs
=
⎧⎨
⎩
Δv(s)
Δs +
Δo(s)
Δs +
A
Δs if s0 < T
Δv(s)
Δs +
Δo(s)
Δs if s0 ≥ T
(6.6)
If the amount sent in case without the incentives is lower than the threshold
s0 < T the players beneﬁt by complying with authority. Therefore, they
can sacriﬁce part of their endowment to follow the suggestion. Nevertheless,
they do not beneﬁt when s0 > T since the utility is independent from the
amount sent.
Hypothesis 3. The amount sent is higher under external non–monetary
incentives than without them if the threshold level is higher than the amount
sent in case without the incentives s0 < T .
Considering the long–run (post–intervention) eﬀect of incentives, we assume
that preferences are endogenous (Bowles, 1998), meaning that the prefer-
ences learned under certain circumstances stay present afterwards. Given
this, we can derive from 6.4 the following relations for the period after the
subsidy policy:
Δc(s∗)
Δs
=
⎧⎨
⎩
Δv(s)
Δs +
Δo(s)
Δs +
λΔo(s)
Δs if s0 < T
Δv(s)
Δs +
Δo(s)
Δs +
λΔo(s)
Δs if s0 ≥ T
(6.7)
There is no direct eﬀect of the subsidy Z since the subsidy policy is ab-
sent now. However, other-regarding preferences are still negatively aﬀected
λΔo(s)
Δs < 0. Thus, we formulate:
Hypothesis 4. The amount sent is lower after experiencing external mon-
etary incentives than without them.
In a similar vein, we derive from 6.5 the next relations for the period after
the targeting policy:
Δc(s∗)
Δs
=
⎧⎨
⎩
Δv(s)
Δs +
Δo(s)
Δs +
A
Δs if s0 < T
Δv(s)
Δs +
Δo(s)
Δs if s0 ≥ T
(6.8)
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When the threshold level is higher than the amount sent in case without
the incentives s0 < T , the players send more after the targeting policy since
they continue to gain utility complying to the authority AΔs > 0.
Hypothesis 5. The amount sent is higher after experiencing external non-
monetary incentives than without them if the threshold level is higher than
the amount sent in case without the incentives s0 < T .
6.3.3 Trustworthiness under External Incentives
We represent the utility function of the trustee in the following way:
u = 1− c(r) + o(r) + I, (6.9)
where c(r) is the trustee’s cost of returning the ratio r = Rm·s , o is the
other regarding preferences that changes with r6, I is the eﬀect of external
intervention (subsidy or suggestion).
We assume that trustees maximize their utility. Since external intervention
depends on the behavior of trustor but not on trustee’s choice we obtain the
following relation:
∂c(r∗)
∂r
=
∂o(r)
∂r
, (6.10)
We know from previous studies (Johnson and Mislin, 2011) that ∂c(r
∗)
∂r∂s =
∂o(r)
∂r∂s > 0. Therefore, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. The trustworthiness rate r is not diﬀerent during and after
the external intervention as compared to the case without it when conditioned
on the amount sent by the trustor s.
6We assume that o is independent from Z since (1) subsidy is provided by a third-party
and (2) both players receive it.
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6.4 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute
of Economics in Jena (Germany) in April 2013. Seven sessions were run, each
of them lasting about 60 minutes and employing 32 experimental subjects.
Experimental subjects were recruited using the ORSEE system (Greiner,
2004), and the experiment was programmed and implemented with the help
of the software z–Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
In the experiment, subjects play various versions of the trust game for 30
periods. In each period, they have an endowment of 100 points, E = 100,
and the sum that they send is tripled, m = 3. The experiment is subdivided
into three blocks of 10 periods each. The ﬁrst and the third blocks are the
same for all subjects — they face the standard trust game. However, in the
second block, subjects play diﬀerent versions of the trust game depending on
the treatment to which they are randomly assigned: SUBLOW, SUBHIGH,
SUGGEST, CONTROL.
In the second block of the SUBLOW treatment, subjects can gain a subsidy
of 20 points, Z = 20, if the amount sent by the trustor exceeds a (low)
threshold of 30, T = 30. See the game ﬂow for the SUBLOW treatment in
Figure 6.3.
Block 1
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Block 2
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 20
T = 30
Block 3
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Figure 6.3: SUBLOW treatment parameters
The SUBHIGH treatment diﬀers from the SUBLOW treatment only in the
threshold level: To gain the subsidy the trustor needs to send not less then
70, T = 70. See Figure 6.4.
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Block 1
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Block 2
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 20
T = 70
Block 3
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Figure 6.4: SUBHIGH treatment parameters
In the SUGGEST treatment — the case of targeting policy — the subsidy
is absent in all blocks, but in block 2 it is suggested by the experimenter
to send not less then 70, so T = 70 (like in SUBHIGH treatment). See
Figure 6.5.
Block 1
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Block 2
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 70
Block 3
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Figure 6.5: SUGGEST treatment parameters
In the CONTROL treatment, the standard trust game, without any subsi-
dies or suggestions, is played for all three blocks. See Figure 6.6.
Block 1
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Block 2
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Block 3
E = 100
m = 3
Z = 0
T = 0
Figure 6.6: CONTROL treatment parameters
We run all four treatments within the same session to control for the session
speciﬁc eﬀects. Subjects are randomly assigned to the treatment and to the
role of the trustor or trustee. They keep their role throughout the whole
experiment and are randomly matched with the other players from the same
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treatment in each period of the experiment (stranger matching design).7
We keep the roles constant and use stranger matching since this design
represents in our view a situation of repeated but independent decisions of
the university to engage in spinoﬀ activities.
The subjects privately receive payments at the end of the experiment ac-
cording to the points they gained in one randomly selected period of the
game.8 Points are converted to Euros at the rate of 10 points for e 0.35.
Including a participation fee of e 2.50, the subjects earned on average e 6.81
with minimum e 2.5 and maximum e 15.5.
Table 6.1 summarizes the descriptive data about the subjects and their
perception of the experiment obtained through the questionnaire given at
the end of each experimental session. We almost perfectly balanced the
sample on gender across the experiment (ratio of female participants: 0.49)
and across sessions (ratio of female participants per session: 0.47, 0.5, 0.5,
0.47, 0.47, 0.53, 0.5). Also, we covered a wide range of age groups from 18 to
48 though most of the participants are relatively young (median age: 23.5).
As concerns the complexity of the experiment, subjects report a fairly high
understanding of instructions with average value of 4.14 on a scale from 1
to 5 and the task diﬃculty as low, with mean 2.27 on a scale from 1 to 10.
Table 6.1: Participants characteristics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Age 224 24.147 4.040 18 48
Share of Females 224 0.491 0.501 0 1
Exp. Interesting 224 2.536 1.249 1 5
Exp. Length 224 2.304 0.871 1 5
Exp. Understandable 224 4.143 1.174 1 5
Task diﬃculty 224 2.268 1.556 1 8
7Though the order of matching is random, it is identical in all four treatments within
the same session. That allows us to reduce the potential eﬀects resulting from the history
of the interaction.
8We use this scheme to avoid the endowment eﬀect. See Azrieli et al. (2012) for the
analysis of incentive schemes in experiments.
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6.5 Results
6.5.1 Descriptive Analysis of Trust and Trustworthiness
To assess subject’s behavior, we ﬁrst compare the average amount sent in
each round across the treatments. Figure 6.7 plots the average amounts sent
over the game. The average amount sent across all the treatments in block
1 is similar to what other studies ﬁnd9 and equals to 40.24. From visual
inspection, no evident diﬀerence in trust level shows up in block 1 across
the four treatments. This is to be expected since subjects play the same
standard trust game in all four treatments.
Now let’s consider block 2. It is clear that subjects send more on average
in the treatment SUGGEST than in any other treatment. This is especially
evident if one compares the treatment SUGGEST (mean: 54.84) to CON-
TROL (mean: 40.22). One can also observe that the curve of the average
amount sent in the treatment with suggestion is always above the similar
curve for the treatments with subsidy. However, the plot does not show
the diﬀerence between the amount sent in treatments with subsidy and the
control treatment.
An interesting pattern emerges after the policy intervention. In block 3 the
average amount sent in the SUGGEST treatment continues to exceed the
corresponding value in the CONTROL treatment until the last periods of
the game. On the contrary, the amount sent in the SUBHIGH treatment
is lower than for CONTROL. The average sending in SUBLOW treatment
is similar to the corresponding value in CONTROL treatment. To have a
more clear picture of the diﬀerence between the treatments, we plot the
cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for each of the three blocks (see
Figure 6.8). The CDFs indicate the proportion of cases where the amount
sent is smaller than a certain value, allowing us to have a detailed view of
the distribution of the amount sent.
Again, we do not see any substantial diﬀerence between treatments in block
9See Johnson and Mislin (2011) for a meta–analysis of experiments based on the trust
games.
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Figure 6.7: Average amount sent by treatment
1 but we observe a very diﬀerent shape of the distributions in block 2. One
can easily identify discontinuities in correspondence to the values of the low
threshold (T = 30) for the treatment SUBLOW, the high threshold (T = 70)
for the treatment SUBHIGH and the suggested amount to be sent (T = 70)
for the treatment SUGGEST. Indeed, we observe changes related to the
policy intervention.
Interestingly, we see very diﬀerent distributions of the amount sent for the
SUBHIGH and SUGGEST treatments if we look at the values that exceed
70 (the high threshold level or the suggested amount to send). While in
the SUGGEST treatment subjects do not simply send the minimal level
suggested, but continue to send higher values as well, in the SUBHIGH
treatment almost no one provide contributions that are higher than that
required for the subsidy. This pattern can be potentially explained by a
crowding out eﬀect and we will discuss it in more details in section 6.5.4.
As concerns block 3, one can observe that the curve of the cumulative dis-
tribution function for SUBHIGH treatment lies below the one of the CON-
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TROL treatment and, on the contrary, the curve for SUGGEST treatment
is above the one of CONTROL treatment.
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Figure 6.8: Cumulative distribution of amount sent by treatment
We conclude the descriptive analysis by discussing how much player 2 (trustee)
sends back. To control for the fact that the amount the subjects can send
back depends on the amount received, we calculate the ratio between the
amount sent back by player 2 and the amount received by the same player
— the trustworthiness rate, r = R3·s . As expected, we do not observe any
diﬀerence in trustworthiness between treatments (see Figure 6.9). The sta-
bility of trustworthiness across the treatments makes it possible to focus on
the aim of our study, the analysis of the eﬀects of external interventions on
trust.
6.5.2 Regression Analysis of Trust and Trustworthiness
To assess signiﬁcance of our results, we provide a regression analysis using
a mixed eﬀects model. We estimate the diﬀerence in amount sent, in the
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Figure 6.9: Average trustworthiness by treatment
trust level across treatments by running the following regression:
s = β0 + βSGSUGGEST + βSLSUBLOW + βSHSUBHIGH + υi + i,t,
(6.11)
where SUGGEST , SUBLOW , SUBHIGH are dummy variables that are
equal to 1 for the corresponding treatments. υi is the random eﬀect for
subject i and i,t is the error term for subject i in period t. The results are
reported in Table 6.2.
In line with expectations and the observed pattern in Figure 6.7 we do not
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence at any conventional level in the ﬁrst ten periods.
The behavior should not diﬀer since there is no intervention in the ﬁrst ten
periods (block 1).
Now let’s consider the eﬀect of the intervention. We observe that subjects
send signiﬁcantly more in the SUGGEST treatment than in the CONTROL
treatment during the ﬁrst 5 periods of block 2 (p = 0.064; βSG = 16.3).
10
10Here and after the p–values for the linear models are obtained using the approximation
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Table 6.2: Determinants of Sending by ﬁve periods — estimation of
equation 6.11
Sent (s)
Periods
1-5 5-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
SUGGEST 1.2 0.6 16.3∗ 12.9 7.5 4.4
(8.4) (10.0) (8.7) (9.7) (10.1) (10.0)
SUBLOW −5.2 −0.2 2.9 6.3 1.5 6.1
(8.4) (10.0) (8.7) (9.7) (10.1) (10.0)
SUBHIGH −9.2 −8.7 4.4 1.5 −6.6 −5.7
(8.4) (10.0) (8.7) (9.7) (10.1) (10.0)
Constant 43.6∗∗∗ 42.2∗∗∗ 42.9∗∗∗ 37.5∗∗∗ 37.3∗∗∗ 32.5∗∗∗
(5.9) (7.1) (6.2) (6.9) (7.2) (7.1)
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,207.3 5,079.5 5,273.9 5,118.6 5,085.7 5,229.5
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 5,233.3 5,105.5 5,299.8 5,144.6 5,111.7 5,255.4
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
During the next 5 periods of block 2 this diﬀerence remains positive, how-
ever, it is no longer signiﬁcant (p = 0.186; βSG = 12.943). Thus, we conclude
that the targeting policy reaches its goal and positively aﬀects the level of
sending though only in the short–run.
As concerns subsidy–policy, its eﬀect is less evident. We cannot reject
the null–hypothesis that the average amount sent in the treatments with
subsidies is the same as the average amount sent in the control treat-
ment neither in the ﬁrst ﬁve periods of block 2 (SUBHIGH: p = 0.742;
βSH = 2.871; SUBLOW: p = 0.616; βSL = 4.386) nor for the next ﬁve peri-
ods (SUBHIGH:p = 0.516; βSH = 6.336; SUBLOW:p = 0.88; βSL = 1.471).
Put it diﬀerently, we do not ﬁnd an evidence that subsidy policy is an eﬀec-
tive mean to promote trustful behavior in the short–run.
In the last ten periods of the game we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant post–
intervention eﬀects. The amount sent in the control treatment does not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀer from the one in any other treatment.11 We observe, however,
that the coeﬃcient associated with the dummy for SUGGEST treatment is
positive and larger than in the ﬁrst periods of the game. This result sug-
of Kenward and Roger (1997).
11We as well do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence comparing each of the treatments to
each other.
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gests that there can be a long-lasting eﬀect of the targeting policy, though
a further investigation is necessary.
We conclude this section by analyzing the evolution of trustworthiness r.
Similarly to (6.11) we estimate the following regression:
r = β0+β
r
SGSUGGEST +β
r
SLSUBLOW +β
r
SHSUBHIGH + s+ υi+ i,t,
(6.12)
In line with the theoretical predictions we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence over the entire experiment in trustworthiness rate between CONTROL,
SUBHIGH, and SUGGEST treatments (see Table 6.7 in appendix 6.7.2).
Trustworthiness is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent during the ﬁrst ﬁve periods (p =
0.047; βrSL = 0.11) and the last ﬁve periods of the game for the SUBLOW
treatment (p = 0.071; βrSL = 0.124). This diﬀerence might be driven by
subjects idiosyncratic characteristics. To avoid interpretation of potentially
biased results in the SUBLOW treatment we focus on the CONTROL, SUB-
HIGH and SUGGEST treatments, though we report the analysis of subjects
behavior in SUBLOW treatment as well.
It is especially interesting to see no diﬀerence in trustworthiness between
the treatments with subsidy and control during the intervention period:
The subjects that are exposed to subsidy still do not signiﬁcantly change
their behavior. It indirectly points out that unconditional subsidy does not
produce crowding out eﬀect.
6.5.3 Net Payoﬀ
Now, we consider how the reaction on diﬀerent policies is reﬂected in the
variation of payoﬀs. Speciﬁcally, we evaluate the eﬀect of each policy on the
average net payoﬀ πN , that is, the diﬀerence between the subject’s payoﬀ
and the value of the subsidy (s)he gets: πN = π − Z. We subtract the
value of a subsidy to account for the costs of the third party. The following
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mixed–eﬀect model is estimated:
πN = β0+β
π
SGSUGGEST+β
π
SLSUBLOW+β
π
SHSUBHIGH+P+υi+i,t,
(6.13)
where SUGGEST , SUBLOW , SUBHIGH are dummy variables that are
equal to 1 for the corresponding treatments. P is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if the player is a trustor and 0 if the player is a trustee. υi is the
random eﬀect for subject i and i,t is the error term for subject i in period
t.
Table 6.3: Determinants of Net Payoﬀ (πN ) by ﬁve periods – estimation
of equation 6.13
Dependent variable:
Net Payoﬀ (πN )
1-5 5-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
SUGGEST 1.2 0.6 16.3∗∗ 12.9∗ 7.5 4.4
(6.7) (6.9) (8.1) (7.7) (8.3) (8.2)
SUBHIGH −5.2 −0.2 2.9 6.3 1.5 6.1
(6.7) (6.9) (8.1) (7.7) (8.3) (8.2)
SUBLOW −9.2 −8.7 4.4 1.5 −6.6 −5.7
(6.7) (6.9) (8.1) (7.7) (8.3) (8.2)
Player (P) −67.8∗∗∗ −59.3∗∗∗ −76.9∗∗∗ −67.9∗∗∗ −69.3∗∗∗ −65.9∗∗∗
(4.7) (4.9) (5.8) (5.4) (5.9) (5.8)
Constant 177.5∗∗∗ 171.9∗∗∗ 181.3∗∗∗ 171.5∗∗∗ 171.9∗∗∗ 165.4∗∗∗
(5.3) (5.4) (6.4) (6.1) (6.6) (6.5)
Observations 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120 1,120
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,329.4 12,493.2 12,459.2 12,474.6 12,581.9 12,671.8
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 12,364.6 12,528.4 12,494.3 12,509.7 12,617.0 12,707.0
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
As expected we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in net payoﬀs during the ﬁrst
ﬁve periods of targeting policy (p = 0.046;βπSG = 16.3) as well as during
the next ﬁve (p = 0.092; βπSG = 12.943). On the contrary, we still do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀect of subsidy policy: The subsidy policy is ineﬀective
both during the ﬁrst ﬁve periods of intervention (SUBHIGH: p = 0.59;
βπSH = 4.386; SUBLOW: p = 0.724; β
π
SL = 2.871 ) and during the next ﬁve
(SUBHIGH: p = 0.848; βπSH = 1.471; SUBLOW: p = 0.409; β
π
SL = 6.336).
To shed light on the reasons of these results, we provide further analysis in
the next subsection.
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6.5.4 Crowding–out
We wish to understand the potential cause of ineﬃciency of subsidy policy.
To do that we focus on the distribution of the amount sent in treatments
with diﬀerent policy but with identical threshold level: SUBHIGH and SUG-
GEST.
At ﬁrst we look at the subject’s general propensity to follow the subsidy
and the targeting policy. We compare the probability that subjects send
an amount that is greater or equal to 70 in the SUBHIGH and SUGGEST
treatments as opposed to CONTROL treatment. We do this by estimating
the following regression:
Pr(s ≥ 70) = L(β0 + β≥SGSUGGEST + β≥SHSUBHIGH + υi), (6.14)
where L is a standard logistic function. The results are reported in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Determinants Pr(s ≥ 70) by ﬁve periods – estimation of
equation 6.14
Pr(s ≥ 70)
Periods
1-5 5-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
SUGGEST 0.8 −0.02 3.0∗∗ 5.4∗∗ 0.8 0.1
(1.6) (1.7) (1.2) (2.3) (1.8) (1.6)
SUBHIGH −0.2 −0.6 2.1∗ 4.2∗∗ −0.4 −0.4
(1.5) (1.8) (1.1) (2.0) (1.8) (1.6)
Constant −6.0∗∗∗ −8.4∗∗∗ −1.9∗∗ −5.3∗∗∗ −8.6∗∗∗ −7.7∗∗∗
(2.0) (1.5) (0.8) (1.6) (1.5) (1.5)
Observations 420 420 420 420 420 420
Akaike Inf. Crit. 338.9 266.9 399.4 329.1 274.3 285.8
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 355.1 283.1 415.6 345.3 290.5 301.9
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Of course, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in propensity to follow the targeting
policy for the ﬁrst ﬁve (p = 0.0118;β≥SG = 3.02; e
β≥SG = 20.56) as well as for
the next ﬁve periods of block 2 (p = 0.0167;β≥SG = 5.4; e
β≥SG = 222.45). It
is, however, more surprising to observe that subjects are signiﬁcantly more
likely to send the required amount during the subsidy policy as well (for
periods 10–15: p = 0.0632;β≥SH = 2.09; e
β≥SH = 8.04; for periods 16–20:
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p = 0.0402;β≥SH = 4.2; e
β≥SH = 67).
This result is puzzling since we do not observe that subjects send signiﬁ-
cantly more on average in the SUBHIGH than in the CONTROL treatment
in block 2 (see Table 6.2 in section 6.5.2).12 We can partially explain it by
the fact that subjects’ propensity to follow the policy tends to be lower in
case of the SUBHIGH than in the SUGGEST treatment (for periods 10–15:
β≥SH = 2.09 < β
≥
SG = 3.02; for periods 16–20: β
≥
SH = 4.2 < β
≥
SG = 5.4).
Thus, given the sample size, we may not capture the eﬀect directly.
The observed pattern points out that subsidy policy signiﬁcantly aﬀects
the subjects’ behavior but it is not that eﬀective as the targeting policy
because subjects avoid to follow the subsidy policy. This explanation can be
partially accepted, however, one needs to compare whether the propensity
to follow the policy is, indeed, signiﬁcantly lower in case of subsidy than in
case of suggestion. To do that we estimate the following regression using
the SUBHIGH treatment as a reference category:
Pr(s ≥ 70) = L(β0 + β≥SGSUGGEST + υi) (6.15)
Nonetheless we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in propensity to follow
the policy between the SUGGEST and SUBHIGH treatments neither in the
ﬁrst ﬁve periods (p = 0.3963;β≥SG = 0.89; e
β≥SG = 2.43) nor in the next ﬁve
periods of block 2 (p = 0.6082;β≥SG = 0.73; e
β≥SG = 2.08). The results are
reported in Table 6.8 in Appendix 6.7.2. It suggests that another source of
ineﬃciency is possibly at work and to ﬁnd it we have a closer look at the
distributions of the sendings in the SUBHIGH and SUGGEST treatments.
We have mentioned in Section 6.5.1 that the distribution of the sendings is
diﬀerent for the SUBHIGH and SUGGEST treatments in block 2. Subjects
tend to send not more than the minimal amount 70 required to get the
subsidy in the SUBHIGH treatment, while in the SUGGEST treatment the
subjects also send more than the minimal level suggested (see Figure 6.8).
If this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant it explains why the eﬀect of the subsidy policy
12As well as given that we do not observe signiﬁcant growth in net payoﬀs during the
subsidy policy (see Table 6.3 in section 6.5.3).
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is not as large as the eﬀect of the targeting policy.
To assess the signiﬁcance of the observed disparity we evaluate whether the
probabilities to send an amount that is greater than 70 or equal to 70 are
diﬀerent between the SUBHIGH and SUGGEST treatments. We estimate
the following two logistic regressions using the SUBHIGH treatment as a
reference category:
Pr(s = 70) = L(β0 + β=SGSUGGEST + υi) (6.16)
Pr(s > 70) = L(β0 + β>SGSUGGEST + υi) (6.17)
We report the results in the Tables 6.5 and 6.6. One can see that the proba-
bility of sending exactly 70 is signiﬁcantly lower in the SUGGEST treatment
as compared to the SUBHIGH treatment during the ﬁrst ﬁve periods of block
2 (p = 0.0234;β=SG = −1.71; eβ
=
SG = 0.18). On the contrary, the probability
of sending more than 70 is signiﬁcantly higher in the SUGGEST treatment
(than in the SUBHIGH treatment) also during the ﬁrst ﬁve periods of block
2 (p = 0.0254;β>SG = 3.44; e
β>SG = 31.29).
Moreover, applying the non–parametric exact paired Wilcoxon test across
aggregated averages over the sessions, we reject the null-hypothesis that
there is no diﬀerence between the SUGGEST and SUBHIGH treatments in
probability to send exactly 70 (p = 0.0076) and more than 70 (p = 0.046)
during the ﬁrst ﬁve periods of block 2.13
That is, in the SUGGEST treatment subjects tend to send more than 70
and, hence, contribute to the growth of the average amount sent. However,
in the SUBHIGH treatment subjects tend to fulﬁll the requirement to get the
subsidy but not to send more, diminishing the average level of contribution.
Thus, the speciﬁc reaction on the subsidy policy decreases its eﬀectiveness.
13We estimate the exact paired Wilcoxon test based on the Shift Algorithm by Streitberg
and Ro¨hmel (1986).
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Table 6.5: Determinants of Pr(s = 70) by ﬁve periods – estimation of
equation 6.16
Pr(s = 70)
Periods
1-5 5-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
SUGGEST 1.1 0.7 −1.7∗∗ −1.7 −0.7 −0.51
(1.2) (1.2) (0.8) (1.6) (1.2) (2.2)
Constant −4.9∗∗∗ −4.9∗∗∗ −1.6∗∗∗ −5.3∗∗ −4.2∗∗∗ −11.6∗∗∗
(1.0) (1.0) (0.5) (2.6) (0.7) (3.5)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280
Akaike Inf. Crit. 46.9 38.8 234.8 186.3 38.8 27.6
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 57.8 49.7 245.7 197.2 49.7 38.5
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 6.6: Determinants of Pr(s > 70), in block 2 – estimation of
equation 6.17
Dependent variable:
Pr(s > 70)
1-5 5-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
SUGGEST 0.7 0.4 3.4∗∗ 2.0 1.2 0.7
(1.1) (1.9) (1.5) (2.0) (1.8) (1.7)
Constant −3.2∗∗∗ −9.3∗∗∗ −3.7∗∗∗ −8.5∗∗∗ −8.8∗∗∗ −8.8∗∗∗
(1.1) (1.7) (1.3) (1.8) (1.7) (1.6)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280
Akaike Inf. Crit. 243.1 158.7 241.1 193.9 187.7 177.5
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 254.0 169.6 252.0 204.8 198.6 188.4
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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6.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, we assess our contribution to the literature. We highlight the
main results and provide a short discussion of the eﬃciency of the studied
external interventions and the mechanisms acting behind them.
Our analysis falls under the broad rubric of studies on incentives and social
preferences. It combines an exercise in decomposition of preferences to un-
cover sources of crowding–out with an attempt to account for the long-run
detrimental eﬀects of incentives.
We develop a model that predicts that the policy that involves monetary
incentives can be ineﬀective since this type of incentives crowd-out other
regarding preferences if subjects comply with the policy. We assume that
preferences are endogenous (Bowles, 1998) — the preference once learned
stays unchanged for some time. Therefore, the monetary–based policy that
eradicates social preferences negatively aﬀects the subjects’ pro–social be-
havior after the intervention. On the contrary, the policy that uses non-
monetary incentives is eﬀective in the short-run and does not have detri-
mental consequences in the long-run because it does not inﬂuence other
regarding preferences.
The experimental results, indeed, show that the non–monetary incentives
are an eﬀective tool to foster pro-social behavior, namely, trustful behavior
in the short–run, while there is no evidence of detrimental eﬀects of this
type of incentives in the long-run. In turn, monetary incentives do not
show their eﬀectiveness in the short– as well as in the long–run though the
policy signiﬁcantly aﬀects the subjects’ behavior during the intervention. To
interpret this fact we turn to the taxonomy of incentive eﬀects on preferences
provided by Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012).
According to their taxonomy, there are three mechanisms linking interven-
tions and preferences: ‘bad news’ — incentives provide information about
interests of a principal; ‘control aversion’ — incentives jeopardize self deter-
mination; ‘moral disengagement’ — incentives activate a switch from pro–
social to own payoﬀ maximization mode of thought. We do not consider here
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the ﬁrst one (‘bad news’) since the incentives are provided by the third–party
and, hence, should not aﬀect the subjects’ behavior. However, the last two
— ‘control aversion’ and ‘moral disengagement’ — can explain the speciﬁc
pattern of subjects reaction on the subsidy policy.
Subjects react to the monetary policy but i) their propensity to follow this
policy is low and ii) those who follow the policy send the minimal amount
required to get the subsidy. We attribute the low propensity to follow the
policy to the mechanism of ‘control aversion’: Subjects perceive the policy
as controlling and avoid following it. The ‘moral disengagement’ can explain
the fact that subjects send mostly the minimal amount: They switch their
way of thinking to own–payoﬀ maximization, thence, if they decide to follow
the policy they simply minimize their costs by sending the minimal amount.
As concerns the post–intervention eﬀect of the policies, despite the fact
that we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between treatments after policy
interventions, we observe that subjects tend to send a high amount after
the targeting policy. This is an interesting observation since it suggests that
a targeting policy can have a potential long–lasting eﬀect. Nevertheless,
further research is needed to test this observation.
It is also interesting to observe that the trustworthiness rate is not aﬀected
during the intervention as well as it does not change afterwards. On the one
hand, this goes in line with theoretical expectations — the trustee’s behavior
should remain the same since the policies incentivize only trustors. On the
other hand, given that trustees also receive subsidies, this fact suggests that
the presence of a subsidy is insuﬃcient to crowd out other-regarding prefer-
ences. It is rather likely that the crowding–out occurs when the monetary
incentives are conditioned on a certain behavior.
To sum up and conclude, in this study, we aim to understand how subsidy
and targeting policies aﬀect an investment decision. We employ a multi–
period trust (investment) game where we introduce an external intervention
either in form of subsidy or suggestion and analyze the level of trustful
behavior during and after the intervention.
We ﬁnd that targeting is an eﬀective instrument to promote trustful behav-
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ior whereas subsidy policy is not eﬀective both in the short– and long–run:
Subjects follow the targeting policy and send even more then minimal level
requested, while under the subsidy policy they exhibit low propensity to
follow the policy and send mostly the minimal amount needed to get the
subsidy. We therefore recommend the targeting policy as one of the instru-
ments to foster trustful behavior.
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6.7 Appendix
6.7.1 Instructions
Player 1, Trustor
Welcome to the experiment!
Thank you very much for participating. We hope that you feel comfortable.
We ask you to remain quiet and do not communicate with any other player.
Please understand that in case you communicate with other players we will
have to exclude you from the experiment without payment. If you have any
questions please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to
you.
We guarantee that all information collected during the experiment undergoes
a strict anonymity process. It ensures anonymity among players and that
you stay anonymous to the experimenter.
During the experiment you will see information about other players. We
have ensured that you cannot identify them personally as well as they cannot
identify you.
The experiment is on decision-making. Your earnings will depend partly on
your decisions and partly on the decisions of other players. You will have
to make one decision in each round of a simple game which consists of 30
rounds.
In each round of the game the earnings will be calculated in points. At the
end of the experiment one round will be randomly chosen. The points
gained during this round will be converted to Euros with the following rate:
10 points = 0.35 Euro
In addition, you will receive 2.50 euro as a compensation for showing up on
time. The game you will play is divided into three blocks (A, B and C),
6.7 Appendix 171
with 10 rounds in each block.
In each round of any block you will be matched with another randomly
chosen player among other participants. There will be a new random pair
each round.
The information about your previous decisions will not be revealed to other
players at any round of the experiment.
In each round you and the other player both will be endowed with 100 points.
You can send any amount to the other player. Each point you send
is tripled. The other player will decide how many points to send back to
you and how many points to keep (from zero to the tripled sum you sent).
[For the SUBHIGH and SUBLOW treatment we add the following para-
graph]
Also, in some blocks if you send not less than a certain minimum, you
and the other player will receive an additional payment. The amount of
the additional payment and the required minimum sent to receive it will
be speciﬁed in the beginning of each block.
[For the SUGGEST treatment we add the following paragraph]
In some blocks it will be suggested to send not less than a certain amount.
The amount suggested is speciﬁed at the beginning of each block.
Player 2, Trustee
Welcome to the experiment!
Thank you very much for participating. We hope that you feel comfortable.
We ask you to remain quiet and do not communicate with any other player.
Please understand that in case you communicate with other players we will
have to exclude you from the experiment without payment. If you have any
questions please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to
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you.
We guarantee that all information collected during the experiment undergoes
a strict anonymity process. It ensures anonymity among players and that
you stay anonymous to the experimenter.
During the experiment you will see information about other players. We
have ensured that you cannot identify them personally as well as they cannot
identify you.
The experiment is on decision-making. Your earnings will depend partly on
your decisions and partly on the decisions of other players. You will have
to make one decision in each round of a simple game which consists of 30
rounds.
In each round of the game the earnings will be calculated in points. At the
end of the experiment one round will be randomly chosen. The points
gained during this round will be converted to Euros with the following rate:
10 points = 0.35 Euro
In addition, you will receive 2.50 euro as a compensation for showing up on
time. The game you will play is divided into three blocks (A, B and C),
with 10 rounds in each block.
In each round of any block you will be matched with another randomly
chosen player among other participants. There will be a new random pair
each round.
The information about your previous decisions will not be revealed to other
players at any round of the experiment.
In each round you and the other player both will be endowed with 100
points. You will receive some amount of points from the other player. Each
point sent by the other player is tripled. You can decide how many
points to send back to him and how many points to keep (from zero to the
tripled sum of points the other player sent).
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[For the SUBHIGH and SUBLOW treatment we add the following para-
graph.]
Also, in some blocks if the other player sends not less than a certain
minimum, you and the other player will receive an additional payment.
The amount of the additional payment and the required minimum sent
to receive it will be speciﬁed in the beginning of each block.
[For the SUGGEST treatment we add the following paragraph]
In some blocks, it will be suggested to other player to send not less than a
certain amount. The amount suggested is speciﬁed at the beginning of each
block.
6.7.2 Additional Estimations
Trustworthiness
Table 6.7: Determinants of trustworthiness by ﬁve periods – estimation
of equation 6.12
Trustworthiness (r)
Periods
1-5 5-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
SUGGEST −0.004 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
SUBLOW 0.1∗∗ 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
SUBHIGH −0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Sent (s) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.3∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.1) (0.1) (0.05) (0.1)
Observations 459 405 455 398 371 312
Log Likelihood 57.4 51.6 102.8 94.6 64.1 31.6
Akaike Inf. Crit. −100.7 −89.1 −191.7 −175.2 −114.3 −49.1
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −71.8 −61.1 −162.8 −147.3 −86.9 −22.9
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6.8: Determinants Pr(s ≥ 70) by ﬁve periods – estimation of
equation 6.15
Pr(s ≥ 70)
Periods
1-5 5-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30
SUGGEST 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.2 0.5
(1.1) (1.8) (1.0) (1.4) (1.8) (1.7)
Constant −3.3∗∗∗ −9.0∗∗∗ 0.2 −0.7 −9.1∗∗∗ −8.6∗∗∗
(1.1) (1.7) (0.7) (1.0) (1.7) (1.6)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280
Akaike Inf. Crit. 248.9 172.1 280.0 250.6 185.4 180.9
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 259.8 183.0 290.9 261.5 196.3 191.8
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
“(The plants and animals of the Galapagos diﬀer radically among islands
that have) the same geological nature, the same height, climate, etc (. . . ).
This long appeared to me a great diﬃculty, but it arises in chief part from
the deeply seated error of considering the physical conditions of a country as
the most important for its inhabitants; whereas it cannot, I think, be disputed
that the nature of the other inhabitants, with which each has to compete, is at
least as important, and generally a far more important element of success.”
— Charles Darwin, cited in Hoﬀ (2000)
7.1 General Remarks
This Doctoral Thesis hopes to be a sort of ‘Voyage of the Beagle’ through the
factors that shape the making of some peculiar ‘irregularities’ of the world
of technological change. The port of departure for this voyage has been a
questioning of the common understanding of General Purpose Technologies,
aimed at both redirecting and extending their theoretical reach. In the open
sea (of knowledge), the chosen course to investigate those irregularities has
been that to focus the analysis on the nature of — and interaction between
— the many (economic and technological) domains involved in determining
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a technology pervasiveness. A search for GPTs has hence turned into an
exploration of linked markets.
As Darwin’s voyage lasted much more than initially programmed, also the
voyage contained in this Thesis touched conceptual locations placed beyond
the narrow domain of GPTs. The strength and direction of competitive
selection when markets are integrated in value chains, and the purposeful
intervention to foster the commercialization of academic knowledge through
the creation of spinoﬀ ventures, all represent network phenomena in which
incentives, constraints, and payoﬀs are not independent of what happens in
linked contexts.
Taking stock, the claim of the Thesis is that the multilevel dimension of
market interactions should be (or should return, depending on the history
of economic thought and reference community favoured by the reader) at
the core of economic analysis, because it is looking at non–trivial feedbacks
and cascades of eﬀects that unexpected results may be found. The theory
of GPTs, and a more general account of economic and technological dynam-
ics in linked markets, appear from this perspective as pieces in the bigger
jigsaw puzzle of economic evolution, where the economy is a complex sys-
tem moving on the tracks of techno–economic paradigms and technological
trajectories.
As a conclusion serves to summarize the successes and failures of any enter-
prise, in what follows the main ﬁndings and the novelty of the Thesis are
highlighted. Also, the possible implications for policy that can be derived
from the studies contained in the Thesis are emphasized, and the limitations
and some ways ahead for the research perspective developed in the previous
pages are indicated.
7.2 Main Findings
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 the Thesis suggests a viable path to extend the eco-
nomic approach to GPTs, that i) incorporates theoretical building blocks
from related strands of literature, ii) repositions the study of pervasive tech-
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nological change within the realm of phenomena of interest for Industrial
Dynamics, and iii) oﬀers a simple framework to understand the factors de-
termining potential GPTs’ success or the failure to become pervasive and
prevalent.
The general ﬁndings can be summarized recalling the three statements that,
at the end of each section of Chapter 3, describe the step–by–step transition
from the theory of GPTs to a theory of technological multipliers:
1. GPTs, meant as a networked phenomenon, can be considered a special
case of spillovers, namely inter–industry (vertical) spillovers involving
enabling technologies and technological complementarity;
2. in its dynamics, a GPT cluster is a special case of unbalanced develop-
ment, with a peculiar structure of interaction, and focused on cascades
of eﬀects on innovative activities rather than economic performance.
The enabling nature of technological complementarities and spillovers,
the feedbacks taking place within the GPT cluster, and the heteroge-
neous distribution of responses to these inducement eﬀects can result
in a synchronous or in an asynchronous change;
3. an extended theory of GPTs and GPT clusters is in a more general way
a theory of technological multipliers, in which an enabling technology
aﬀects the sectors to which it is linked, and it is aﬀected by them. The
net eﬀect resulting from positive feedbacks, driven by economic and
technological complementarity, and negative feedbacks, determines if
the technology or the sector under consideration succeeds to gain per-
vasiveness, to establish a GPT cluster and eventually to inﬂuence the
direction of an economy’s evolution.
Additionally, the ‘Ricardian’ model of technological specialization described
in Chapter 4 oﬀers a set of insights regarding the outcomes of an upstream
competition for a downstream market, where one (or more) potential new
GPT–like technologies strive to acquire purposes. New upstream technolo-
gies can succeed in ‘conquering’ the whole downstream market, can fail and
be conﬁned in niches, or can share the downstream market with the estab-
lished GPT on a rather equal standing. In general terms, the lesson to be
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taken home from Chapter 4 is that, in the context of linked markets, the
array of scenarios that the process of purposes acquisition can produce is
rather wide; economic agents can act on diﬀerent ‘levers’ to inﬂuence the
results of the competition for the (downstream) market.
In Chapter 5 the Thesis derives a set of theoretical results from the analyt-
ical and computational analysis of the replicator dynamics in value chains.
The propositions outlined in the Chapter suggest that ﬁrms integrated into
value chains do not necessarily increase (decrease) their market share even
though they have a higher (lower) ﬁtness than the reference population. The
very existence of value chains relations may induce violations of the replica-
tor dynamics, that we labeled ‘regressive developments’ of market selection.
Additional results deal with the intensity, rather than with the direction, of
market selection. In fact, the Chapter shows that, in the scenario with ﬁrms
randomly matched and with the possibility to switch partners between value
chains, competition generates high market shares volatility in every inno-
vation and returns to scale setting. This result raises new questions about
our understanding of market turbulence and industry life cycle patterns.
Another ﬁnding of the Chapter has to do with the diﬀerential strength with
which market selection shapes ﬁrms’ success and failure across value chains
layers; this opens room for the deﬁnition of a set of competition policies that
are tailored for the particular market of intervention.
In Chapter 6 the Thesis oﬀers both a theoretical model and an experimental
analysis that explain the short– and long–run dynamics of a trust relation-
ship between agents when an external intervention is introduced. More
speciﬁcally, the agents are universities and academic spinoﬀs, and the study
aims at capturing which type of interventions — a subsidy, or a targeting
policy — is more eﬀective, or less harmful in case the displacement of intrin-
sic motivations (crowding–out) occurs. Theoretically, the Chapter ﬁnds that
the interaction of other–regarding preferences and compliance to authority
are among the elements that can explain the better performance of target-
ing (suggestions) policies. Empirically, the main ﬁnding is that monetary
incentives (subsidies) do not signiﬁcantly increase investment levels, while
the targeting policy in which authorities suggest a desired behavior increases
the investment activity during the intervention and does not have long–run
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(post–intervention) detrimental eﬀects. Experimental subjects tend not to
follow the subsidy policy; if they do, they send mostly the lowest amount
required to obtain the subsidy.
In sum, the ﬁndings of the Thesis range from conceptual contributions to a
generalized and more consistent deﬁnition of GPTs and technological mul-
tipliers, to analytical contributions on how the vertical relation among mar-
kets aﬀects outcomes such as technological pervasiveness (acquired purposes)
and selection (replicator dynamics), and ﬁnally to an experimental contri-
bution to the design of policies that can strengthen the trustful ties between
Academia and Industry.
7.3 Novelty
The main novelty of the Thesis is the micro– and mesoeconomic approach to
GPTs. This perspective suggests the possibility to study GPTs as networked
and complex phenomena. The generalization of the modeling and empirical
analysis of GPTs to a broader research agenda dedicated to the Microeco-
nomics of heterogeneous technical change and linked markets is a ﬁrst step
towards a novel interpretation of the process of generic technological change.
The broader objective of the original theoretical analysis presented in the
Thesis is to build a bridge between two distinct research traditions: a
short term Economics of Innovation, and a long term study of Long Waves,
techno–economic paradigms, and technological revolutions. Both the tradi-
tions encountered limitations: on the one hand, the microeconomic study of
innovation is still short of contributions capable to model and identify the
micro–to–macro causal channels connecting the ‘locus of learning’, meaning
the ﬁrm, to the macroeconomic implications of restless creative destruction.
On the other hand, the study of Long Waves is caught between the limited
heuristic power of theories that are mainly historical in kind, and the dif-
ﬁculties to ﬁnd the unbiased ‘ﬁltering’ method to identify periodic cyclical
patterns in the evolution of economies. The nature of Long Waves, divided
between being just a consequences of Mankind’s pattern–seeking need, a
statistical outcome at the edge of Chaos, or a phenomenon caused by inno-
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vation, is yet to be fully uncovered.
The novelty of the Thesis lies also in the fact that it provides the ﬁrst at-
tempt to generalize the replicator dynamics by incorporating in the model
the vertical relations between markets linked in value chains. In a historical
phase in which the functioning of the world economy revolves around the or-
ganization of production in global value chains, it is of utmost importance to
understand if, and how, market selection takes place and if the competition
for the market aﬀects — and is aﬀected by — the very existence of value
chains linkages. Hence, a multilevel view of market dynamics is deﬁnitely a
major novelty of the Thesis.
Finally, the Thesis provides a novel and fresh contribution to our under-
standing of the eﬀects of given Science and Innovation policies. Both the
methodology — an experimental study with an original design — and the
research questions, that focus on the assessment of diﬀerent policy schemes
and their long–run (post–intervention) consequences, represent an original
contribution to the literature.
7.4 Policy Implications
Concerning the policy dimension, the Thesis oﬀers insights on several di-
mensions.
Firstly, concerning GPTs and technological competition in vertically–linked
markets, a case is made for the evaluation of diﬀerent policy mixes, meant
as multiple levers capable to aﬀect the ‘jump’ between diﬀerent equilibria,
that, in turn, are the possible outcomes of the competition between upstream
technologies striving to acquire generality of purpose.
Secondly, for what regards market selection when value chain relations are
taken into account, the implications for policy are mostly related to the fact
that the ‘survival of the ﬁttest’ principle acts with heterogeneous strengths
across the layers of the value chains. This result supports the view that
one–size–ﬁts–all policies may fall short of eﬀectiveness, given that they do
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not account for the variety of market dynamics.
Thirdly, regarding the study of external interventions and trust between uni-
versities and academic spinoﬀs, the relevant policy implication has to do with
the choice of the appropriate schemes capable to foster, rather than hinder,
knowledge commercialization. The Chapter suggests that non–monetary
policies such as targeting ones may exploit authority–related mechanisms
and produce better results during and after the period of intervention.
7.5 Limitations and Research Ahead
This Thesis is a contribution to the economic understanding of technologi-
cal change, innovation, industry dynamics, market selection and knowledge
commercialization when diﬀerent levels of analysis are interdependent. The
research eﬀort was certainly not exempt from trade–oﬀs. In the design of
the Thesis, and during its progressive construction, alternative paths and
logical chains of analysis have been pursued or left aside. Trade–oﬀs, one of
the essences of economic reasoning, apply to research as well. In this sense,
the limitations of the Thesis are all those research routes that have not been
yet crossed, the possible extensions not yet modeled, and the robustness
checks not yet tested.
In particular, the empirical analysis of GPTs and technological multipli-
ers has been introduced, but not fully developed. An exhaustive theory of
technology–induced feedbacks requires also to provide a sound methodolog-
ical framework in order to test for the empirical relevance of the theoretical
insights developed in the Thesis.
Another limitation has to do with the lack of a more in–deep study of some of
the phenomena touched upon in the Thesis. For example, a through exten-
sion of the Ricardian model of Chapter 4 — one incorporating also features
taken from complex networks and percolation models — may shed some ad-
ditional light on the unbalanced process of purposes acquisition. The same
remark holds for the replicator dynamics in value chains, where a deeper ex-
ploration of the conditions under which regressive developments of market
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selection occur (and the role vertical relations plays in that) could oﬀer fur-
ther insights on the microeconomic dynamics underlying the heterogeneous
strength of market shares reallocation across markets.
The limitations of the Thesis also help to draw the lines to identify some
potential ways ahead for the study of linked markets. In fact, several paths to
extend the studies proposed in the Thesis can be outlined. If innovations are
‘like troubles’, in the sense that they ‘do not come singly, but in battalions’
(Freeman, 2004, p. 550), the same holds for research questions.
A ﬁrst extension has to do with the arguments developed in Chapter 3:
combining input–output tables and innovation input (R&D) data, a set of
indicators of upstream and downstream pervasiveness for industries or entire
ﬁlie`res can be derived, and their dynamics tracked over time. In a sense,
this approach would feature an empirical application of Industrial Dynam-
ics methodologies and methods (for example, Markov transition matrices
and mobility analysis could be used in this context) to the generalized and
networked conceptualization of GPTs provided in the Thesis. The aim of
this extension would be to measure the technological ‘power of pull’ of given
industries, technologies, and ﬁlie`res in order to inform policy–makers of the
magnitude and direction of technological multiplier eﬀects.
A second extension goes in the direction of the analysis developed in Chap-
ters 3 and 6, namely to identify or design the best policies for industrial
technological upgrading. In this sense, the ‘hirschmanian’ perspective on
the importance of bottlenecks and linkages to generate between–industries
inducements could be pushed forward by exploring the eﬀects of purposeful
creation and removal of economic and technological bottlenecks. An exten-
sion along this lines may provide additional useful evidence on the stability
and resilience of economic linkages, to be used in the setup of industrial poli-
cies at the regional, national and also supranational (for example, European)
level. A speciﬁc set of research questions in this context could point at the
eﬀect of innovative public procurement when multiple potential GPTs com-
pete for the downstream market and strive for pervasiveness, as suggested
in Chapter 4 of the Thesis.
A Third extension builds on the contribution of Chapter 5 on market selec-
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tion. Exceptions to the expected behavior of the replicator dynamics can
depend on the structure of value chains, but also on other factors that are
well–known in Economics of Innovation; for example, policy interventions,
and cooperations among ﬁrms. In a nutshell, the theory of market selection
can incorporate further dimensions of analysis in order to become a more
general theory of market interactions.
Eventually, a fourth extension looks at the modeling side, and refers to the
contribution of Chapter 4. Firstly, the model of vertically–related markets
can be extended to take into account the patterns of within–markets ﬁrms
behaviors in term of entry and exit. A way forward in this sense is to es-
tablish a connection between models of Industry Life Cycles and models
featuring linked markets, in order to begin an investigation of multilevel In-
dustrial Dynamics. Secondly, a theoretical contribution aimed at extending
our understanding of technological change and linked markets could build
a bridge with the literature on platforms, two– and multi–sided markets,
given that also in this literature the general phenomenon under scrutiny
has to do with the incentives and constraints shaping the dynamics of ‘star
economies’. In this case, the focus would be on the dynamic determina-
tion of market structures at diﬀerent, linked levels. Indeed, to combine the
building blocks of multi–sided markets and GPTs (and also those of the
most recent contributions on dynamic oligopoly theory) could represent a
step ahead towards a study of interdependent market structures.
To conclude, this Doctoral Thesis has highlighted the potential generality
of an economic analysis of markets that are linked by technological and
economic ties. It is a partial account of an object of analysis that is indeed
relevant, but also very broad. However, to the author this partial account
seems to be on the right track for what concerns the direction to be followed
in order to better understand the evolution of markets and societies. In fact,
we share the remark of Lord Keynes: it is better to be partially right, than
completely wrong.
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